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GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 6/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash to Debt 1.40
AMZN's Cash to Debt is ranked higher than
76% of the 1278 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.92 vs. AMZN: 1.40 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Cash to Debt Range
Min: 0.02   Max: No Debt
Current: 1.4

Equity to Asset 0.20
AMZN's Equity to Asset is ranked lower than
52% of the 1271 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.47 vs. AMZN: 0.20 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Equity to Asset Range
Min: -0.88   Max: 0.41
Current: 0.2

-0.88
0.41
Interest Coverage 0.85
AMZN's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
56% of the 870 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 28.57 vs. AMZN: 0.85 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Interest Coverage Range
Min: 0.45   Max: 9999.99
Current: 0.85

0.45
9999.99
F-Score: 5
Z-Score: 4.17
M-Score: -2.99
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 7/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating margin (%) 0.20
AMZN's Operating margin (%) is ranked higher than
55% of the 1280 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 4.95 vs. AMZN: 0.20 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Operating margin (%) Range
Min: -41.4   Max: 6.36
Current: 0.2

-41.4
6.36
Net-margin (%) -0.27
AMZN's Net-margin (%) is ranked higher than
55% of the 1280 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.14 vs. AMZN: -0.27 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Net-margin (%) Range
Min: -51.1   Max: 8.5
Current: -0.27

-51.1
8.5
ROE (%) -2.33
AMZN's ROE (%) is ranked higher than
54% of the 1258 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 8.73 vs. AMZN: -2.33 )
AMZN' s 10-Year ROE (%) Range
Min: -355.56   Max: 3821.38
Current: -2.33

-355.56
3821.38
ROA (%) -0.58
AMZN's ROA (%) is ranked higher than
55% of the 1285 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 4.06 vs. AMZN: -0.58 )
AMZN' s 10-Year ROA (%) Range
Min: -61.35   Max: 21.74
Current: -0.58

-61.35
21.74
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) 1.26
AMZN's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) is ranked higher than
55% of the 1281 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 17.31 vs. AMZN: 1.26 )
AMZN' s 10-Year ROC (Joel Greenblatt) (%) Range
Min: -252.59   Max: 187.06
Current: 1.26

-252.59
187.06
Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) 22.70
AMZN's Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
97% of the 1077 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.30 vs. AMZN: 22.70 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Revenue Growth (3Y)(%) Range
Min: 16.8   Max: 297.4
Current: 22.7

16.8
297.4
EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) 32.40
AMZN's EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) is ranked higher than
96% of the 896 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.10 vs. AMZN: 32.40 )
AMZN' s 10-Year EBITDA Growth (3Y)(%) Range
Min: 15.8   Max: 219.7
Current: 32.4

15.8
219.7
» AMZN's 10-Y Financials

Financials


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Oprt. Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow

» Details

Guru Trades

Q1 2014

AMZN Guru Trades in Q1 2014

Ray Dalio 1,706 sh (New)
Chris Davis 1,096,136 sh (+6231.29%)
Paul Tudor Jones 2,694 sh (+264.55%)
Louis Moore Bacon 2,375 sh (+81.16%)
Murray Stahl 2,221 sh (+69.41%)
Ron Baron 41,428 sh (+19.53%)
Frank Sands 6,555,089 sh (+1.93%)
John Griffin 810,000 sh (+1.25%)
Jean-Marie Eveillard 307 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 80,000 sh (unchged)
Caxton Associates Sold Out
Chase Coleman Sold Out
George Soros Sold Out
Jeremy Grantham Sold Out
Stanley Druckenmiller Sold Out
Tom Gayner Sold Out
PRIMECAP Management 141,350 sh (-0.81%)
Pioneer Investments 229,854 sh (-1.48%)
Ken Fisher 2,343,442 sh (-2.61%)
Mario Gabelli 5,285 sh (-3.38%)
Steven Cohen 480,665 sh (-4.57%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 169,872 sh (-6.79%)
RS Investment Management 28,012 sh (-15.00%)
Bill Frels 1,189 sh (-20.68%)
John Burbank 97,746 sh (-29.11%)
» More
Q2 2014

AMZN Guru Trades in Q2 2014

George Soros 15,000 sh (New)
Jim Simons 169,055 sh (New)
Bill Nygren 971,000 sh (New)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 755,452 sh (+344.72%)
Chris Davis 2,341,553 sh (+113.62%)
Mario Gabelli 9,095 sh (+72.09%)
Louis Moore Bacon 3,288 sh (+38.44%)
Murray Stahl 2,405 sh (+8.28%)
Ken Fisher 2,466,455 sh (+5.25%)
Pioneer Investments 230,865 sh (+0.44%)
Frank Sands 6,578,073 sh (+0.35%)
Jean-Marie Eveillard 307 sh (unchged)
John Griffin 810,000 sh (unchged)
Paul Tudor Jones Sold Out
John Burbank Sold Out
Ray Dalio Sold Out
Ron Baron 41,040 sh (-0.94%)
Bill Frels 1,153 sh (-3.03%)
PRIMECAP Management 134,550 sh (-4.81%)
RS Investment Management 22,615 sh (-19.27%)
» More
Q3 2014

