John Hussman: Deflationary Boom?
On Friday, bonds fell, stocks rallied and the U.S. dollar surged on strength in the June non-farm payroll report. While employment is widely understood to be a lagging, not leading indicator of the economy, the report would be worthy of enthusiasm if it was also coupled with strength in leading economic measures and coincident/lagging measures. We observe little evidence of that at present. Indeed, while both the establishment and household surveys showed job growth in June, the composition detail in the household survey was hardly an indication of a robust economy, with a loss of 240,000 full-time jobs offset by a 360,000 gain in employees reporting that they usually work part-time. Fully 352,000 of this increase fell into the category of “part time for economic reasons (slack work or business conditions).”
We can make sense of the “deflationary boom” thesis only if we consider various pieces in isolation, rather than as a cohesive whole. With Europe still in a recession, and an acute relapse of credit concerns in Portugal in recent days, Mario Draghi at the European Central Bank reached for the only tool still at his infinite disposal – words – to promise that interest rates would be held at zero for a significant length of time. In China, debt servicing problems are emerging in corporate and local government debt following years of unproductive overinvestment in still-vacant buildings, and attempts to slow the rapid, low-quality credit growth has quickly been met by strains on liquidity and economic growth. Coupled with the better-than-expected employment numbers, at least on the surface, Wall Street has chosen China and Europe to make the deflation case, and the perception of U.S. economic growth as the basis for a “cleanest dirty shirt” argument for the U.S. dollar and U.S. equities. In effect, Wall Street is singing “We are the world… so the rest of the world can sink into the sea.”
While the “deflationary boom” thesis appears implausible, our investment views don’t rest on that judgment. Rather, our investment views are driven by prevailing, observable conditions, and the average return/risk profile that has historically accompanied similar conditions. From that standpoint, the present difference between 10-year Treasury yields and 3-month T-bill yields is now higher than in 85% of post-war instances, with no evident pressures on inflation or capacity. While we fully expect a “tapering” of the pace of quantitative easing, we also estimate that even a 0.25% hike in Treasury bill yields would require the Federal Reserve to actually reduce the size of its balance sheet by at least $400 billion, which is nowhere in the offing. Even in the absence of recession risks (which we continue to view as a much greater prospect than a surprising economic boom), Treasury bonds appear reasonably priced relative to alternatives – something that we don’t believe can be said of equities.
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