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GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 6/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash to Debt 0.05
VRX's Cash to Debt is ranked lower than
94% of the 729 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.63 vs. VRX: 0.05 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash to Debt only.
VRX' s Cash to Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -1.06  Med: 0.24 Max: No Debt
Current: 0.05
-1.06
No Debt
Equity to Asset 0.13
VRX's Equity to Asset is ranked lower than
96% of the 677 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 0.63 vs. VRX: 0.13 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity to Asset only.
VRX' s Equity to Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.13  Med: 0.50 Max: 0.81
Current: 0.13
0.13
0.81
Interest Coverage 1.18
VRX's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
96% of the 470 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 123.58 vs. VRX: 1.18 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
VRX' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.17  Med: 7.04 Max: 121.91
Current: 1.18
0.17
121.91
F-Score: 6
Z-Score: 0.70
M-Score: -2.12
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating margin (%) 17.30
VRX's Operating margin (%) is ranked higher than
76% of the 686 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 8.82 vs. VRX: 17.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating margin (%) only.
VRX' s Operating margin (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -9.32  Med: 19.24 Max: 33.39
Current: 17.3
-9.32
33.39
Net-margin (%) 0.95
VRX's Net-margin (%) is ranked lower than
71% of the 687 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 6.45 vs. VRX: 0.95 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net-margin (%) only.
VRX' s Net-margin (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -17.62  Med: 15.44 Max: 26.4
Current: 0.95
-17.62
26.4
ROE (%) 1.28
VRX's ROE (%) is ranked lower than
67% of the 715 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 7.30 vs. VRX: 1.28 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE (%) only.
VRX' s ROE (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -20.19  Med: 13.39 Max: 21.19
Current: 1.28
-20.19
21.19
ROA (%) 0.20
VRX's ROA (%) is ranked lower than
68% of the 740 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 3.67 vs. VRX: 0.20 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA (%) only.
VRX' s ROA (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -3.88  Med: 6.21 Max: 13.02
Current: 0.2
-3.88
13.02
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) 26.51
VRX's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) is ranked higher than
68% of the 735 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 14.76 vs. VRX: 26.51 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) only.
VRX' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -69.93  Med: 82.71 Max: 144.06
Current: 26.51
-69.93
144.06
Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) 53.40
VRX's Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
96% of the 585 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 5.80 vs. VRX: 53.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) only.
VRX' s Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -10.8  Med: 15.25 Max: 55.3
Current: 53.4
-10.8
55.3
EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) 64.00
VRX's EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
96% of the 531 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 7.50 vs. VRX: 64.00 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) only.
VRX' s EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -35.7  Med: 15.55 Max: 113
Current: 64
-35.7
113
EPS Growth (3Y)(%) 83.30
VRX's EPS Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
97% of the 487 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 6.00 vs. VRX: 83.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EPS Growth (3Y)(%) only.
VRX' s EPS Growth (3Y)(%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -37.1  Med: 5.75 Max: 83.3
Current: 83.3
-37.1
83.3
» VRX's 10-Y Financials

Financials


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Oprt. Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow

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Guru Trades

Q1 2015

VRX Guru Trades in Q1 2015

Bill Ackman 19,473,933 sh (New)
Jim Simons 475,837 sh (+1120.44%)
John Paulson 2,050,000 sh (+293.70%)
Louis Moore Bacon 30,063 sh (+110.44%)
Jeremy Grantham 1,155,927 sh (+10.91%)
Lou Simpson 1,898,540 sh (+5.81%)
Diamond Hill Capital 179,505 sh (+4.66%)
Private Capital 295,320 sh (+0.86%)
First Eagle Investment 1,191,832 sh (unchged)
Jeff Ubben 19,383,877 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen Sold Out
George Soros Sold Out
Ruane Cunniff 34,089,378 sh (-0.71%)
Glenn Greenberg 5,877,016 sh (-4.07%)
Steve Mandel 5,569,460 sh (-32.50%)
Wallace Weitz 917,261 sh (-33.46%)
Chris Davis 1,877,040 sh (-46.50%)
Lee Ainslie 1,275,861 sh (-47.36%)
Andreas Halvorsen 4,058,343 sh (-55.29%)
Jana Partners 1,571,454 sh (-63.52%)
Joel Greenblatt 65,531 sh (-77.83%)
Paul Tudor Jones 1,256 sh (-98.74%)
» More
Q2 2015

VRX Guru Trades in Q2 2015

Kyle Bass 10,198 sh (New)
Ken Fisher 1,828 sh (New)
George Soros 9,254 sh (New)
Steven Cohen 42,900 sh (New)
John Paulson 9,000,000 sh (+339.02%)
Jeremy Grantham 1,708,746 sh (+47.82%)
Andreas Halvorsen 4,616,738 sh (+13.76%)
Private Capital 302,715 sh (+2.50%)
Bill Ackman 19,473,933 sh (unchged)
Glenn Greenberg 2,500 sh (unchged)
Paul Tudor Jones Sold Out
Louis Moore Bacon Sold Out
Ruane Cunniff 33,884,050 sh (-0.60%)
Glenn Greenberg 5,701,010 sh (-2.99%)
Steve Mandel 5,310,143 sh (-4.66%)
Chris Davis 1,762,238 sh (-6.12%)
Joel Greenblatt 61,178 sh (-6.64%)
Lou Simpson 1,728,265 sh (-8.97%)
First Eagle Investment 1,055,332 sh (-11.45%)
Jana Partners 1,342,723 sh (-14.56%)
Wallace Weitz 716,730 sh (-21.86%)
Jeff Ubben 14,994,261 sh (-22.65%)
Diamond Hill Capital 130,617 sh (-27.23%)
Lee Ainslie 756,609 sh (-40.70%)
Jim Simons 107,789 sh (-77.35%)
» More
Q3 2015

