Switch to:
Also traded in: Canada, Germany, Mexico, Switzerland, UK

GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 3/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash-to-Debt 0.04
VRX's Cash-to-Debt is ranked lower than
96% of the 827 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.89 vs. VRX: 0.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash-to-Debt only.
VRX' s Cash-to-Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -1.06  Med: 0.19 Max: No Debt
Current: 0.04
-1.06
No Debt
Equity-to-Asset 0.13
VRX's Equity-to-Asset is ranked lower than
96% of the 766 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 0.64 vs. VRX: 0.13 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity-to-Asset only.
VRX' s Equity-to-Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.07  Med: 0.46 Max: 0.85
Current: 0.13
0.07
0.85
Debt-to-Equity 5.10
VRX's Debt-to-Equity is ranked lower than
99% of the 535 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 0.30 vs. VRX: 5.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-Equity only.
VRX' s Debt-to-Equity Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.04  Med: 0.79 Max: 9.47
Current: 5.1
0.04
9.47
Debt-to-EBITDA 7.69
VRX's Debt-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
93% of the 503 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.74 vs. VRX: 7.69 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-EBITDA only.
VRX' s Debt-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.28  Med: 8.03 Max: 36
Current: 7.69
0.28
36
Interest Coverage 0.31
VRX's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 641 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 106.84 vs. VRX: 0.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
VRX' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.17  Med: 2.06 Max: 121.91
Current: 0.31
0.17
121.91
Piotroski F-Score: 5
Altman Z-Score: 0.32
Beneish M-Score: -2.83
WACC vs ROIC
5.82%
-1.03%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 7/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating Margin % 6.50
VRX's Operating Margin % is ranked lower than
76% of the 781 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 7.94 vs. VRX: 6.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating Margin % only.
VRX' s Operating Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -9.32  Med: 13.49 Max: 24.38
Current: 6.5
-9.32
24.38
Net Margin % 14.51
VRX's Net Margin % is ranked lower than
78% of the 780 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 6.12 vs. VRX: 14.51 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net Margin % only.
VRX' s Net Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -24.9  Med: 1.89 Max: 26.4
Current: 14.51
-24.9
26.4
ROE % 31.91
VRX's ROE % is ranked lower than
81% of the 803 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 7.08 vs. VRX: 31.91 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE % only.
VRX' s ROE % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -52.21  Med: 0.33 Max: 31.91
Current: 31.91
-52.21
31.91
ROA % 3.04
VRX's ROA % is ranked lower than
71% of the 831 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 3.77 vs. VRX: 3.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA % only.
VRX' s ROA % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -5.13  Med: 0.3 Max: 13.02
Current: 3.04
-5.13
13.02
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % 24.74
VRX's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
75% of the 817 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 13.08 vs. VRX: 24.74 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % only.
VRX' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -69.94  Med: 64.52 Max: 144.06
Current: 24.74
-69.94
144.06
3-Year Revenue Growth Rate 24.80
VRX's 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate is ranked higher than
89% of the 674 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 5.40 vs. VRX: 24.80 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate only.
VRX' s 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -10.8  Med: 27.4 Max: 82.5
Current: 24.8
-10.8
82.5
3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate 19.30
VRX's 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate is ranked higher than
68% of the 656 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 9.20 vs. VRX: 19.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate only.
VRX' s 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -35.7  Med: 19.3 Max: 113.3
Current: 19.3
-35.7
113.3
3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate 47.70
VRX's 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate is ranked higher than
88% of the 632 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 7.50 vs. VRX: 47.70 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate only.
VRX' s 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -37.1  Med: 20.75 Max: 101
Current: 47.7
-37.1
101
GuruFocus has detected 4 Warning Signs with Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc VRX.
More than 500,000 people have already joined GuruFocus to track the stocks they follow and exchange investment ideas.
» VRX's 30-Y Financials

Financials (Next Earnings Date: 2018-02-28)


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Operating Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow
Operating Cash Flow & Net Income