AMZN Guru Trades in Q3 2014

Jeremy Grantham 4,015,184 sh (New)
Steven Cohen 100,000 sh (New)
John Hussman 10,000 sh (New)
Dodge & Cox 770 sh (New)
PRIMECAP Management 220,280 sh (+63.72%)
Chris Davis 3,320,506 sh (+41.81%)
Mario Gabelli 10,370 sh (+14.02%)
Bill Nygren 1,069,000 sh (+10.09%)
Louis Moore Bacon 3,605 sh (+9.64%)
Murray Stahl 2,546 sh (+5.86%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 770,926 sh (+2.05%)
Pioneer Investments 215,695 sh (unchged)
Jean-Marie Eveillard 307 sh (unchged)
RS Investment Management Sold Out
George Soros Sold Out
Ken Fisher 2,461,685 sh (-0.19%)
Frank Sands 6,461,118 sh (-1.78%)
Bill Frels 1,003 sh (-13.01%)
John Griffin 675,000 sh (-16.67%)
Ron Baron 23,794 sh (-42.02%)
Jim Simons 33,755 sh (-80.03%)
» More
Q4 2014

AMZN Guru Trades in Q4 2014

Paul Tudor Jones 10,533 sh (New)
Steven Cohen 260,000 sh (+160.00%)
Ron Baron 56,655 sh (+138.11%)
Chris Davis 4,670,390 sh (+40.65%)
Jeremy Grantham 4,586,073 sh (+14.22%)
Bill Nygren 1,219,000 sh (+14.03%)
Murray Stahl 2,812 sh (+10.45%)
Mario Gabelli 10,390 sh (+0.19%)
PRIMECAP Management 220,580 sh (+0.14%)
Dodge & Cox 770 sh (unchged)
Julian Robertson 160,000 sh (unchged)
Jean-Marie Eveillard 307 sh (unchged)
John Griffin Sold Out
Louis Moore Bacon Sold Out
Jim Simons Sold Out
John Hussman Sold Out
Ken Fisher 2,415,177 sh (-1.89%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 746,164 sh (-3.21%)
Bill Frels 928 sh (-7.48%)
Pioneer Investments 7,322 sh (-96.61%)
Frank Sands 2,820 sh (-99.96%)
Frank Sands 2,820 sh (-99.96%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with AMZN

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)



No Guru Trades Found!
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Guru Investment Theses on Amazon.com Inc

Bill Nygren Comments on Amazon - Jul 10, 2014

That brings me to our newest position, which will no doubt make some question our credentials as value investors: Amazon (AMZN).



Consensus forward earnings for Amazon are a little over a dollar. At the median forward P/E multiple, Amazon would be priced in the low $20s. So, even though the stock fell $124 from its January high of $408 to a May low of $284, its P/E ratio remained in nosebleed territory. But we have never believed the P/E ratio was the be-all and end-all for valuation. Amazon is a retailer – a very efficient retailer. When we compare stocks in the same industry, we often compare their market caps to their sales rather than their earnings. Since 2001, Amazon has generally traded at a cap-to-sales ratio of two to four times that of the average bricks-and-mortar retailer. Having fallen to just under two recently, one might say that, as an advantaged retailer, Amazon looks somewhat attractive.



But that metric misses an important change in Amazon’s business. Third-party sales (sales on amazon.com where the seller is not Amazon) have grown more rapidly than Amazon’s direct business. And on those transactions, accounting rules credit only Amazon's commission as revenue. So if you buy a $100 item on amazon.com from a third party, Amazon is only allowed to show about $13 of revenue, nearly all of which is gross profit. For third-party sales, Amazon is effectively functioning as the mall owner, collecting a percentage of sales as rent. Amazon earns less gross profit on that sale than an average retailer would, but it is also a much lower risk endeavor. For that reason, we think a dollar of third-party sales should be worth about the same as a dollar that Amazon sells directly.



It gets interesting when we adjust our cap-to-sales ratio comparison to include estimated gross third-party sales. Instead of selling at twice the ratio to sales of the average bricks–and-mortar retailer, Amazon is selling at only 80%. So, relative to gross sales, Amazon's stock would have to increase 25% to be priced consistent with the very companies whose survival Amazon is threatening. On that metric, Amazon has never been cheaper.