VRX Guru Trades in Q3 2015

Leon Cooperman 484,915 sh (New)
Jeremy Grantham 8,176,586 sh (+378.51%)
Joel Greenblatt 88,677 sh (+44.95%)
Steve Mandel 7,461,780 sh (+40.52%)
Diamond Hill Capital 169,542 sh (+29.80%)
Lou Simpson 1,952,983 sh (+13.00%)
Andreas Halvorsen 4,993,353 sh (+8.16%)
Lee Ainslie 811,361 sh (+7.24%)
Ken Fisher 1,833 sh (+0.27%)
Ruane Cunniff 33,922,192 sh (+0.11%)
First Eagle Investment 1,055 sh (unchged)
Bill Ackman 19,473,933 sh (unchged)
Jeff Ubben 14,994,261 sh (unchged)
First Eagle Investment 1,055,332 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen Sold Out
George Soros Sold Out
Kyle Bass Sold Out
Jana Partners Sold Out
Jim Simons Sold Out
John Paulson 8,890,000 sh (-1.22%)
Private Capital 296,931 sh (-1.91%)
Glenn Greenberg 5,577,892 sh (-2.16%)
Wallace Weitz 630,155 sh (-12.08%)
Chris Davis 1,509,122 sh (-14.36%)
» More
Q4 2015

VRX Guru Trades in Q4 2015

Lou Simpson 2,698,614 sh (+38.18%)
Ken Fisher Sold Out
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Guru Investment Theses on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Jan 27, 2016

When we purchased Valeant at an average price of $196, we bought the company at a modest discount to intrinsic value as represented by the company’s existing portfolio of products and businesses, but at a very substantial discount to fair value in light of its acquisition track record, the large number of potential targets, and its competitive advantages which include its low-cost operating model and favorable tax structure. When the stock price rose this summer to the mid-$200s per share, we did not sell as we believed it was probable the company would likely complete additional transactions that would meaningfully increase intrinsic value. In retrospect, this was a very costly mistake.

Our failure to sell stock wasn’t entirely an unforced error as we found ourselves largely restricted from trading during this period. During the summer, we were made aware of a large potential transaction that Valeant was working on, and as a result, we were restricted from trading at a time when it would have been prudent to take some money off the table. In retrospect, in light of Valeant (NYSE:VRX)’s leverage and the regulatory and political sensitivity of its underlying business, we should have avoided becoming restricted to preserve trading flexibility, or alternatively, we should have made a smaller initial investment in the company.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square Annual Investor Letter 2015.

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Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Jan 22, 2016

Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) is a multinational, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of brand name, generic, branded generic and over-the-counter (OTC) products in over 100 countries. We closed the firm’s position in Valeant toward the end of October. The stock came under heavy selling pressure in September as a result of increased political scrutiny regarding the increasing cost of prescription drugs. We believed pricing risks were (and are) real and growing but navigable. Our base-case business value estimate assumed (and had always assumed) minimal contribution from future price increases. In October, however, questions arose about the possibility of wrongdoing and questionable disclosure regarding Philidor, an “alternative fulfillment” pharmacy Valeant used to distribute portions of its dermatology medications. Our decision to sell was ultimately based on a combination of difficult to answer questions, Valeant’s potential long-term reputational impact, future business model uncertainty, and financial leverage. We also had competing uses for capital in healthcare with more attractive risk-reward profiles. While our investment in Valeant ended on a disappointing note, it was a healthy multi-year contributor to performance.

From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s fourth quarter 2015 Value Fund commentary.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Dec 16, 2015

Valeant (NYSE:VRX)

Valeant’s stock price declined significantly in the quarter as a result of statements by politicians regarding drug price increases, subpoenas from regulators, attacks by short sellers, and the termination of Valeant’s relationship with Philidor, a specialty pharmacy distribution channel used for dermatology products. On October 30, 2015, we held an investor conference call to answer the many questions we received about our investment in Valeant.

Approximately six weeks ago, Valeant’s board formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the recent allegations made against Philidor, including claims that Valeant management was involved in the alleged wrongdoing at Philidor. The committee has hired former U.S. Deputy Attorney General and Kirkland & Ellis partner Mark Filip to lead the investigation.

Valeant will hold an in-person, half-day investor meeting tomorrow, Wednesday, December 16th, to provide updated financial guidance for 2016, review the company’s strategy, and answer investor questions. We believe that this is an important step for Valeant to restore investor confidence.

On November 23rd, we filed a 13D reflecting our increased stake in Valeant. Before we increased our position, we did substantial due diligence by re-underwriting our investment in the company. In particular, we reviewed all of the short sellers’ allegations, the potential political and regulatory risks, the impact of the shutdown of Philidor, and the company’s capital structure, debt covenants, and overall financial risk. We updated our financial model in light of recent business developments in order to better assess free cash flows, how quickly the company would be able to reduce leverage, the probability of financial distress, and to determine a conservative estimate of Valeant’s intrinsic value.

Ultimately, we concluded that the risk of bankruptcy or financial distress was de minimis in light of (1) the highly cash-flow-generative nature of the business, (2) the minimal debt maturities over the next several years, (3) the nature of Valeant’s financial covenants, and the highly diversified (both by therapeutic area and geography) product portfolio. Because Valeant owns a highly diversified, divisible, and desirable portfolio of products that can be sold product -by-product and/or division-by-division in an industry with many well-capitalized buyers, it could deleverage at an even more rapid rate if it chose to do so. Once we determined that the risk of financial default was extremely small and the stock was trading at an enormous discount to intrinsic value, we considered various approaches to increasing our investment.

Generally, we purchase stocks outright to get exposure to a particular investment. In this case, we took advantage of the high volatility of Valeant stock, its extremely low share price, and the high degree of market uncertainty in choosing to build a position that offered us a compelling reward for the potential risk. Rather than purchase common stock outright, we increased our investment through a contemporaneous series of over-the-counter option transactions. The bulk of the increase in our investment in Valeant was created through the sale of European-style put options struck at a $60 stock price, the purchase of American-style call options at a $95 stock price, and the sale of European -style call options at $165 stock price, all of which expire in January 2017. This derivative position gives us the upside of the stock from $95 per share up to $165 per share until January 2017. The net purchase price of the options was $6.75.