» Details

Guru Trades

Q4 2016

VRX Guru Trades in Q4 2016

Jim Simons 2,913,089 sh (+573.56%)
First Eagle Investment 613,800 sh (+61.14%)
Private Capital 478,125 sh (+37.64%)
Francis Chou 1,960,843 sh (+35.53%)
John Paulson 19,384,500 sh (+2.72%)
George Soros 500,000 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 1,320,000 sh (unchged)
Jeff Ubben 14,994,261 sh (unchged)
Ruane Cunniff Sold Out
Steven Cohen Sold Out
Chris Davis 7,000,303 sh (-4.95%)
Bill Ackman 18,114,432 sh (-16.10%)
Diamond Hill Capital 34,500 sh (-90.04%)
» More
Q1 2017

VRX Guru Trades in Q1 2017

Murray Stahl 26,485 sh (New)
Steven Cohen 359,000 sh (New)
Francis Chou 2,353,843 sh (+20.04%)
Jeff Ubben 17,997,224 sh (+20.03%)
Private Capital 481,390 sh (+0.68%)
John Paulson 19,384,500 sh (unchged)
Diamond Hill Capital 34,500 sh (unchged)
Bill Ackman Sold Out
Jim Simons Sold Out
First Eagle Investment 613,100 sh (-0.11%)
Chris Davis 3,917,812 sh (-44.03%)
» More
Q2 2017

VRX Guru Trades in Q2 2017

Robert Bruce 581,000 sh (New)
Ray Dalio 70,269 sh (New)
Jim Simons 2,402,589 sh (New)
Joel Greenblatt 823,046 sh (New)
Francis Chou 3,053,843 sh (+29.74%)
John Paulson 21,813,400 sh (+12.53%)
Diamond Hill Capital 34,500 sh (unchged)
George Soros 1,650,000 sh (unchged)
Jeff Ubben 17,997,224 sh (unchged)
Chris Davis Sold Out
Private Capital Sold Out
Murray Stahl 26,273 sh (-0.80%)
First Eagle Investment 551,300 sh (-10.08%)
Steven Cohen 50,000 sh (-86.07%)
» More
Q3 2017

VRX Guru Trades in Q3 2017

Lee Ainslie 276,490 sh (New)
Jim Simons 4,780,500 sh (+98.97%)
Jeff Ubben 18,010,027 sh (+0.07%)
Diamond Hill Capital 34,500 sh (unchged)
First Eagle Investment 551,300 sh (unchged)
Ray Dalio 70,269 sh (unchged)
Murray Stahl 26,273 sh (unchged)
George Soros 2,160,000 sh (unchged)
Francis Chou 3,053,843 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 3,500,000 sh (unchged)
Robert Bruce 581,000 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen Sold Out
John Paulson 20,839,035 sh (-4.47%)
Joel Greenblatt 475,002 sh (-42.29%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with VRX

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)

GuruDate Trades Impact to Portfolio Price Range * (?) Current Price Change from Average Current Shares
John Paulson 2017-09-30 Reduce -4.47%0.23%$13.1 - $17.77 $ 20.4135%20,839,035
Joel Greenblatt 2017-09-30 Reduce -42.29%0.08%$13.1 - $17.77 $ 20.4135%475,002
John Paulson 2017-08-09 Reduce -4.47%0.21%Premium Member Access $15.64 $ 20.4130%20,839,035
John Paulson 2017-06-30 Add 12.53%0.57%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4171%21,813,400
Joel Greenblatt 2017-06-30 New Buy0.2%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4171%823,046
Robert Bruce 2017-06-30 New Buy2.59%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4171%581,000
First Eagle Investment 2017-06-30 Reduce -10.08%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4172%551,300
Private Capital 2017-06-30 Sold Out 0.82%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4171%0
Chris Davis 2017-06-30 Sold Out 0.19%$8.51 - $17.31 $ 20.4171%0
John Paulson 2017-06-14 Add 12.53%0.4%Premium Member Access $12.46 $ 20.4164%21,813,400
Chris Davis 2017-03-31 Reduce -44.03%0.2%$10.64 - $16.86 $ 20.4148%3,917,812
First Eagle Investment 2017-03-31 Reduce -0.11%$10.64 - $16.86 $ 20.4148%613,100
Private Capital 2017-03-31 Add 0.68%0.01%$10.64 - $16.86 $ 20.4148%481,390
Bill Ackman 2017-03-31 Sold Out 4.45%$10.64 - $16.86 $ 20.4148%0
Bill Ackman 2017-03-13 Sold Out 4.45%Premium Member Access $12.11 $ 20.4169%0
John Paulson 2016-12-31 Add 2.72%0.1%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%19,384,500
Bill Ackman 2016-12-31 Reduce -16.10%1.58%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%18,114,432
Chris Davis 2016-12-31 Reduce -4.95%0.04%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%7,000,303
First Eagle Investment 2016-12-31 Add 61.14%0.01%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%613,800
Private Capital 2016-12-31 Add 37.64%0.29%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%478,125
Ruane Cunniff 2016-12-31 Sold Out 0.06%$13.6 - $24.59 $ 20.4111%0
Premium More recent guru trades are included for Premium Members only!!
Premium More recent guru trades are included for USA Subscribe Members only!!
» Interactive Charts

