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GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash to Debt 0.40
HLF's Cash to Debt is ranked lower than
59% of the 1414 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.64 vs. HLF: 0.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash to Debt only.
HLF' s 10-Year Cash to Debt Range
Min: 0.28  Med: 0.68 Max: N/A
Current: 0.4
Equity to Asset -0.13
HLF's Equity to Asset is ranked lower than
98% of the 1249 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.52 vs. HLF: -0.13 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity to Asset only.
HLF' s 10-Year Equity to Asset Range
Min: -0.18  Med: 0.23 Max: 0.43
Current: -0.13
-0.18
0.43
Interest Coverage 5.60
HLF's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
75% of the 789 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 26.62 vs. HLF: 5.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
HLF' s 10-Year Interest Coverage Range
Min: 1.13  Med: 26.39 Max: 57
Current: 5.6
1.13
57
F-Score: 6
Z-Score: 3.52
M-Score: -3.02
WACC vs ROIC
14.81%
27.14%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating margin (%) 10.86
HLF's Operating margin (%) is ranked higher than
76% of the 1410 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 4.57 vs. HLF: 10.86 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating margin (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Operating margin (%) Range
Min: 9.23  Med: 14.03 Max: 16.28
Current: 10.86
9.23
16.28
Net-margin (%) 6.50
HLF's Net-margin (%) is ranked higher than
70% of the 1413 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.11 vs. HLF: 6.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net-margin (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Net-margin (%) Range
Min: -1.09  Med: 8.84 Max: 12.01
Current: 6.5
-1.09
12.01
ROE (%) 284.52
HLF's ROE (%) is ranked higher than
100% of the 1392 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 6.66 vs. HLF: 284.52 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year ROE (%) Range
Min: -9.47  Med: 79.87 Max: 284.52
Current: 284.52
-9.47
284.52
ROA (%) 12.57
HLF's ROA (%) is ranked higher than
88% of the 1435 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.27 vs. HLF: 12.57 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year ROA (%) Range
Min: -1.54  Med: 18.37 Max: 30.79
Current: 12.57
-1.54
30.79
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) 145.33
HLF's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) is ranked higher than
97% of the 1423 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 10.92 vs. HLF: 145.33 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) Range
Min: 115.41  Med: 264.62 Max: 500.88
Current: 145.33
115.41
500.88
Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) 25.40
HLF's Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
92% of the 1161 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.80 vs. HLF: 25.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) Range
Min: 5.2  Med: 15.50 Max: 27.6
Current: 25.4
5.2
27.6
EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) 9.10
HLF's EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
66% of the 958 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.60 vs. HLF: 9.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) Range
Min: 6.7  Med: 14.80 Max: 29.8
Current: 9.1
6.7
29.8
EPS Growth (3Y)(%) 0.80
HLF's EPS Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked lower than
51% of the 878 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.90 vs. HLF: 0.80 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EPS Growth (3Y)(%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year EPS Growth (3Y)(%) Range
Min: 0.8  Med: 26.50 Max: 41.3
Current: 0.8
0.8
41.3
» HLF's 10-Y Financials

Financials


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Oprt. Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow

» Details

Guru Trades

Q2 2014

HLF Guru Trades in Q2 2014

Carl Icahn 17,000,000 sh (unchged)
Louis Moore Bacon Sold Out
Kyle Bass Sold Out
George Soros 4,736,337 sh (-3.37%)
Jeremy Grantham 567,778 sh (-12.23%)
John Burbank 3,482 sh (-13.73%)
Richard Perry 4,000,000 sh (-16.67%)
Jim Simons 324,100 sh (-49.25%)
Paul Tudor Jones 7,100 sh (-52.74%)
» More
Q3 2014

HLF Guru Trades in Q3 2014

Paul Tudor Jones 17,700 sh (+149.30%)
Richard Perry 5,575,000 sh (+39.38%)
Carl Icahn 17,000,000 sh (unchged)
Jim Simons Sold Out
John Burbank Sold Out
Jeremy Grantham 350,878 sh (-38.20%)
George Soros 1,888,288 sh (-60.13%)
» More
Q4 2014

