John Hussman

John Hussman

Last Update: 08-11-2016

Number of Stocks: 183
Number of New Stocks: 29

Total Value: $654 Mil
Q/Q Turnover: 18%

Countries: USA
Details: Top Buys | Top Sales | Top Holdings  Embed:

John Hussman Watch

  • John Hussman Buys Infosys, Southern

    John Hussman (Trades, Portfolio) is the president and principal shareholder of Hussman Strategic Advisors, the investment advisory firm that manages the Hussman Funds. During the second quarter he bought shares in the following stocks.


    The investor raised his stake in Infosys Ltd. ADR (INFY) by 7,042.86% with an impact of 1.34% on the portfolio.

      


  • John Hussman: Impermanence and Full Cycle Thinking

    My friend and teacher Thich Nhat Hanh once said, “It is not impermanence that makes us suffer. What makes us suffer is wanting things to be permanent when they are not. Wilting flowers do not cause suffering; it is the unrealistic desire that flowers not wilt that causes suffering.”


    We observe an extremely aged and overvalued bull market here; where the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, despite the exuberance of “record highs,” is just 2% above its May 2015 peak; where the broad NYSE Composite remains below its June 2014 level; where international markets, despite a recent short-covering panic on post-Brexit monetary enthusiasm, remain in a larger pattern of retreat; where valuation measures most reliably correlated with actual subsequent outcomes in market cycles across history now imply S&P 500 nominal total returns averaging less than 1.5% annually over the coming 12-year period; where a retreat to even the richest valuations observed by the completion of any market cycle in the past century (even cycles where interest rates were depressed) would imply a market loss of at least 40% over the completion of the current cycle; where market internals remain mixed despite positive whipsaws in various trend-following components; where, as a minor technical point, any serious reading of Hamilton and Rhea would still classify stocks in an ongoing Dow Theory bear market that began more than a year ago; and where the S&P 500 has pushed to the most extreme “overvalued, overbought, overbullish” syndrome we identify, in an environment where cyclical momentum has rolled over. Whether one is bullish or bearish, if one recognizes that current extremes are impermanent, one will ultimately suffer less.

      


  • Speculative Extremes and Historically Informed Optimism- John Hussman

    There’s a field in one of our data sets that rarely sees much play, being driven primarily by only the most extreme combination of overvaluation, overbullish sentiment, and overbought conditions we’ve identified across history. It’s one of a variety of such syndromes we track, and I’ve simply labeled it “Bubble,” because with a single exception, this extreme variant has only emerged just before the worst market collapses in the past century. Prior to the advance of recent years, the list of these instances was: August 1929, the week of the market peak; August 1972, after which the S&P 500 would advance about 7% by year-end, and then drop by half; August 1987, the week of the market peak; March 2000, the week of the market peak; and July 2007, within a few points of the final peak in the S&P 500, with a secondary signal in October 2007, the week of that final market peak.


    The advancing segment of the current market cycle was different in its response to historic speculative extremes. Air-pockets, panics and crashes had regularly followed these and lesser “overvalued, overbought, overbullish” extremes in every previous market cycle, and our reliance on that fact became our Achilles Heel during the advancing half of this one. In an experiment that will ultimately have disastrous consequences, the Federal Reserve’s policy of quantitative easing intentionally encouraged yield-seeking speculation in this cycle far beyond the point where these warning signals emerged.

      


  • Scrounging Through The Dumpster - John Hussman

    From a long-term and full-cycle perspective, the most reliable valuation measures we follow - those with the strongest correlation with actual subsequent stock market returns across history - are consistent with roughly zero S&P 500 nominal total returns on a 10-12 year horizon, and the likelihood of an interim market loss of about 40-55% over the completion of the current cycle. As I noted last week, however, our near-term outlook is rather neutral, largely because enough trend-following components have improved (though our broadest measures of market internals have not) to keep us from pounding tables about immediate losses. Even as we allow for further near-term speculation, I remain convinced that the S&P 500 is likely to be lower a decade from now than it is today.


    The only wrinkle in an otherwise spectacularly hostile investment environment is that speculators appear to be so possessed by collapsing global interest rates that the immediacy of a market loss may be deferred until this fresh round of yield-seeking exhausts itself. As one observer told Bloomberg last week, “they’re out there scrounging through the dumpster looking for yield.”