Peter Lynch Chart ( What is Peter Lynch Charts )

Business Description

Industry: Drug Manufacturers » Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic    NAICS: 325412    SIC: 3741
Compare:SHSE:603858, BOM:500257, TSE:4506, SZSE:002001, BOM:500124, XTER:SAZ, TSE:4581, OHEL:ORNBV, SZSE:000423, NYSE:CTLT, SHSE:600535, SZSE:002773, HKSE:00867, NSE:AUROPHARMA, BSP:HYPE3, SZSE:000513, BUD:RICHTER, SZSE:300122, SZSE:300142, TSE:4516 » details
Traded in other countries:VRX.Canada, BVF.Germany, VRX N.Mexico, VRX.Switzerland, 0QYW.UK,
Headquarter Location:Canada
Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc is a specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company which develops, manufactures, and markets a range of generic and branded generic pharmaceuticals, over-the-counter products and medical devices.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals is a global specialty pharmaceutical firm with a focus on branded products for the dermatology, gastrointestinal, and ophthalmology markets. The firm also has a branded generics business that operates primarily in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia.

Guru Investment Theses on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant in Annual Shareholder Letter - May 08, 2017

We recently sold Valeant at a price that may end up looking cheap. Why?

At the time of sale, Valeant represented about 3% of the Company. If the stock price had increased even very substantially from here, the impact on our overall performance would have been modest, and would not compensate us for the human resources and substantial mindshare that this investment had and would have continued to consume if we had remained a shareholder. Furthermore, while Valeant has made significant progress and we expect management to continue to do so, there is still a lot of work to be done.

Clearly, our investment in Valeant (NYSE:VRX) was a huge mistake. The highly acquisitive nature of Valeant’s business required flawless capital allocation and operational execution, and therefore, a larger than normal degree of reliance on management. In retrospect, we misjudged the prior management team and this contributed to our loss. We deeply regret this mistake, which has cost all of us a tremendous amount, and which has damaged the record of success of our firm.

While there are many lessons from our investment in Valeant which we have previously discussed at length, we highlight a few important reminders from this experience:

  • Mana gement’s historic ability to d eploy capital i n acquisitions and earn high rates of return is not a sufficiently durab e asset that one can assign m aterial value t o in assessing the intrinsic va lue of a busin ess.

When we acquired V aleant, we vie wed our purch ase price as re presenting a m odest discount to the value of the comp ny’s existing assets, but a large discount to intrinsic value in light of ou r expectation that managem ent would continue to b e able to invest capital in new transactions on terms that w ould create significant long term value as it had done over the previ ous eight years . In retrospect, it appears that prior management substantially overp aid for the com pany’s largest acquisition – its acquisition of Salix – which occurred c ntemporaneo sly with t he substantial majority of ou r investment in the company.

  • Intrin ic value can be dramatically affected by ch anges in regulations, politics , or other extrinsic factors we cannot control, and the existence of these factors is a highly im portant consideration in position sizing.

In retrospect, our in estment in Valeant was too arge a percentage of capital in light of the greater risk of these factors having a negative impact o n intrinsic valu e.

  • A ma agement team with a superb long-term investment record is still capable of making significant mist akes.

We ha d the opportu ity to work al ongside Valea nt management for nearly one year on the Allergan transa ction, and were favorably impressed. In p articular, ma nagement’s de cision to walk away from the Allergan deal on terms that we believed continued t o offer high ra tes of return an d significant s trategic value reinforced our view that the company had a highly disc iplined approach to investin g capital. This coupled with the company’s histor c acquisition a nd integration track record o ver approxima tely 100 previous transactio ns gave us com fort that the Salix transa tion would be highly value- reating for Va leant. In retro spect, it appea rs that the com pany substantially overpa d for Salix, and it has not yet achieved the results anticipated by prior anagement.