HLF Guru Trades in Q4 2014

George Soros 3,448,288 sh (+82.61%)
Carl Icahn 17,000,000 sh (unchged)
Richard Perry Sold Out
Paul Tudor Jones 15,740 sh (-11.07%)
Jeremy Grantham 88,800 sh (-74.69%)
» More
Q1 2015

HLF Guru Trades in Q1 2015

HOTCHKIS & WILEY 828,600 sh (New)
George Soros 3,448,288 sh (unchged)
Carl Icahn 17,000,000 sh (unchged)
Paul Tudor Jones Sold Out
Jeremy Grantham 79,800 sh (-10.14%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with HLF

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Guru Investment Theses on Herbalife Ltd

Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Oct 04, 2013

During the quarter, Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) stock price rose from approximately $45 to $70 per share, and from approximately $60 to $70 per share during the month of September alone. The principal driver of the stock price appears to be the belief by bulls that government regulators will do nothing,and that the Company will continue to generate strong earnings and cash flows which will be returned to shareholders in the form of share repurchases, which could force shorts, including Pershing Square, to cover.The stock price appreciation this past month appears to have been driven by commentary from Tim Ramey, a perennially bullish Herbalife analyst from D.A. Davison, who stated a few weeks ago that in September 2013 PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) would complete its re-audit of the Company's last three years of financial statements, and Herbalife, shortly thereafter, would launch a $2 billion investment grade bond issue at an interest rate of 4%, the proceeds to be used to fund a share repurchase at $75 per share. According to Ramey, the buyback would serve to refute the bear case on Herbalife as shorts, including Pershing Square, are forced to cover.

The high degree of specificity of Ramey's bullish call has led investors to believe that he is speaking on behalf of th e Company. While September has come and gone without PwC's completion of Herbalife's re -audited financials, bullish investors apparently continue to expect the re-audit to be completed shortly, and a large buyback to be forthcoming.

We are skeptical of Ramey's pronouncements for several reasons. While we do not know the timing of PwC's re - audit of Herbalife's financial statements, we have identified a substantial number of serious issues with Herbalife's accounting, disclosure, and tax policies that we h ave brought to the attention of PwC and the SEC in a series of three letters that we delivered to them in recent weeks, the first of which we shared with you earlier this month. At a minimum, we would not be surprised if the re-audited financials provide further disclosures about the Company which will raise additional questions about its business practices and its previously reported results.

With respect to the supposed $2 billion investment grade bond issue at an interest rate of 4%, we believe it is extremely unlikely that Herbalife will be able to garner an investment grade rating and raise $2 billion, let alone at an interest rate of 4%. As of March 2011, when Moody's withdrew its ratings on Herbalife, the Company was rated Ba1, a junk rating. When the ratings were withdrawn, Herbalife had only $178 million of debt, approximately 0.5 times the then 12 month trailing operating profits, and there was little public scrutiny of the Company's business practices. If Herbalife were able to issue $2 billion of additional debt today, the Company would have $3 billion of total debt, or 4.3 times 12-month trailing operating profits. With more than 16times as much debt, substantially greater scrutiny of the Company's business practices, and a regulatory cloud over the Company, we believe that it would now garner a substantially lower junk rating than that of early 2011.

Furthermore, we question whether a bank would be willing to take on the potential underwriter liability associated with a debt issue for Herbalife. If the Company were later deemed to be a pyramid scheme, an underwriter could find itself liable for the face amount of the entire debtissue, as recoveries to creditors of a pyramid scheme are likely to be de minimis . To earn a 150 basis point fee and risk losing 70 times that amount in a lawsuit is a risk-reward proposition thatwe believe no financial institution would find attractive.