In summary, if the stock rises to $ 165 or more by January 2017, we will make more than 10 times our net investment over this period. Our downside is equal to the net purchase price of each option plus the decline in the stock price, if any, below $60 per share as of January 2017. By selling European-style put options, the shares cannot be put to us until January of 2017. By then, we estimate that Valeant’s stock price will be substantially in excess of $60 per share, potentially several multiples of this price.

The upside of our derivative investment is approximately equal to that of owning the stock outright at $95 per share with 30% less downside, i.e., if the stock were to go zero, we would lose approximately $67 per share, (the put strike price plus the net option premium). By selling two options for every option that we have purchased, we have also minimized the effective cost of this investment and limited the impact of rapid time value decay which is characteristic of an outright option purchase on a highly volatile stock. In a worse-case scenario, which we believe is extremely unlikely to occur, we risked approximately 4% of additional capital on this investment while increasing our notional exposure to Valeant by about 6% of the portfolio.

We added to our investment because we believe that Valeant shares are enormously undervalued. While we expect a degree of disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business, we believe that the fundamentals of Valeant’s overall business remain strong. Just this morning, Valeant announced a 20-year agreement with Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., the largest pharmacy chain in the U.S. with more than 8,000 units, which will “more than replace” Valeant’s Philidor specialty pharmacy distribution. We believe that this agreement will go a long way to addressing concerns about the disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business by expanding convenient and affordable access to Valeant products, and will help restore credibility by the company partnering with the largest and best-managed pharmacy chain. The agreement provides for discounted pricing for Valeant’s dermatology and ophthalmology products reducing costs for the health care system.

Valeant’s stock price is currently impacted by the high degree of uncertainty created by the shutdown of Philidor and the corresponding investigation of allegations, recent political scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry, negative press coverage of Valeant, and technical trading factors. These technical factors include: (1) the large amount of tax-loss selling which will likely continue until year end, (2) redemption-related sales from funds whose performance was affected by the decline in Valeant’s stock price, (3) “window dressing” where investment managers who held Valeant stock sell it before year-end so they do not need to show their investors the actual losses they incurred holding the position, and (4) the inherent complexity of the company that requires substantial due diligence before new investors establish their investment.

Because of the controversy around Valeant, many portfolio managers have been unwilling to retain an investment in the company as client scrutiny and headline risk became intolerable. In light of the above technical factors, we believe that most new investors would prefer to wait to establish an investment in Valeant until after the upcoming analyst day and when year-end technical factors abate.

There are a number of relatively short-term catalysts that we believe may lift the overhang on Valeant shares. We expect that this morning’s announcement will reduce if not eliminate concerns about disruptions in the distribution of Valeant’s dermatology products. We expect that additional uncertainty will begin to dissipate at tomorrow’s analyst day when the company will announce its revenues and earnings guidance for 2016 and answer questions from existing and prospective investors. In addition, we expect the results of the Philidor investigation to be announced sometime in the first quarter of next year. The company will likely file its 10-K in February with the results of Price Waterhouse’s year-end audit. This should comfort investors who have concerns about Valeant’s accounting.

While we expect a messy fourth quarter due to the shutdown of Philidor and investigative costs, the company should be able to post “clean” quarters beginning in the second quarter of next year. With the passage of time, the reduction in uncertainty, increased transparency, the reporting of operating results which we anticipate to be strong, along with the deleveraging of the balance sheet, we expect Valeant stock to rise substantially.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square Holdings third quarter 2015 letter to shareholders.

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First Eagle Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Nov 02, 2015

While the political spotlight and market pullback have adversely affected all of our health care holdings, we believe it is important to share with you our views on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (NYSE:VRX). Valeant has been the subject of numerous articles/ rumors over the last month regarding its business practices. What initially began as an investigation into the aggressive manner in which Valeant had raised prices on two drugs that it had acquired in early 2015 has grown into a full-scale firestorm of controversy over its entire business model. Two US District Attorneys have issued subpoenas requesting information on Valeant’s pricing as well as its patient assistance programs. As we write today on October 21, the company is now under suspicion over the utilization of a network of specialty pharmacies that it uses to distribute and fulfill a portion of the demand for its products.

We continue to remain focused on the facts: that Valeant has been quite successful pursuing an acquisition program, growing adjusted free cash flow from $182 million in 2008 to over $2.1 billion over the last twelve months. We acknowledge Valeant has accumulated significant debt as part of its acquisition strategy and while manageable, its balance sheet has left it vulnerable to short sellers. In our view, the debt is fully manageable and debt-to-EBITDA may decline.

With regard to Valeant’s business practices, we have studied the issues at play. In our dealings with the company over the last eight years, we have been consistently impressed with the thoroughness and diligence of the management team.

We clearly recognize that political pressures have grown on the pharmaceutical industry, yet we believe Valeant management is fully cognizant of this new reality, and should adapt its strategy swiftly and appropriately. In our view, much of the rhetoric is based on misinformation or misunderstanding and this noise should eventually diminish. We believe the current stock price is trading at a significant discount to the value that underlying business fundamentals should warrant.

Our core investment philosophy that has served us well over the years is predicated on an ability to look through short term uncer-tainty, and to focus on the intrinsic value of a business over the longer term. From a broader perspective, the portfolio valuation looks attractive to us. Although the recent weeks and months have been volatile and painful, our experience has taught us to remain true to our philosophy and discipline through all market conditions.



From the First Eagle Fund of America Q3 commentary.



