(AAPL, Financial) shares fell from $532 to $443 during the quarter. The biggest problems with our AAPL investment are disappointing earnings and a diminished forecast. When AAPL announced its year-end result, it made clear that it would earn less in the March quarter than it did a year ago. Forward estimates have been falling for a while. Last July, consensus estimates for fiscal 2014 were $64 per share; estimates now stand at $44. When we thought the company would earn $64 per share, the shares seemed cheap even as they reached $700 in September. Of course, that required AAPL to meet that forecast.
Our thesis is that AAPL has a terrific operating platform, engendering a loyal, sticky and growing customer base that will make repeated purchases of an expanding AAPL product offering. Unfortunately, there have been a series of disappointments including slower sales growth, lower margins, and increased competition. There have also been delays in new carrier wins, next generation product introductions, and new product category launches. While all of these have had an understandably negative impact on AAPL’s share price, we take a longer view and believe our thesis is intact.
As shareholders, we watched AAPL accumulate a cash stockpile greater than the market capitalization of all but 17 companies in the S&P 500, and recognized that its high cost of capital and shareholder-unfriendly capital allocation were depressing the stock price. AAPL’s management and Board, either unconcerned or unaware of the detrimental effects of AAPL’s all common equity capital structure, seemed uninterested in finding a solution.
As shareholders who believe in AAPL’s core business, we wanted to help AAPL resolve its cash problem in a way that satisfied AAPL, the market, and its shareholders. Based on years of observation and many discussions, we believed that AAPL would not issue debt under any circumstances, and especially not to return cash to shareholders. With this in mind, coupled with our awareness that AAPL was loath to repatriate (and thereby pay taxes on) its overseas cash, last year we suggested iPrefs to Peter Oppenheimer, AAPL's CFO. We had no better luck than any of the many other investors and analysts who for years have pressed Apple to return excess capital to shareholders. Our concerns fell on deaf ears.
In February, CalPERS came out in loud support of a proposal aimed at improving AAPL’s corporate governance that inexplicably bundled several measures into a single voting measure. The proposal, which included an unwarranted provision prohibiting AAPL from issuing preferred stock, was in direct violation of SEC rules, and we filed a lawsuit insisting that AAPL allow the shareholders to vote on each measure separately. We believed this would generate a public dialogue around AAPL’s capital allocation strategy.
When Tim Cook later called the lawsuit a sideshow, it was understandable. Whereas we chose to focus on the very real issue of Apple’s capital structure, others seemed more intent on turning things into a circus. A lawyer known mostly for preserving the autonomy of Boards to act in any manner they wish wrote a piece titled Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy. Given the hysteria implied in the title, one would think we had suggested that AAPL hire Steve Ballmer to run new product development. A retired Fortune 500 CEO said, “I’d give Einhorn the back of my hand,” prompting us to wonder why he wouldn’t give us the front of his hand. Perhaps most startling was the reaction from CalPERS, who vigorously defended the proposal.
The essence of corporate governance is form over substance. The belief is that properly-made decisions will lead to better decisions, so it was odd to watch self-identified corporate governance advocates support a proxy proposal that violated SEC rules. Incongruously, CalPERS believes good corporate governance is unnecessary when approving policies that purport to improve corporate governance.
Others ignored the circus and focused on the balance sheet. We received feedback from many AAPL shareholders, including some of AAPL’s largest institutional investors, thanking us for initiating the public discussion. Even some who disagreed with our idea helped further the public debate. Respected NYU finance professor Aswath Damodaran wrote a critical piece that pushed us to refine our presentation of the iPrefs idea. These thoughtful responses reinforce the value of speaking publicly, despite the more obvious drawbacks.
In the end, the judge sided with us, and AAPL withdrew the proposal from consideration. Once the shareholder meeting passed, there was nothing left for a court to do, so the case became moot and was dropped. Not long after, we met with AAPL management and its investment bankers to further discuss AAPL’s options. We believe that our thoughts were given a fair hearing.
Ultimately, the Board and AAPL decided to abandon their “no debt” philosophy and gave birth to iBonds. As rejections go, AAPL’s bond issuance ($17 billion in bonds were issued at about a 2% average interest cost) was as good as anything shareholders could have hoped for and the market seems to agree. AAPL announced that it will return $100 billion to shareholders by the end of 2015 and will evaluate returning additional capital annually. This vastly more shareholder-friendly capital allocation policy is a dramatic shift from where AAPL stood just a few months ago. We have added to our AAPL position. We now await the release of Apple’s next blockbuster product.