All of the above notwithstanding, if Herbalife could achieve a $2 billion financing, we believe the interest rate would be much higher, and the buyback could only be completed at a price that would be minimally accretive to the Company, factoring in the after-tax cost of debt and the buyback price required to acquire nearly 30% of the outstanding float. When one considers the high degree of leverage that would result from the buyback, we would expect the Company's earnings multiple to compress accordingly. As a result, we believe that such a leveraged recapitalization would generate minimal, if any, shareholder value.

Based on an analysis of comparable situations with our prime brokers, we believe that such a buyback would not require us to cover our position. Furthermore, if a large amount of debt were issued, an Herbalife CDS market would likely develop, presenting us with an even more attractive method to bet against the then highly leveraged Company. We could then choose to add to or replace all or a portion of our existing short position with an even larger notional short position in the debt through the purchase of CDS. We would welcome such an opportunity,although for the reasons described above, we do not believe that the Company will be able to borrow funds to complete such a transaction.

Since our presentation on Herbalife at the end of last year, we have not learned any facts that are inconsistent with our belief that the Company is a pyramid scheme that engages in unlawful and deceptive marketing practices. In fact, there have been a number of materially positive developments that increase the likelihood of regulatory intervention and the Company's closure.

Numerous state, federal, and international regulators have launched investigations or inquiries into the Company's business practices and products that we believe are ongoing. Many federal,state and local elected officials, consumer protection and community organizations and other advocates have publicly called for the FTC and state regulators to investigate the Company. A number of whistle blowers have contacted us, several in the last few weeks alone, and provided us with information that is confirmatory of our thesis that Herbalife is a pyramid scheme while raising additional concerns that we had not previously identified. Bottom line, we continue to have enormous conviction in our investment thesis.

While we have endured mark-to-market losses on this investment as Herbalife bulls have promoted the stock and downplayed the probability of government intervention, we believe it is only a matter of time before the Company is shut down and prosecuted by regulators.

In order to mitigate the risk of further mark-to-market losses on Herbalife, in recent weeks wehave restructured the position by reducing our short equity position by more than 40% andreplacing it with long-term derivatives, principally over-the-counter put options. Therestructuring of the position preserves our opportunity for profit – if the Company fails within areasonable time frame we will make a similar amount of profit as if we had maintained the entireinitial short position – while mitigating the risk of further substantial mark-to-market losses – because our exposure on the put options is limited to the total premium paid. In restructuring the position, we have also reduced the amount of capital consumed by the investment from 16% to12% of our funds.

We were able to restructure the position cost effectively due to several factors. Over the last 60or so days, the cost to borrow Herbalife shares has declined substantially while the stock pricehas risen. Shortly after we filed a formal complaint with the SEC regarding what we believe to be unlawfully manipulative conduct by other market participants, the cost to borrow Herbalifeshares dropped substantially to the lowest rate since prior to our presentation last December. Inan unrelated recent enforcement action, the SEC confirmed that attempting to engineer a shortsqueeze by removing stock from the available lending base is a form of market manipulation.

Because of the rise of the stock price, the low cost of borrow, and the fact that we are betting onthe failure of the Company, we have been able to purchase long-dated, privately negotiated out-of-the-money put options on terms that offer us an attractive opportunity for profit versus their cost. Furthermore, by substantially reducing the size of our short position as a percentage of theshare float, we minimize the risk of so-called short squeezes or other technical attempts bymarket manipulators to force us to cover our position. In that a substantial component of the bullcase on Herbalife is predicated on forcing us to cover, we think the restructuring of our investment negates this important pillar of the bull case.

The biggest risk of the restructured position is that time begins to be a factor with respect to a portion of our investment. We believe, however, that the long-term nature of the options we ownwill provide sufficient time for us to be rewarded on this portion of our position. In that theoptions are privately negotiated, over-the-counter contracts, we have the ability to extend their terms, if we deem it prudent and attractive to do so in the future.

At yesterday's closing price of $72.84, we believe the potential reward from being short Herbalife is extremely attractive relative to the risk of loss. Using the average analyst s' price target of $77 per share – which assumes that the Company is operating entirely legally – investors have less than 6% upside compared with 100% downside if the Company is determinedto be a pyramid scheme by regulators.