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Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International - Oct 27, 2015

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (NYSE:VRX) – Following a strong calendar second quarter, Valeant shares came under pressure during September as a high-profile presidential hopeful and portions of the popular press called drug industry pricing practices into question. While stocks across the pharmaceutical industry have given back recent gains, Valeant has been hit particularly hard after being mentioned alongside a couple of unscrupulous actors. While Valeant has significantly raised the list prices of several of the drugs it has recently acquired, large price increases have not been the primary driver of the company’s earnings growth. Perhaps more importantly, neither we nor the company believe they are necessary to fuel the company’s future growth. After significantly trimming our position during the third quarter, we began selectively adding to the position in October for the first time in several years below $170/share.



From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s 3Q 2015 commentary.

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Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Oct 27, 2015

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (NYSE:VRX) is a multinational, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of brand name, generic, branded generic and over-the-counter (OTC) products in over 100 countries. Despite a significant pullback in Valeant’s stock during September, its shares remain among our top contributors through the first nine months of calendar year 2015. We took advantage of this strength over the course of the spring and summer to pare back Valeant’s position size at levels that approached and briefly reached our base case estimate of intrinsic value. While drug price regulation has dominated headlines over the past several weeks, the likelihood of “price controls” becoming a legislative reality appears low at present. The multi-year outlook for Valeant’s core business remains attractive.



From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s 3Q 2015 commentary.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Sep 11, 2015

Valeant (NYSE:VRX)



On April 1, 2015, Valeant closed the acquisition of Salix, the largest acquisition in its history. Valeant has rapidly integrated Salix. Highlights of the integration include the realization of $500 million of cost synergies, the restructuring of Salix’s sales force, and an important FDA approval. Salix’s financial results since the acquisition have substantially exceeded budget.



Valeant’s second quarter organic revenue growth was 19%, marking the fourth consecutive quarter of greater than 15% organic growth. This quarter’s results benefited from the successful launch of several new products, including a portfolio of dermatology products largely developed by Valeant scientists. The company has materially increased full year sales and earnings guidance.



On its quarterly conference call, management presented a detailed review of its capital allocation track record representing $40 billion of investments in more than 140 transactions. The results are impressive. Management has generated an estimated 37% unlevered, after-tax annual rate of return on these transactions. We believe that Valeant will continue to be able to make attractive acquisitions in light of the extraordinarily large, fragmented and inefficient pharmaceutical industry.



On August 20, 2015, Valeant announced the acquisition of Sprout Pharmaceuticals, a company which earlier last week received approval for a female sexual dysfunction drug. We believe that Sprout reflects the opportunistic nature of Valeant’s business development program. Sprout’s Addyi drug offers the potential for billions of dollars of future sales in treating a condition for which there are limited alternative medical treatments. Valeant structured the transaction in a manner which moderates its downside risk in the event that sales are below projections, while allowing the company to benefit materially if the drug is a blockbuster. As part of the transaction, Valeant hired the Sprout management team including its superb CEO Cindy Whitehead.



Certain Pershing Square employees including myself were pre-FDA approval investors in Sprout and provided strong references to Sprout management on the quality and character of the Valeant management team, which were helpful to Sprout as the outcome for Sprout shareholders and its employees is heavily dependent on how the company and the drug is managed going forward. We discuss Pershing Square’s personal trading policies in detail below.



On July 1, 2015, Valeant hired a new Chief Financial Officer, Rob Rosiello. Rob comes to Valeant following a long career at McKinsey, where he led the firm’s M&A advisory practice. Former CFO Howard Schiller leaves Valeant’s executive team after nearly four years of service. Howard will remain with Valeant as a member of its board of directors and a major shareholder.



Despite a substantial increase from our purchase price earlier this year, we believe that Valeant shares remain undervalued. We believe that the stock price does not reflect the quality of Valeant’s franchises and future cash flows, and the business development, capital allocation and operating abilities of its management team.



From Pershing Square's semi-annual 2015 report.



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Sequoia Fund Comments on Valeant Pt. II - Aug 28, 2015

David Poppe:



I do not think we actually know the weighted average P/E on GAAP earnings. For companies like Valeant, I am not sure it would be a relevant number anyway. On the rest of it we will bring Rory up and put him on the spot.



Rory Priday:



Valeant (NYSE:VRX) does spend on R&D. I think the company is going to spend, adding Salix and the legacy Valeant businesses, about $300 million. We met with Mike a few weeks ago and he was telling us how with $300 million, you can get an awful lot done. Mike can get a lot done with very little. Jublia is a good example. Jublia is a toenail fungus drug that Valeant just launched last year. It spent $30 − $40 million developing that drug over the last few years, and it is probably going to do more than $300 million in sales this year.



Valeant has a number of other compounds in the pipeline, especially on the dermatology side. It bought Dow Pharmaceuticals early on in Mike’s reign at the company — he paid $285 million. Valeant has gotten Acanya out of it, which was a $70 − $80 million drug, and it is getting Jublia now. Valeant has six or seven drugs that it expects to launch over the next eighteen months. One of them, Vesneo, for glaucoma, management thinks could generate as much as $1 billion in sales globally. I think Mike said the company is going to spend less than $100 million on that program, in total. With an R&D budget of $300 million, Valeant can do quite a bit in terms of building its pipeline.



In terms of the pharmaceuticals and Valeant’s exposure to patents, one of the things the company has tried to do is go into areas where the company has durable products. Valeant has a lot of branded generic drugs overseas, which are off patent drugs. Valeant has contact lens solutions and OTC pharmaceuticals. It has CeraVe, which is a moisturizer. And Valeant has a lot of drugs that are not going off patent. The key in the pharma game is always, once you have the distribution, once you have a sales force in the ophthalmology space or in the dermatology space, how do you source innovation? You can do that through R&D or you can do that through buying things. Mike is making a big bet that it is cheaper sometimes to buy things, to source that innovation when you have the distribution. So it seems like that model is working. The business is growing right now pretty nicely.