  • A large stock price d ecline can destroy substantia l amounts of intrinsic value due to its effe cts on morale, retent on and recruitment, and the perception and reputation of a company.

Our s perb investme nt results in General Growth Properties, where the stock price had declined more tha 99% before we made our first purchase, gave us confi dence that we could assist V aleant in a turnaround after its stock price collapse . In retrospect, Valeant’s un derlying busin esses were not sufficiently d urable to withstand the impact of the rep utational dam age caused by the stock price decline, negative media atte ntion, and its impact on employee morale, retention, recruitment and the repu tation of the company.

My appro a ch to mistakes is that I personally assume 00% of the responsibility on behalf of the firm while sha ring the credit f or our successes. While I an d the rest of th e Pershing Square team hav e suffered significant losses f rom this failed investment as we are collectively the large t investors in the funds, it is much more pa inful to lose our shareholders’ money, an d for this I deeply and profou ndly apologiz e.

We are ex tremely focused and working hard to contin ue to repair the damage from our investment in Valeant y diligently overseeing ou r existing portfolio companies and identifying new opportunities. With a strong commitment to the core principles that have generate d the vast majo rity of our ret urns since ince ption and the best and most e xperienced tea m that we have had since th e formation of the firm more than 13 years ago, we are w ell positioned for a strong recovery.

From 2016 annual letter to shareholders of Pershing Square by Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio).

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Francis Chou Comments on Valeant - Mar 24, 2017

At the current price, Valeant (NYSE:VRX) stock is not a mouth-watering bargain at less than 3 times earnings or less than 2 times free cash flow because it carries around $30 billion of debt, but it is still relatively cheap. If Valeant can reduce its debt by as much as $8 billion as stated by management, through a combination of organic earnings and the sale of non-core assets, it will remove the feeling that the company is standing on the edge of a precipice.

A large debt means that any small misstep or missed guidance could result in bankruptcy. If the company’s debt is reduced, it will then be valued based on the free cash flow generated from operations. In addition, Valeant is also undergoing criminal investigations over its ties with Philidor. However, we believe the impact of these litigations is likely to be rather limited given that it pertains to only 5% of its revenue. Although, we do emphasize that it is difficult to accurately predict the outcome or impact of any lawsuit.

In conclusion:

  • Valeant could return to trading at the normal multiples if its debt is significantly reduced and the impact and costs of litigations are determined.

  • The company appears to have good cash flow characteristics, resulting from solid portfolio pipelines.

  • While we believe Valeant is cheap, the undervaluation is not as deep as it first appears. One must look at return on a fully capitalized basis to get the full picture. Based on the information we now have, the initial price we paid was on the high side but we believe that the intrinsic value is higher than the average cost we have paid for Valeant.

From Francis Chou (Trades, Portfolio)'s Opportunity Fund fourth quarter 2016 shareholder letter.

Check out Francis Chou latest stock trades

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals International - Dec 09, 2016

Since our last update in August, Valeant (NYSE:VRX) has bolstered its management ranks, improved dermatology average selling prices (ASPs), stabilized its salesforces, and experienced acceleration in Salix script trends. Despite these positive developments, financial results continue to be challenged as certain unexpected events impacted Valeant in Q3 and weakness in Valeant’s U.S. Diversified Products segment continues to weigh on near- to medium-term earnings.

Valeant reported quarterly revenue of $2.48 billion, Adjusted EBITDA of $1.16 billion and Adjusted EPS of $1.55. This represented sequential improvement of 2%, 7% and 11%, respectively, as the business continues to stabilize following the disruption of recent quarters.

Beginning this quarter, management provided disclosure under the new financial reporting structure. The business is now aligned across three verticals: (1) Bausch + Lomb / International (“Durable”), (2) Branded Rx (“Growth”), and (3) U.S. Diversified Products (“Cash Generating”). This new disclosure is consistent with Valeant’s commitment to greater transparency. Over time, Valeant has indicated that a substantial mix-shift will take place in its business as Bausch + Lomb / International and Branded Rx target mid-single digit revenue growth (high-single digit operating income growth) while Valeant’s U.S. Diversified Products segment declines. As this mix-shift happens over time, a greater percentage of Valeant’s profits will come from higher quality, higher growth and more valuable businesses.