In my career, I have not seen a less attractive risk-reward ratio than a long investment inHerbalife common stock at current levels.

From Bill Ackman's Pershing Square third quarter 2013 investor letter.


Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

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Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
P/E(ttm) 14.19
HLF's P/E(ttm) is ranked higher than
70% of the 1078 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 21.50 vs. HLF: 14.19 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful P/E(ttm) only.
HLF' s 10-Year P/E(ttm) Range
Min: 4.07  Med: 14.43 Max: 912
Current: 14.19
4.07
912
Forward P/E 9.98
HLF's Forward P/E is ranked higher than
81% of the 454 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 16.53 vs. HLF: 9.98 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward P/E only.
N/A
PE(NRI) 13.70
HLF's PE(NRI) is ranked higher than
71% of the 1074 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 21.60 vs. HLF: 13.70 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE(NRI) only.
HLF' s 10-Year PE(NRI) Range
Min: 4.08  Med: 14.38 Max: 297.7
Current: 13.7
4.08
297.7
P/S 0.91
HLF's P/S is ranked higher than
50% of the 1402 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.88 vs. HLF: 0.91 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful P/S only.
HLF' s 10-Year P/S Range
Min: 0.37  Med: 1.35 Max: 2.47
Current: 0.91
0.37
2.47
PFCF 12.86
HLF's PFCF is ranked higher than
70% of the 649 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 21.70 vs. HLF: 12.86 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PFCF only.
HLF' s 10-Year PFCF Range
Min: 3.83  Med: 13.49 Max: 65.14
Current: 12.86
3.83
65.14
POCF 9.17
HLF's POCF is ranked higher than
66% of the 896 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 13.32 vs. HLF: 9.17 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful POCF only.
HLF' s 10-Year POCF Range
Min: 2.79  Med: 10.87 Max: 53.65
Current: 9.17
2.79
53.65
EV-to-EBIT 11.10
HLF's EV-to-EBIT is ranked higher than
70% of the 1100 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 15.71 vs. HLF: 11.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
HLF' s 10-Year EV-to-EBIT Range
Min: 3.1  Med: 10.00 Max: 15.3
Current: 11.1
3.1
15.3
PEG 0.65
HLF's PEG is ranked higher than
90% of the 435 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.87 vs. HLF: 0.65 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG only.
HLF' s 10-Year PEG Range
Min: 0.15  Med: 0.61 Max: 1.32
Current: 0.65
0.15
1.32
Shiller P/E 14.48
HLF's Shiller P/E is ranked higher than
74% of the 652 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 22.32 vs. HLF: 14.48 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller P/E only.
HLF' s 10-Year Shiller P/E Range
Min: 7.52  Med: 20.17 Max: 34.6
Current: 14.48
7.52
34.6
Current Ratio 1.22
HLF's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
67% of the 1281 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.59 vs. HLF: 1.22 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
HLF' s 10-Year Current Ratio Range
Min: 1  Med: 1.30 Max: 2.15
Current: 1.22
1
2.15
Quick Ratio 0.94
HLF's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
57% of the 1280 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.07 vs. HLF: 0.94 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
HLF' s 10-Year Quick Ratio Range
Min: 0.66  Med: 0.95 Max: 1.79
Current: 0.94
0.66
1.79
Days Inventory 134.80
HLF's Days Inventory is ranked lower than
82% of the 1369 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 64.10 vs. HLF: 134.80 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
HLF' s 10-Year Days Inventory Range
Min: 88.23  Med: 114.35 Max: 135.34
Current: 134.8
88.23
135.34
Days Sales Outstanding 6.60
HLF's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked higher than
90% of the 1095 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 38.42 vs. HLF: 6.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
HLF' s 10-Year Days Sales Outstanding Range
Min: 6.15  Med: 10.01 Max: 12.08
Current: 6.6
6.15
12.08