David Poppe:



Mike Pearson believed that he could build a large and successful pharmaceutical company without taking the risk of expensive R&D that most large, successful pharma and biotech companies had taken. He would instead do it by focusing on specialties that did not require these risks through lean R&D, zero-based budgeting, minimal taxation, and high returns from the get-go on numerous acquisitions. He would target companies of all sizes in product and geographic areas in which big companies did not compete and in which there was minimal reimbursement risk. By avoiding all of those other risks, he would be able to take some risk by leveraging his balance sheet to generate very rapid growth and high returns on total capital and spectacularly high returns on shareholders’ equity.



...



Question:



On page three of the prospectus, there is a bar chart showing the performance. We all know that Valeant has a big effect on the total bottom line. But if you start with 2012 when the return was about 16% and the next year 35%, last year 8%, this year it is about 12% — if you backed out Valeant, what would those percentages be for the other 80% of the investments in the Sequoia Fund?



David Poppe:



Valeant has outperformed the S&P 500 by a substantial margin over the last three years. If you backed Valeant out, the other 80% would have underperformed the S&P, but that includes a substantial cash position at all times. The stock portfolio performed roughly in line with the S&P.



Question:



So on a percentage basis, what would let’s say last year’s 8% be without Valeant?



David Poppe:



About 4%.



Question:



Let’s say the current bottom line is about 12%, right?



David Poppe:



Valeant came into the year at 20% of the portfolio and it is up 56% year to date. So that is over eleven points of return for the total portfolio.



Sequoia is up about 12% so the rest of the portfolio generated less than one point of return and the market has generated about 3.



Question:



So you are saying that without Valeant, instead of its being 12%, it would be less than 1%?



David Poppe:



When a 20% position goes up over 50% that works out to a lot of performance, yes.



Question:



If you skip last year and you go to the wonderful year of 2013 when the result was 35%, what would that have been without Valeant, about?



David Poppe:



Valeant was up almost 100% that year. It started the year at about 12% of assets. If Valeant went up 100% in 2013 and it was 12% of the portfolio that was twelve points of performance. We were up 35 that year and began with about 14% in cash. So, the rest of the stocks, about 74% of the portfolio, were up around 31% in aggregate and generated 23 points of return.



...



Question:



I have two quick questions. I might have missed the first one, but I was wondering what you thought of Valeant going forward, if you thought it was going to perform similarly well from now to next year. The other question I had that you might have answered earlier is based on kind of an expertise thing. I noticed that given your asset allocations mostly in equities that you are probably very correlated to the S&P, and I was wondering if you had ever thought about investing in other asset classes, going into FX, commodities or anything to maybe reduce that, or not?



Bob Goldfarb:



I would disagree with your statement that our equities are closely correlated to the S&P. They are not. That lack of correlation accounts for much of the significant variance in performance, in both directions, between Sequoia and the S&P over 45 years. The firm has invested in bonds twice since it was founded. But given the results from this week’s auctions, maybe we should have invested in art. We did not. And we do not have any plans to diversify on that score. With regard to Valeant, we are not any good at predicting short term movements in the stock; so we are not going to hazard a guess. But I would say that it is definitely ... it is a virtual certainty that we will have significantly lower returns from Valeant in the next five years than we had in the first five.



From Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Investor Day 2015 Transcript Part II - Sequoia Fund.



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Sequoia Fund Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Aug 27, 2015

Question:



Howard Schiller has resigned as the chief financial officer at Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) after four years. The Financial Times joked that he may be exhausted from ‘‘all this fiddling.’’ With Valeant’s lofty stock price likely bringing its percentage of our fund’s assets to upwards of 20% and with the company’s accelerated growth likely to be impacted by the specter of rising interest rates, have you been reevaluating our position?



Rory Priday:



He has done quite a bit of fiddling. The market cap since Howard Schiller joined Valeant went from less than $15 billion to over $70 billion today. But I think some people get burned out at the company just because of the number of deals that they do and the number of products that they manage. Some people refer to their time at Valeant as a tour of duty. It was a little concerning for us that he left, but he is going to be on the board hopefully for a long time. He told us that he would be there as long as investors wanted to have him. So I do not think he is going anywhere.1



David Poppe:



The fact that Howard is staying on the board is a pretty strong sign that there are no disagreements or unhappiness. Not so long ago, he was telling us that Valeant closed a deal at eight o’clock at night on New Year’s Eve. It is a very intense pace. Sometimes you make a lot of money and that pace is too much. I think it is more about that than it is about anything else.2





...





Question:



If I could ask about Valeant as well.... Being students of the family of Berkshire, can you discuss your views and perhaps comment on what Mr. Munger insinuated about Valeant recently?



Bob Goldfarb:



After reading about Mr. Munger’s comments, Rory looked for all the books on Harold Geneen that he could find. I think he is the man to answer your question. Rory?



Rory Priday:



We were not at the Daily Journal meeting, where Mr. Munger made the remark comparing Valeant and ITT. So we do not know exactly what he said. But it was something to the effect that Valeant was like ITT, except that Mike Pearson was worse than Harold Geneen, who became CEO of ITT in 1959. ITT was one of a number of serial acquirers that were active particularly in 1960s. Geneen bought a raft of companies — some of the names you will recognize today like Sheraton and Avis. Bob can provide more context than I can because he is pretty familiar with the company as well. But Geneen bought a lot of disparate businesses in different industries. I recall from the books I read that ITT’s sales went from $700 million to $17 billion over eighteen years and the earnings went from $29 million to $550 million. But ITT also issued a lot of equity and was prone to issue equity in order to buy these companies. By the time Geneen stepped down from the CEO’s spot, ITT’s share count had increased tenfold.



One of the big differences is that Valeant is focused on the healthcare sector. Last year, 57% of sales came from pharmaceuticals. The company is not really going outside the healthcare space, and it is not going far outside pharmaceuticals. There are plenty of pharma companies that operate in different therapeutic areas, and the main ones for Valeant today are dermatology, ophthalmology, and gastroenterology. Another difference is that Mike does not like to issue equity. Even though the Bausch & Lomb and Salix acquisitions required him to issue some equity, the share count has not really moved that much.