From David Einhorn's first quarter 2013 letter.
Our thesis is that AAPL has a terrific operating platform, engendering a loyal, sticky and growing customer base that will make repeated purchases of an expanding AAPL product offering. Unfortunately, there have been a series of disappointments including slower sales growth, lower margins, and increased competition. There have also been delays in new carrier wins, next generation product introductions, and new product category launches. While all of these have had an understandably negative impact on AAPL’s share price, we take a longer view and believe our thesis is intact.
As shareholders, we watched AAPL accumulate a cash stockpile greater than the market capitalization of all but 17 companies in the S&P 500, and recognized that its high cost of capital and shareholder-unfriendly capital allocation were depressing the stock price. AAPL’s management and Board, either unconcerned or unaware of the detrimental effects of AAPL’s all common equity capital structure, seemed uninterested in finding a solution.
As shareholders who believe in AAPL’s core business, we wanted to help AAPL resolve its cash problem in a way that satisfied AAPL, the market, and its shareholders. Based on years of observation and many discussions, we believed that AAPL would not issue debt under any circumstances, and especially not to return cash to shareholders. With this in mind, coupled with our awareness that AAPL was loath to repatriate (and thereby pay taxes on) its overseas cash, last year we suggested iPrefs to Peter Oppenheimer, AAPL's CFO. We had no better luck than any of the many other investors and analysts who for years have pressed Apple to return excess capital to shareholders. Our concerns fell on deaf ears.
In February, CalPERS came out in loud support of a proposal aimed at improving AAPL’s corporate governance that inexplicably bundled several measures into a single voting measure. The proposal, which included an unwarranted provision prohibiting AAPL from issuing preferred stock, was in direct violation of SEC rules, and we filed a lawsuit insisting that AAPL allow the shareholders to vote on each measure separately. We believed this would generate a public dialogue around AAPL’s capital allocation strategy.
When Tim Cook later called the lawsuit a sideshow, it was understandable. Whereas we chose to focus on the very real issue of Apple’s capital structure, others seemed more intent on turning things into a circus. A lawyer known mostly for preserving the autonomy of Boards to act in any manner they wish wrote a piece titled Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy. Given the hysteria implied in the title, one would think we had suggested that AAPL hire Steve Ballmer to run new product development. A retired Fortune 500 CEO said, “I’d give Einhorn the back of my hand,” prompting us to wonder why he wouldn’t give us the front of his hand. Perhaps most startling was the reaction from CalPERS, who vigorously defended the proposal.
The essence of corporate governance is form over substance. The belief is that properly-made decisions will lead to better decisions, so it was odd to watch self-identified corporate governance advocates support a proxy proposal that violated SEC rules. Incongruously, CalPERS believes good corporate governance is unnecessary when approving policies that purport to improve corporate governance.
Others ignored the circus and focused on the balance sheet. We received feedback from many AAPL shareholders, including some of AAPL’s largest institutional investors, thanking us for initiating the public discussion. Even some who disagreed with our idea helped further the public debate. Respected NYU finance professor Aswath Damodaran wrote a critical piece that pushed us to refine our presentation of the iPrefs idea. These thoughtful responses reinforce the value of speaking publicly, despite the more obvious drawbacks.
In the end, the judge sided with us, and AAPL withdrew the proposal from consideration. Once the shareholder meeting passed, there was nothing left for a court to do, so the case became moot and was dropped. Not long after, we met with AAPL management and its investment bankers to further discuss AAPL’s options. We believe that our thoughts were given a fair hearing.
Ultimately, the Board and AAPL decided to abandon their “no debt” philosophy and gave birth to iBonds. As rejections go, AAPL’s bond issuance ($17 billion in bonds were issued at about a 2% average interest cost) was as good as anything shareholders could have hoped for and the market seems to agree. AAPL announced that it will return $100 billion to shareholders by the end of 2015 and will evaluate returning additional capital annually. This vastly more shareholder-friendly capital allocation policy is a dramatic shift from where AAPL stood just a few months ago. We have added to our AAPL position. We now await the release of Apple’s next blockbuster product.
From David Einhorn's first quarter 2013 letter.