Dividend & Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
Dividend Yield 0.68
HLF's Dividend Yield is ranked lower than
87% of the 1594 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.96 vs. HLF: 0.68 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Dividend Yield only.
HLF' s 10-Year Dividend Yield Range
Min: 0.46  Med: 1.75 Max: 6.18
Current: 0.68
0.46
6.18
Dividend growth (3y) -25.50
HLF's Dividend growth (3y) is ranked lower than
76% of the 571 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.60 vs. HLF: -25.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Dividend growth (3y) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Dividend growth (3y) Range
Min: 0  Med: -25.50 Max: 44.2
Current: -25.5
0
44.2
Yield on cost (5-Year) 0.93
HLF's Yield on cost (5-Year) is ranked lower than
81% of the 1601 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.33 vs. HLF: 0.93 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Yield on cost (5-Year) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Yield on cost (5-Year) Range
Min: 0.61  Med: 2.33 Max: 8.23
Current: 0.93
0.61
8.23
Share Buyback Rate 10.10
HLF's Share Buyback Rate is ranked higher than
98% of the 762 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: -1.20 vs. HLF: 10.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Share Buyback Rate only.
HLF' s 10-Year Share Buyback Rate Range
Min: 10.1  Med: 3.20 Max: -11.7
Current: 10.1

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price/Projected FCF 0.72
HLF's Price/Projected FCF is ranked higher than
81% of the 623 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.48 vs. HLF: 0.72 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Projected FCF only.
HLF' s 10-Year Price/Projected FCF Range
Min: 0.46  Med: 1.07 Max: 1.93
Current: 0.72
0.46
1.93
Price/DCF (Earnings Based) 1.75
HLF's Price/DCF (Earnings Based) is ranked lower than
54% of the 79 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.65 vs. HLF: 1.75 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/DCF (Earnings Based) only.
N/A
Price/Median PS Value 0.65
HLF's Price/Median PS Value is ranked higher than
85% of the 1304 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.10 vs. HLF: 0.65 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Median PS Value only.
HLF' s 10-Year Price/Median PS Value Range
Min: 0.31  Med: 1.00 Max: 1.74
Current: 0.65
0.31
1.74
Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value 0.73
HLF's Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value is ranked higher than
82% of the 229 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.48 vs. HLF: 0.73 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value only.
HLF' s 10-Year Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value Range
Min: 0.19  Med: 0.60 Max: 1.21
Current: 0.73
0.19
1.21
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) 9.05
HLF's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) is ranked higher than
77% of the 1395 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 4.80 vs. HLF: 9.05 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) Range
Min: 6.5  Med: 10.00 Max: 32.2
Current: 9.05
6.5
32.2
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) 26.76
HLF's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) is ranked higher than
91% of the 660 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.42 vs. HLF: 26.76 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) only.
HLF' s 10-Year Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) Range
Min: 18.6  Med: 26.95 Max: 41.4
Current: 26.76
18.6
41.4