Should Amazon sell at a discount on sales? The answer largely rests on what Amazon could earn if it wasn’t investing so heavily for future growth. For most asset heavy businesses, growth investment is primarily on the balance sheet, and is slowly expensed on the income statement as depreciation throughout its useful life. In an asset–lite business like Amazon, however, most growth spending gets directly expensed to the income statement, creating a much larger immediate reduction in income. We believe that if Amazon sharply curtailed its growth spending so that it only grew at the rate other retailers grow, it could produce similar operating margins. But we don't want them to do that. We believe that management is maximizing value by investing heavily for super-normal organic growth. So, yes, Amazon is a rapidly growing business. But at this price, we believe it is also a value stock.



From Bill Nygren (Trades, Portfolio)'s Oakmark Fund second quarter 2014 letter.



Check out Bill Nygren latest stock trades

Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - May 29, 2014

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN), the world's largest online retailer, fell 16% due to weaker than anticipated revenue growth in the fourth quarter of 2013. We expect the company to improve growth rates going forward. Amazon continues to expand into large new growth markets, including apparel, consumer product goods, consumer electronics, grocery, and Amazon Web Services. Given that e-commerce still represents less than 10% of retail sales today, we believe that the ongoing shift to online retailing represents a multi-year growth opportunity from which Amazon should benefit.





From Baron Funds' first quarter 2014 commentary.



Check out Ron Baron latest stock trades

Top Ranked Articles about Amazon.com Inc

Bill Nygren's Stocks Trading Near 52-Week Lows
In Bill Nygren (Trades, Portfolio)’s Oakmark Fund, he seeks undervalued stocks of companies that have a strong balance sheet, significant free cash flow and capable management teams that maximize shareholder value, and takes long-term view. Read more...
Can Coke Refresh Your Stock Portfolio?
The Amazon Valuation Dilemma
Conventional wisdom from value investing says that Amazon (AMZN) is extremely overpriced. In Ben Graham’s “The Intelligent Investor”, he says that it is generally not wise to buy a stock over 1.5 times its book value, although it would be okay to slightly overpay if the P/E was below 15. Now how about a price-to-book (P/B) ratio of 14.3 and a P/E of 509? It seems absurd that a value investor would consider buying this stock given those extremely high valuations. But when you take a step back to think about it, how much would someone be willing to pay for a company that is single handedly destroying everyone in the retail industry? I am pretty sure it would be more than $15.9 billion, 1.5 times Amazon’s book value. Read more...
Bill Nygren Comments on Amazon
That brings me to our newest position, which will no doubt make some question our credentials as value investors: Amazon (AMZN). Read more...
Bill Nygren's Oakmark Fund - Second Quarter 2014 Letter
June 30, 2014 Read more...
Amazon: A Growth or Value Stock?
1. The Company Read more...
Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com
Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (AMZN), the world's largest online retailer, fell 16% due to weaker than anticipated revenue growth in the fourth quarter of 2013. We expect the company to improve growth rates going forward. Amazon continues to expand into large new growth markets, including apparel, consumer product goods, consumer electronics, grocery, and Amazon Web Services. Given that e-commerce still represents less than 10% of retail sales today, we believe that the ongoing shift to online retailing represents a multi-year growth opportunity from which Amazon should benefit. Read more...
Tech Stocks with David Einhorn’s New Short Criterion of 90% Downside
David Einhorn (Trades, Portfolio) had a mediocre quarter one, dropping 1.5% while the S&P gained 1.2%, but he spies opportunities up ahead, according to his Greenlight Capital letter. One such is a short of a basket of technology stocks he believes are far overvalued and due for a correction, for which there is a precedent from the last tech bubble. Read more...

Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
Forward P/E 90.91
AMZN's Forward P/E is ranked higher than
59% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 24.88 vs. AMZN: 90.91 )
N/A
P/B 16.00
AMZN's P/B is ranked lower than
62% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.40 vs. AMZN: 16.00 )
AMZN' s 10-Year P/B Range
Min: 6.43   Max: 4806
Current: 16

6.43
4806
P/S 1.92
AMZN's P/S is ranked lower than
57% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.91 vs. AMZN: 1.92 )
AMZN' s 10-Year P/S Range
Min: 0.9   Max: 3.91
Current: 1.92

0.9
3.91
PFCF 87.10
AMZN's PFCF is ranked higher than
62% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 45.09 vs. AMZN: 87.10 )
AMZN' s 10-Year PFCF Range
Min: 15.52   Max: 559.57
Current: 87.1

15.52
559.57
POCF 25.63
AMZN's POCF is ranked higher than
66% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 16.57 vs. AMZN: 25.63 )
AMZN' s 10-Year POCF Range
Min: 12.44   Max: 64.93
Current: 25.63