In conjunction with announcing Q3 results, management updated 2016 guidance, reducing full year estimates. Full year Adjusted EBITDA and EPS are now projected to be $4.25 billion to $4.35 billion (down from $4.8 billion - $4.95 billion) and $5.30 to $5.50, respectively (down from $6.60 to $7.00). Implicit in updated guidance is a sequential decline in Q4 versus Q3. Management addressed some of the key factors on the earnings call contributing to this dynamic, some of which are permanent headwinds while others are temporary.

Valeant management provided initial perspectives on 2017 results on the earnings call including an expectation for Bausch + Lomb / International and Branded Rx to achieve mid-single-digit revenue growth and high-single-digit operating profit growth. Management anticipates that this growth will be more than offset by the decline in U.S. Diversified Products (specifically the neurology and generics business) as a result of patent expirations and generic competition. Management announced the planned implementation of a zero-based-budgeting initiative, expected to save $75 to $100 million in 2017 and a goal to improve gross profit by $150 to $250 million by 2020 through supply chain rationalization.

Management reiterated its commitment to achieve more than $5 billion of debt reduction over the next 18 months from a combination of cash generation and asset divestitures. We believe that asset sales are an important catalyst for value creation and stock price appreciation at Valeant. Valeant has identified approximately $8 billion of assets that are non-core which it has begun to market for sale.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square third-quarter shareholder letter.

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Aug 29, 2016

At the time of our last financial report in March, Steve Fraidin and I had just joined the board of Valeant (NYSE:VRX) in an attempt to stabilize and enhance our investment in the company. Since we joined the board, the company has hired Joe Papa, an extremely capable and talented CEO, the substantial majority of the board has been replaced, the company has returned to filing its fmancial reports in a timely fashion, its bank debt has been successfully modified to substantially reduce the risk of covenant default, a highly credible and experienced CFO, Paul Herendeen, and General Counsel, Christina Ackermann, have joined the company, a new strategy and new fmancial reporting structure have been announced, and approximately $8 billion of assets are being evaluated for potential disposition.

As a result of the above developments, we believe that Valeant has been successfully stabilized and is on the path to recovery. While we still expect the occasional negative press article about the company due to the ongoing government investigations and civil litigation, continued business progress should begin to focus investors and the public's attention on the company's high quality brands and products and its mission to improve patients' lives. With improved business performance, cash generation and leverage reduction, we expect Valeant's stock price to increase substantially from current levels.

Valeant reported Adjusted EBITDA of $1.09 billion in the quarter and Adjusted EPS of $1.40. This represented sequential improvement vs. Q1 as the business continues to stabilize following the disruption from the events of the fall / winter of 2015.

Management reaffirmed full year 2016 guidance of $4.80 to $4.95 billion of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EPS of $6.60 to $7.00. On the earnings call, management discussed some of the key factors which are likely to accelerate growth through the end of the year including: increased profitability in dermatology, an acceleration in script growth at Salix (principally Xifaxan), emerging markets growth, the launch of Relistor Oral and traditional seasonality in the business.

Management announced specific actions the company has taken in recent weeks to return the dermatology business to profitable growth, including progress in improving the Walgreens distribution arrangement (beginning August 5, 2016), the launch of a coupon program for independent pharmacies (June 27th), a new prior authorization program administered by CoverMyMeds (August 4, 2016) and enhanced pharmacist training and education. Each of these initiatives should help improve the profitability of the dermatology franchise which has been challenged in recent quarters. On the earnings call, management discussed a plan to reduce the cost structure in-line with the current revenue base driven by consolidation of duplicative functions, vendor rationalization and other efficiencies.

The company introduced a new financial reporting structure which will be rolled out later this year. The business will now be aligned across three verticals: (1) Bausch + Lomb / International ("Durable Growth"), (2) Branded Rx ("Growth") and (3) U.S. Diversified Products ("Cash Generating"). This new disclosure provides a more logical and informative description of Valeant's different businesses, which when coupled with greater disclosure, provides investors with a more complete understanding of Valeant's growth trajectory, business durability and quality. Because Valeant's higher quality growth businesses — which represent 80% of revenue — are expected to grow rapidly, while the company's lower quality businesses — which currently represent 20% of revenues — are declining, over time Valeant's overall growth rate and business quality and cash flow durability should improve. This should lead investors to pay a higher valuation for the company over time.