      


  • John Hussman: Race to the Bottom

    On the basis of leading economic data we find most strongly correlated with actual subsequent economic performance, the underlying strength of the U.S. economy remains tepid at best.


    Looking beyond the U.S., China’s trade minister over the weekend described the global economic situation, correctly, I think, as “complicated and grim.” The chart below presents our leading economic composite (measured in standard deviations from the mean) along with actual growth in U.S. nonfarm payrolls over the subsequent three-month period. Despite Friday’s strong payroll showing, the three-month rate of payroll growth in the U.S. remains on a slowing trajectory.

      


  • John Hussman's Top-Performing Stocks

    John Hussman (Trades, Portfolio) is the president and principal shareholder of Hussman Strategic Advisors, the investment advisory firm that manages the Hussman Funds. During the first quarter 2016, the guru increased several stakes, and the following are the ones with the highest performance since that buy.


    Universal Forest Products Inc. (UFPI)

      


  • John Hussman: Head of the Snake

    “Understand that securities are not net economic wealth. They are a claim of one party in the economy - by virtue of past saving - on the future output produced by others. Fundamentally, it's the act of value-added production that ‘injects’ purchasing power into the economy (as well as the objects available to be purchased), because by that action the economy has goods and services that did not exist previously with the same value. True wealth is embodied in the capacity to produce (productive capital, stored resources, infrastructure, knowledge), and net income is created when that capacity is expressed in productive activity that adds value that didn't exist before.


    “New securities are created in the economy each time some amount of purchasing power is transferred to others, rather than consuming it. Once issued, all of these pieces of paper can vary in price later, so the saving that someone did in a prior period, embodied in the form of some paper security, may be worth more or less consumption in the current period than it was initially. That’s really the main effect QE has - to encourage yield-seeking speculation that drives up the prices of risky securities, but without having any material effect on the real economy or the underlying cash flows that those securities will deliver over time.

      


  • John Hussman Acquires Stake in Nike

    John Hussman (Trades, Portfolio) purchased a 100,000-share stake in Nike Inc. (NYSE:NKE) during the first quarter.


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  • John Hussman: Brexit and the Bubble in Search of a Pin

    First things first. While the full attention of financial market participants is focused on “Brexit” – last week’s British referendum to exit the European Union – the singular factor to recognize here is that the vulnerability of the financial markets to steep losses has very little to do with Brexit per se. Rather, years of yield-seeking speculation, encouraged by central banks, had already brought the financial markets to a precipice prior to last week’s vote.


    It’s not entirely clear whether Brexit is a sufficient catalyst to burst the bubble, as we recall that the failure of Bear Stearns in early 2008 was followed by a period of calm before the crisis, and numerous dot-com stocks had already been obliterated by September 2000 when the tech bubble began its collapse in earnest. We’ll take the evidence as it comes, but we’re certainly defensive at present for reasons that have little to do with Brexit at all.

      


  • John Hussman: Imagine

    Imagine the collapse of an extended speculative tech bubble, resulting in a broad economic recession. Imagine if the Federal Reserve had persistently slashed short-term interest rates during the downturn, to no avail, leaving rates at just 1% by the time the Standard & Poor's 500 had lost half of its value and the Nasdaq 100 collapsed by 83%. Imagine that the Fed kept rates suppressed, in the initially well-meaning hope of encouraging lending, growth and employment. Imagine that the depressed level of interest rates made investors feel starved for yield and drove them to look for safe alternatives to Treasury bills.


    Imagine that investors found the higher yields they sought in mortgage securities, which had historically always been safe, and that Fed policy inadvertently created voracious demand for more of that debt. Imagine Wall Street had weak enough requirements on capital and underwriting standards that financial institutions had an incentive to create more “product” by lending to borrowers with lower and lower creditworthiness. Imagine that by the magic of “financial engineering” and lax oversight of credit ratings, Wall Street could pass these mortgages off to investors either directly by bundling, slicing and dicing them into mortgage-backed securities or by piggy-backing on the good faith and credit of the government by transferring them to Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FMCC) in return for funds obtained from investors in these “agency” securities.

      


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