Business Description

Industry: Consumer Packaged Goods » Household & Personal Products
Compare:LRLCY, KMB, RBGPF, EL, UNLRY » details
Traded in other countries:HOO.Germany,
Herbalife Ltd was incorporated on April 4, 2002 in Cayman Islands. The Company along with its subsidiaries is a nutrition company that sells weight management, targeted nutrition, energy, sports & fitness, and outer nutrition products. The Company offers its products into five groups: weight management, targeted nutrition, energy, sports & fitness, outer nutrition, and literature, promotional and other. The Weight Management products are meal replacement, protein shakes, drink mixes, weight loss enhancers and healthy snacks. Its representative products include Formula 1 Healthy Meal, Herbal Tea Concentrate, Protein Drink Mix, Personalized Protein Powder, Total Control, Prolessa Duo and Protein Bars. The Targeted Nutrition products are dietary and nutritional supplements containing quality herbs, vitamins, minerals and other natural ingredients. Its representative products include Aloe Concentrate, Niteworks, Garden 7 phytonutrient supplement, Best Defense for improved immune system, and COQ10 Plus. The Energy, Sports & Fitness includes products that support a healthy active lifestyle. Its representative products include Herbalife24 product line, Liftoff energy drink, and H3O hydration drink. The Outer Nutrition includes facial skin care, body care, and hair care products including Herbalife SKIN line, Skin Activator anti-aging line, Herbal Aloe Bath and Body Careline, NouriFusion multivitamin skin care line, and Radiant C antioxidant skin care line. The Literature, Promotional and Other includes Start-up kits, sales tools, and educational materials including International Business Packs, and BizWorks. The Company sells its products through retail stores, sales representatives, sales officers and independent service providers in China. The Company sells its products in approximately 91 countries. The Company operates in geographical regions including North America; Mexico; South and Central America; EMEA, including Europe, the Middle East and Africa; Asia Pacific (excluding China); and China. The Company's competitors include NuSkin Enterprises, Nature's Sunshine, Alticor/Amway, Melaleuca, Avon Products, Oriflame, Omnilife, Tupperware and Mary Kay, as well as retail establishments including Weight Watchers, Jenny Craig, General Nutrition Centers, Wal-Mart and retail pharmacies. It use the umbrella trademarks Herbalife and the Tri-Leaf design, and protect other trademarks and trade names related to its products and operations, such as Niteworks and Liftoff. In both its United States and foreign markets, the Company is affected by laws, governmental regulations, administrative determinations, court decisions and similar constraints.
» More Articles for HLF

Headlines

Articles On GuruFocus.com
3 Stocks With No Analyst Coverage – Blue Tower 2Q 2015 Letter Jul 14 2015 
Pershing Square's Letter To Herbalife Jun 28 2015 
Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Releases Letter To Herbalife CEO Michael Johnson Jun 26 2015 
A Close Look Of Herbalife Clubs Worldwide: Part III Jun 11 2015 
A Close Look of Herbalife Clubs Worldwide: Part II Jun 11 2015 
A Close Look of Herbalife Clubs Worldwide: Part I Jun 11 2015 
Nu Skin Enterprises - Is It Worth Investing In? May 21 2015 
Here's Why Herbalife Is Better Than Avon Products May 20 2015 
Herbalife Faces Investigation From Federal Agencies May 20 2015 
Weight Watchers Has 90% Downside May 14 2015 

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FTC’s Open And Shut Case Vs. Herbalife Should Be Winding Down Jul 27 2015
Herbalife seeks information from Twitter about one of its users Jul 23 2015
Herbalife to Support Special Olympics Athletes from Around the World Jul 23 2015
Giant Hedge Fund Bridgewater Flips View on China: ‘No Safe Places to Invest’ Jul 22 2015
Giant Fund Flips View On China: Steer Clear Jul 22 2015
Herbalife goes to court to unmask Twitter user who criticized company Jul 22 2015
Herbalife wants Twitter to unmask troll Jul 22 2015
Herbalife Members from Across the Country Visit Washington D.C. to Meet with Members of Congress Jul 22 2015
Herbalife Members from Across the Country Visit Washington D.C. to Meet with Members of Congress Jul 22 2015
Early movers: BA, KO, XOM, CPB, WHR, Z & more Jul 22 2015
Herbalife files petition to seek user information from Twitter Jul 22 2015
Herbalife files petition to seek user information from Twitter Jul 22 2015
Herbalife files petition to seek user information from Twitter Jul 22 2015
Herbalife: Not a Pyramid Scheme, Not Worth Buying Jul 21 2015
Coverage initiated on Herbalife by Sterne Agee CRT Jul 21 2015
Herbalife (HLF) Stock is the 'Chart of the Day' Jul 17 2015
Company executives can be the biggest threat to your stocks Jul 16 2015
American Red Cross and Herbalife Partner to Encourage Blood Donations Jul 10 2015
NYSE resumes floor trading Jul 08 2015
Herbalife Sponsors Manufacturing Day Jul 08 2015

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