In conjunction with the new reorganization, Valeant announced promotions of current executives and the hiring of three new executives: Christina Ackermann (EVP, General Counsel), Scott Hirsch (SVP, Business Strategy and Communications) and Sam Eldessouky (SVP, Corporate Controller and Chief Accounting Officer). On August 22, 2016, Valeant announced that Paul Herendeen, previously the CFO of Zoetis, would become CFO of the company. We think Paul is a superb choice in light of his long-term track record as a public company CFO in the specialty pharmaceutical industry, including his experience in turnarounds, highly leveraged situations, and his recent tenure at Zoetis where he led a substantial cost reduction initiative. We were very impressed with the work Paul did at Zoetis and are delighted to be working with him at Valeant.

Management reiterated its expectation to substantially reduce leverage in the coming months. The company expects to reduce debt by more than $5 billion over the next 18 months funded primarily by cash flow and to a lesser extent by asset sales. Management announced that it had identified non-core assets which represent a transaction value of —$8 billion or 11 times EBITDA (based on comparable assets sales and/or unsolicited indications of interest) which are being evaluated for divestment. Valeant owns a large collection of highly marketable assets which, due to the highly acquisitive and well-capitalized nature of the pharma sector, should be able to achieve attractive transaction values in our view.

Lastly, management noted that while the company is projected to be in compliance with its financial maintenance covenants under the bank debt through 2016 at current guidance, the "cushion is not as large" as management would like it to be. As a result, the company has negotiated a favorable modification of its bank credit facilities to reduce EBITDA maintenance covenants and permit a greater amount of asset sales.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s mid-year 2016 letter.

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - May 11, 2016

We have made material progress at Valeant (NYSE:VRX) since our last communication. Shortly after Steve Fraidin and I joined the board in March, the company launched a search process for a new CEO. On May 2nd, Joe Papa, formerly the Chairman and CEO of Perrigo (NYSE: PRGO), joined Valeant as its Chairman and CEO. We believe that Joe is an ideal choice for Valeant as he has extensive senior leadership experience in all aspects of the pharmaceutical industry, a strong reputation for integrity, and an excellent track record at Perrigo as reflected by the company’s 24% compounded annual return to shareholders during his tenure. Joe is passionate about the opportunity for value creation at Valeant, and we are excited to have him on board.



Valeant filed its 10-K as expected on April 29th, eliminating any potential default under its existing credit agreements. Other than the previously reported $58 million revenue restatement from Q4 2014, there were no other restatements required in the company’s audited statements. As this was likely one of the most carefully audited financial statements ever, this should serve to comfort investors as to the integrity of the company’s financial statements.

Valeant will have a largely new board slate for the upcoming annual meeting in June. Two of the company’s legacy directors will remain on the board – Bob Power and Bob Ingram, the company’s former Chairman. Over the past six weeks, the current board led by Bob Ingram has worked very effectively despite difficult circumstances. We are extremely appreciative of the board’s hard work and commitment to the company, and for the two Bobs’ willingness to continue to serve going forward.

The new board of Valeant will be comprised of CEO Joe Papa, Bob Ingram and Bob Power, the four directors who joined in March – Tom Ross, Fred Eshelman, Steve Fraidin and myself – Rob Hale, a representative of ValueAct, and three new directors who will join at the annual meeting. The new board will have ample shareholder representation, substantial executive level pharmaceutical industry expertise, and accounting expertise, as well as a practicing dermatologist.

There is much work to do at Valeant, which, among other issues, includes restoring the dermatology business to growth while working out transition issues with its new Walgreens distribution arrangement, accelerating the growth of Salix, Valeant’s gastrointestinal business, and reducing the company’s debt through free cash flow generation and the potential sale of non-core assets. We believe that Valeant has some of the best and most durable assets in the pharmaceutical industry, which do not require aggressive pricing in order to generate growth and substantial free cash flow. It will take time for Valeant to regain its stakeholders’ trust. We believe that this will occur over time as the company delivers several new quarters of results and continues to fulfill its commitments to shareholders, patients, doctors, and the community at large. Over time under Joe’s leadership, we expect the market to rerate Valeant to a substantially higher valuation reflective of its underlying business.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s first quarter shareholder letter.