If you adjust for the dividend that Valeant paid out before the Biovail merger, earnings per share have gone from 81 cents to probably close to $27 this year. Next year’s EPS will be close to $38 a share. So the earnings will have gone up over 45 times in seven years.



Bob Goldfarb:



My guess, when I saw the comments, was that Charlie might have been targeting Valeant’s accounting. If I were going to question the accounting, the principal issue I would have would be with the accounting for the restructuring charges after Valeant makes a large acquisition. The company and the analysts who follow it add back these restructuring charges to derive the company’s cash earnings. What we do is add back the restructuring charges to the purchase price; so that if Valeant buys a company for $9 billion and there are $500 million of after-tax restructuring charges, the company effectively paid $9.5 billion rather than the $9 billion that it announced initially.



If you deduct the restructuring charges associated with significant acquisitions from a given year’s earnings, I do not think that is accurate accounting even though it does conform to GAAP. When we look at a company’s reported earnings in a given year, we are always searching for a sense of what the true earning power of that company is relative to the stock price. If you deduct the large restructuring charges in a given year, you are not going to get an accurate number for the earning power. Heinz — Berkshire acquired 50% of the company — is an example. Jonny, Heinz had very low earnings last year, right, because of the restructuring charges?



Jon Brandt:



Yes, it did.



Bob Goldfarb:



That was GAAP accounting. Heinz’s earning power is clearly very substantial but it was masked in the accounting by that huge restructuring charge. So when we looked at Berkshire in the year Heinz was acquired, we just added back those restructuring charges to get a better idea of what Heinz was earning, half of which Berkshire3 was earning as well.



Question:



I guess it is no surprise that most of the questions are about Valeant. So I will add one more. A few weeks ago in the papers it was reported that Valeant raised the price on a particular drug by 400% − 500%, within a very short period of time after purchasing the rights to that drug from another company. I was troubled by reading that. I am curious to hear your reaction.



Rory Priday:



I understand why reaction to that could be negative. Obviously, Sequoia and our clients that own Valeant are benefiting from those price increases. But in general, the capitalistic approach to pricing is to charge what the market will bear. Valeant believes that when it buys a drug and it is underpriced, it should charge a price that will maximize the company’s long term cash earnings. Some people maybe feel differently about healthcare. It is obviously a more sensitive topic.



Bob Goldfarb:



Embedded in the asking price for Marathon — which is the company that sold these drugs to Valeant — embedded in the sale price was a significant increase in the price of those drugs. In fact, Rory, what had Marathon’s management been advised to do with its prices?



Rory Priday:



We were told that Marathon had hired a consulting firm that advised it to take huge price increases. So Valeant was following the advice of the consulting firm, not that Mike would shy away from taking a price increase if he saw an opportunity. We are not really sure why the company decided to sell these drugs, but I think part of the reason was that management was looking at selling another asset. So Marathon needed to get this deal done. That is the one that David mentioned earlier when Valeant was working at 8:00 p.m. on New Year’s Eve.



Bob Goldfarb:



A point that the article missed, and I am not faulting the Wall Street Journal, is that either those prices or the volumes at those elevated prices are going to be very short-lived because both of those drugs are subject to genericization and Valeant management expects that they will be genericized within a couple of years. So Valeant had to recoup its investment and more within that short window of time in order to achieve the returns that management was expecting.





From Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb Investor Day 2015 Transcript Part I.



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Diamond Hill Capital Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc - Jul 25, 2014

We initiated a position in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc., (VRX) a specialty pharmaceutical company that is a leader in eye care and dermatology. Unlike most in the pharmaceutical space, Valeant has a very lean cost structure and a much more targeted focus for internal research and development. Instead, the company has been very successful in acquiring proven products. Management is among the best in the business, making every decision through the lens of shareholder value creation.

From Diamond Hill Capital (Trades, Portfolio)'s Select Fund Second Quarter 2014 Commentary.

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Sequoia Fund's Discussion of Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Mar 07, 2014

Our largest holding, Valeant, had an outstanding year. Full year numbers have not been reported yet, but we believe that cash earnings per share should exceed $6, well ahead of last year’s result. The big news of the year was the acquisition of Bausch & Lomb for nearly $9 billion in August. The deal should be highly accretive and, together with modest organic growth in its other operations, enable cash earnings per share to increase significantly in 2014. The integration of Bausch & Lomb appears on track with cost synergies, originally estimated by management at around $800 million, now expected to be over $850 million.



Cash earnings per share have probably more than tripled over the last four years. While we do not expect this growth trajectory to continue at such a rapid pace in the future, we do believe the company can continue to produce positive organic growth supplemented by ongoing acquisitions that will enable Valeant to grow cash earnings per share at an above-average rate.



We like Valeant’s approach to the pharmaceutical business. It has acquired a diverse stable of branded, generic and OTC drugs and, more recently, medical devices including dermal fillers and contact lenses. Many of its products are steady sellers in specialty categories like dermatology and ophthalmology. In our view, Valeant is essentially a value investor in health care products.





Source: Sequoia Fund's 2013 Annual Report - Management's Discussion of Fund Performance



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Top Ranked Articles about Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc

In Vast Difference From Berkshire Style, Lou Simpson Adds to Valeant Position Former CIO of Geico demonstrates unique value strategy in 4th quarter
Former Geico CIO Lou Simpson (Trades, Portfolio) is well known for having been a trusted manager of the Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE:BRK.A) (NYSE:BRK.B) subsidiary, of whom Warren Buffett often sang the praises in his annual shareholder letters. As demonstrated in his fourth-quarter trades, however, Simpson can also have vastly different investment ideas than what can be considered a classic Buffett company. Read more...
Lou Simpson Adds to Valeant Stake Former Geico CEO ups holding in 4th quarter
Guru Lou Simpson (Trades, Portfolio) ran the Geico insurance, a subsidiary of Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) (BRK.B) for more than three decades with outstanding returns. In his 2004 letters to shareholders, Warren Buffett (Trades, Portfolio) dedicated an entire section to Lou Simpson (Trades, Portfolio) called "Portrait of a Disciplined Investor." Read more...
Valeant's Share Price Continues to Decline Though the price is falling, there are strong drivers to analyze
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NYSE:VRX), one of the best specialty drugmakers, has been trading down since September 2015 when the last rally was seen. Since then, the stock plunged to less than half of its value. Read more...
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Bill Ackman’s Fund Falls by Double Digits Again in January All of the investor's long positions declined in the new year
The 12 positions in Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)’s portfolio at his hedge fund Pershing Square Holdings declined a further 11.1% in 2016, extending his dismal 20% drop last year. Read more...
Pershing Square's New Presentation, Part 1 Commentary on Valeant, Mondelez, Air Products, Canadian Pacific, Restaurant Brands
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Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant Guru stock highlight
When we purchased Valeant at an average price of $196, we bought the company at a modest discount to intrinsic value as represented by the company’s existing portfolio of products and businesses, but at a very substantial discount to fair value in light of its acquisition track record, the large number of potential targets, and its competitive advantages which include its low-cost operating model and favorable tax structure. When the stock price rose this summer to the mid-$200s per share, we did not sell as we believed it was probable the company would likely complete additional transactions that would meaningfully increase intrinsic value. In retrospect, this was a very costly mistake. Read more...
Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals Guru stock highlight
Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) is a multinational, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of brand name, generic, branded generic and over-the-counter (OTC) products in over 100 countries. We closed the firm’s position in Valeant toward the end of October. The stock came under heavy selling pressure in September as a result of increased political scrutiny regarding the increasing cost of prescription drugs. We believed pricing risks were (and are) real and growing but navigable. Our base-case business value estimate assumed (and had always assumed) minimal contribution from future price increases. In October, however, questions arose about the possibility of wrongdoing and questionable disclosure regarding Philidor, an “alternative fulfillment” pharmacy Valeant used to distribute portions of its dermatology medications. Our decision to sell was ultimately based on a combination of difficult to answer questions, Valeant’s potential long-term reputational impact, future business model uncertainty, and financial leverage. We also had competing uses for capital in healthcare with Read more...
Bill Ackman Slashes Stake in Valeant Pharmaceuticals Guru makes second transaction of quarter in company
Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio) made his second fourth-quarter transaction involving Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (NYSE:VRX) on the next-to-last day of the quarter. Ackman sold 5,027,429 shares – nearly 15% of his stake – on Dec. 30, 2015, for an average price of $102.33 per share. Read more...
Wally Weitz Gives Rare Early Look at 4th Quarter Portfolio The guru discloses several buys and sells long before deadline
Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio), founder and chief investment officer of Weitz Investments, on Friday gave a rare mid-quarter update of some changes he made to a portfolio that he manages, the Partners III Opportunity Fund. Read more...

Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
P/E(ttm) 60.21
VRX's P/E(ttm) is ranked lower than
79% of the 499 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 28.00 vs. VRX: 60.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful P/E(ttm) only.
VRX' s P/E(ttm) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 5.91  Med: 17.65 Max: 660.81
Current: 60.21
5.91
660.81
Forward P/E 5.89
VRX's Forward P/E is ranked higher than
95% of the 236 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 20.62 vs. VRX: 5.89 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward P/E only.
N/A
PE(NRI) 60.40
VRX's PE(NRI) is ranked lower than
79% of the 496 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 28.20 vs. VRX: 60.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE(NRI) only.
VRX' s PE(NRI) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 5.9  Med: 17.56 Max: 631.44
Current: 60.4
5.9
631.44
P/B 5.08
VRX's P/B is ranked lower than
79% of the 706 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.79 vs. VRX: 5.08 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful P/B only.
VRX' s P/B Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.03  Med: 2.97 Max: 14.44
Current: 5.08
1.03
14.44
P/S 4.39
VRX's P/S is ranked lower than
69% of the 675 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.72 vs. VRX: 4.39 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful P/S only.
VRX' s P/S Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.17  Med: 5.64 Max: 14.01
Current: 4.39
2.17
14.01
PFCF 16.68
VRX's PFCF is ranked higher than
75% of the 248 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 9999.00 vs. VRX: 16.68 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PFCF only.
VRX' s PFCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.67  Med: 12.81 Max: 281.44
Current: 16.68
2.67
281.44
POCF 14.17
VRX's POCF is ranked higher than
71% of the 384 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 27.79 vs. VRX: 14.17 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful POCF only.
VRX' s POCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.05  Med: 10.84 Max: 48.31
Current: 14.17
4.05
48.31
EV-to-EBIT 53.15
VRX's EV-to-EBIT is ranked lower than
84% of the 515 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 20.63 vs. VRX: 53.15 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
VRX' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -1086.7  Med: 17.60 Max: 414.9
Current: 53.15
-1086.7
414.9
EV-to-EBITDA 21.66
VRX's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
60% of the 540 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 17.42 vs. VRX: 21.66 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
VRX' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -13.2  Med: 16.90 Max: 293.5
Current: 21.66
-13.2
293.5
PEG 1.16
VRX's PEG is ranked higher than
68% of the 278 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.13 vs. VRX: 1.16 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG only.
VRX' s PEG Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.59  Med: 1.91 Max: 249.36
Current: 1.16
0.59
249.36
Shiller P/E 181.56
VRX's Shiller P/E is ranked lower than
92% of the 140 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 43.61 vs. VRX: 181.56 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller P/E only.
VRX' s Shiller P/E Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 8.8  Med: 41.50 Max: 462.51
Current: 181.56
8.8
462.51
Current Ratio 1.50
VRX's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
68% of the 713 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.27 vs. VRX: 1.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
VRX' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.72  Med: 1.63 Max: 9.68
Current: 1.5
0.72
9.68
Quick Ratio 1.25
VRX's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
62% of the 713 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.65 vs. VRX: 1.25 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
VRX' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.59  Med: 1.25 Max: 9.3
Current: 1.25
0.59
9.3
Days Inventory 194.93
VRX's Days Inventory is ranked lower than
79% of the 643 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 118.46 vs. VRX: 194.93 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
VRX' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 115.82  Med: 142.55 Max: 185.86
Current: 194.93
115.82
185.86
Days Sales Outstanding 132.68
VRX's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked lower than
81% of the 585 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 75.01 vs. VRX: 132.68 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
VRX' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 43.41  Med: 60.52 Max: 106.05
Current: 132.68
43.41
106.05
Days Payable 94.92
VRX's Days Payable is ranked higher than
66% of the 558 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 72.59 vs. VRX: 94.92 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
VRX' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 62.65  Med: 80.71 Max: 120.5
Current: 94.92
62.65
120.5