12.44
64.93
EV-to-EBIT 965.18
AMZN's EV-to-EBIT is ranked higher than
56% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 19.25 vs. AMZN: 965.18 )
AMZN' s 10-Year EV-to-EBIT Range
Min: 17.4   Max: 1614.3
Current: 965.18

17.4
1614.3
Shiller P/E 352.00
AMZN's Shiller P/E is ranked higher than
62% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 48.76 vs. AMZN: 352.00 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Shiller P/E Range
Min: 43.53   Max: 407.8
Current: 352

43.53
407.8
Current Ratio 1.12
AMZN's Current Ratio is ranked higher than
57% of the 1280 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.57 vs. AMZN: 1.12 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Current Ratio Range
Min: 1.07   Max: 3.09
Current: 1.12

1.07
3.09
Quick Ratio 0.82
AMZN's Quick Ratio is ranked higher than
70% of the 1280 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.85 vs. AMZN: 0.82 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Quick Ratio Range
Min: 0.75   Max: 2.89
Current: 0.82

0.75
2.89
Days Inventory 42.33
AMZN's Days Inventory is ranked higher than
87% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 99.00 vs. AMZN: 42.33 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Days Inventory Range
Min: 15.13   Max: 45.69
Current: 42.33

15.13
45.69
Days Sales Outstanding 23.02
AMZN's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked higher than
71% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 22.52 vs. AMZN: 23.02 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Days Sales Outstanding Range
Min: 9.12   Max: 23.37
Current: 23.02

9.12
23.37

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price/Tangible Book 23.10
AMZN's Price/Tangible Book is ranked lower than
58% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.60 vs. AMZN: 23.10 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Price/Tangible Book Range
Min: 10.6   Max: 261.94
Current: 23.1

10.6
261.94
Price/DCF (Projected) 4.50
AMZN's Price/DCF (Projected) is ranked higher than
68% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.20 vs. AMZN: 4.50 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Price/DCF (Projected) Range
Min: 1.72   Max: 260.53
Current: 4.5

1.72
260.53
Price/Median PS Value 1.00
AMZN's Price/Median PS Value is ranked higher than
80% of the 1362 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.20 vs. AMZN: 1.00 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Price/Median PS Value Range
Min: 0.58   Max: 12.75
Current: 1

0.58
12.75
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) 0.10
AMZN's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) is ranked lower than
51% of the 1279 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.60 vs. AMZN: 0.10 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) Range
Min: 0.1   Max: 5.7
Current: 0.1

0.1
5.7
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) 24.46
AMZN's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) is ranked higher than
93% of the 884 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 9.63 vs. AMZN: 24.46 )
AMZN' s 10-Year Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) Range
Min: -1   Max: 62.6
Current: 24.46

-1
62.6

Business Description

Industry: Retail - Apparel & Specialty » Specialty Retail
Compare:TSCO, EBAY, FIVE, AZO, BBBY » details
Traded in other countries:AMZ.Germany, AMZO34.Brazil, AMZ N.Mexico, AMZN.Chile, AMZN.Switzerland, 0R1O.UK,
Amazon.com Inc was incorporated in July 1994 in the state of Washington. It was reincorporated in 1996 in the state of Delaware. The Company had completed its initial public offering in May 1997. It is an online retailer. The Company sells its products through its website. It also provides services such as advertising services and co-branded credit card agreements. It operates its business on geographical basis and has accordingly organized its operations into two segments: North America and International. The Company serves its consumers through its retail websites with respect to criteria such as selection, price and convenience. It has designed its websites to enable the sale of the products of the company and third parties across different product categories. Customers can access its websites directly and also through their own mobile websites and applications. The Company also manufactures and sells electronic devices. In addition, it offers Amazon Prime - an annual membership program that includes unlimited free shipping on different items, access to unlimited instant streaming of movies and TV episodes, and access to books to be borrowed and read for free on a Kindle device. It offers programs that enable sellers to sell their products on its websites and on their own branded websites, and offers to fulfill orders through them. The Company serves authors and independent publishers with Kindle Direct Publishing - an online platform that lets independent authors and publishers choose a percentage of their royalty option and make their books available in the Kindle Store, along with Amazon's own publishing arm Amazon Publishing. It also offers programs that allow authors, musicians, filmmakers, application developers and others to publish and sell content. The Company provides e-commerce and other services to businesses through commercial agreements, strategic alliances and business relationships. It provides services such as web services, technology, computing, digital storage and other services, as well as enables sellers to offer products and services through its websites. The Company is subject to general business regulations and laws, as well as regulations and laws specifically governing the Internet, e-commerce, electronic devices, and other services.
» More Articles for AMZN

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