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price/Projected FCF 1.86
VRX's Price/Projected FCF is ranked higher than
60% of the 313 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.72 vs. VRX: 1.86 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Projected FCF only.
VRX' s Price/Projected FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.33  Med: 2.13 Max: 11.22
Current: 1.86
0.33
11.22
Price/Median PS Value 0.82
VRX's Price/Median PS Value is ranked higher than
69% of the 612 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.18 vs. VRX: 0.82 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Median PS Value only.
VRX' s Price/Median PS Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.5  Med: 1.56 Max: 5.41
Current: 0.82
0.5
5.41
Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value 2.31
VRX's Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value is ranked lower than
63% of the 172 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.99 vs. VRX: 2.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value only.
VRX' s Price/Peter Lynch Fair Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.67  Med: 2.58 Max: 61.66
Current: 2.31
0.67
61.66
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) 1.85
VRX's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) is ranked lower than
60% of the 723 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 3.10 vs. VRX: 1.85 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) only.
VRX' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.2  Med: 3.80 Max: 17.1
Current: 1.85
0.2
17.1
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) 88.31
VRX's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) is ranked higher than
99% of the 325 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 6.77 vs. VRX: 88.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) only.
VRX' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) (%) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.5  Med: 17.00 Max: 86.8
Current: 88.31
2.5
86.8

More Statistics

Revenue(Mil) $9766
EPS $ 1.77
Beta0.06
Short Percentage of Float4.43%
52-Week Range $69.33 - 263.81
Shares Outstanding(Mil)343.10

Analyst Estimate

Dec15 Dec16 Dec17 Dec18
Revenue(Mil) 14,904 17,912 19,851 21,100
EPS($) 15.38 20.60 23.34 26.37
EPS without NRI($) 15.38 20.60 23.34 26.37

Latest Earnings Webcast

Call starts at Oct 19, 2015 08:00 AM EDT

» More Conference Calls

Business Description

Industry: Drug Manufacturers » Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic
Compare:TKPYY, TEVA, AGN, FRX, MRX » details
Traded in other countries:VRX.Canada, BVF.Germany, VRX N.Mexico, VRX.Switzerland, 0QYW.UK,
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc was formed under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) on February 18, 2000, as a result of the amalgamation of TXM Corporation and Biovail Corporation International. Biovail was continued under the Canada Business Corporations Act effective June 29, 2005. In connection with the acquisition of Valeant Pharmaceuticals International (Valeant) in September 2010, Biovail was renamed Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. It is a multinational, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures, and markets a range of branded, generic and branded generic pharmaceuticals, over-the-counter products OTC, and medical devices such as contact lenses, intraocular lenses, ophthalmic surgical equipment, and aesthetics devices, which are marketed directly or indirectly in over 100 countries. The Company operates in two segments; Developed Markets and Emerging Markets. In the Developed Markets segment, it focuses its efforts in the eye health, dermatology, and neurology therapeutic classes. The Developed Markets segment consists of four reporting units based on geography, namely; U.S., Canada and Australia, Western Europe, and Japan. In the Emerging Markets segment, it focuses on branded generics, OTC products, and medical devices. The Emerging Markets segment consists of three reporting units based on geography, namely; Central & Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and Asia & South Africa. Its principal pharmaceutical products are; Wellbutrin XL, Xenazine, Zovirax Cream, Zovirax, Lotemax, Arestin and Prolensa. Its principal OTC products are; PreserVision, ReNu Multiplus, Ocuvite, Artelac, and CeraVe. The Company relies on a combination of contractual provisions, confidentiality policies and procedures and patent, trademark, copyright and trade secrecy laws to protect the proprietary aspects of its technology and business. Its top four geographic markets are; the U.S. and Puerto Rico, Canada, Poland and Russia. The Company competes with specialty and other pharmaceutical companies, medical device companies, biotechnology companies, OTC companies and generic manufacturers, in the U.S., Canada, the EU and in other countries in which it market its products. The principal raw materials, including active pharmaceutical ingredient, used by the Company "or its third party manufacturers" for its various products are purchased in the open market or are otherwise available from several sources. The Company is subject to extensive U.S. federal and state health care marketing and fraud and abuse regulations, such as the federal False Claims Act, federal and provincial marketing regulation in Canada and similar regulations in foreign countries in which it may conduct its business.
» More Articles for VRX

Headlines

Articles On GuruFocus.com
In Vast Difference From Berkshire Style, Lou Simpson Adds to Valeant Position Feb 08 2016 
Lou Simpson Adds to Valeant Stake Feb 07 2016 
So, Bill Ackman Makes Some Good Points on the Index Bubble… Feb 05 2016 
Valeant's Share Price Continues to Decline Feb 05 2016 
Whitney Tilson's New Emails to Partners Feb 05 2016 
Leith Wheeler Investment Funds 4th Quarter Review Jan 29 2016 
Pershing Square's New Presentation, Part 1 Jan 29 2016 
Steven Romick Reduces 7 Stakes in 4th Quarter Jan 28 2016 
Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant Jan 27 2016 
Bill Ackman's Pershing Square Annual Investor Letter Jan 27 2016 

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