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Apr 22, 2016

Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) is a multi-national, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of brand name, generic and over-the-counter products in over 100 countries. We closed our position in Valeant toward the end of October last year. The stock came under heavy selling pressure as a result of increased political scrutiny around drug pricing and possible wrongdoing at one of its “alternative fulfillment” pharmacy partners. Our decision to sell was ultimately based on a combination of important questions we had difficulty answering regarding potential long-term reputational damage to Valeant’s business, the likelihood of difficult payer negotiations, future business model uncertainty and financial leverage. While our investment in Valeant ended on a disappointing note, it was a healthy multi-year contributor to Fund performance.

From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s Weitz Value Fund 1st quarter 2016 commentary.

Check out Wallace Weitz latest stock trades

Sequoia Fund Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Mar 01, 2016

Sequoia turned in its second straight year of poor results in 2015.Teasing out the source of our underperformance doesn’t take much work. We began the year with a 20% weighting in Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX). Valeant rose by more than 80% through the summer, driving very strong gains for the Fund. But the price collapsed in the fall amid revelations and allegations about the company’s business practices. Ultimately, Valeant declined 29% for the year and by more than 70% from its 52-week high to its low. We bought more shares in October, and we calculate that Valeant contributed -6.3% to Sequoia’s return of -7.3% for the year.



At its peak price,Valeant constituted more than 30% of the Fund’s assets. We’ve been criticized for allowing the holding to grow so large, but our feeling before the crisis erupted was that Valeant was executing well on its business model. Earnings were growing rapidly and we believed the company was making intelligent acquisitions that were creating shareholder value.Valeant was taking outsized price increases on a portion of its drug portfolio, but the entire branded pharmaceutical industry routinely has taken substantial annual price increases on drugs for more than a decade.





As you are no doubt aware,Valeant was rocked in the fall by the closure of an affiliated specialty pharmacy, Philidor, after health care payers said they would not reimburse Philidor for claims it submitted. It has been further buffeted by subpoenas from Congress over its pricing strategies and by regulatory and law enforcement scrutiny over practices at Philidor. A committee of Valeant’s board of directors is investigating the relationship with Philidor.Valeant recently said it would restate prior earnings as it improperly accounted for sales to Philidor in late 2014.



As these inquiries continue andValeant remains a subject of intense scrutiny, the share price is very unstable. For the stock to regain credibility with long-term investors, Valeant will need to generate strong earnings and cash flow this year, make progress in paying down some of its debt, demonstrate that it can launch new drugs from its own development pipeline and avoid provoking health care payers and the government. The company has committed to doing all of these things and we are confident interim CEO Howard Schiller and interim board chairman Robert Ingram are focused on the right metrics. Before CEO J. Michael Pearson went out on an extended medical leave, he also seemed committed to this path.



In the end, Valeant’s ability to grow earnings over a period of years will determine the stock price. A few months ago, the consensus cash earnings estimate from Wall Street analysts for Valeant in 2016 was about $16 per share. Today, estimates are closer to $13.50. This represents material deterioration, but still good growth over 2015 results. And with strong performance from its gastrointestinal drug Xifaxan and a slate of new product releases in 2016, Valeant has the potential to grow earnings for several years driven more by organic volume increases than price hikes.



As the largest shareholder of Valeant, our own credibility as investors has been damaged by this saga. We’ve seen higher-than-normal redemptions in the Fund, had two of our five independent directors resign in October and been sued by two Sequoia shareholders over our concentration in Valeant. We do not believe the lawsuit has merit and intend to defend ourselves vigorously in court.



From Sequoia Fund's 4th quarter 2015 shareholder letter.



Check out Ruane Cunniff latest stock trades

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Jan 27, 2016

When we purchased Valeant at an average price of $196, we bought the company at a modest discount to intrinsic value as represented by the company’s existing portfolio of products and businesses, but at a very substantial discount to fair value in light of its acquisition track record, the large number of potential targets, and its competitive advantages which include its low-cost operating model and favorable tax structure. When the stock price rose this summer to the mid-$200s per share, we did not sell as we believed it was probable the company would likely complete additional transactions that would meaningfully increase intrinsic value. In retrospect, this was a very costly mistake.

Our failure to sell stock wasn’t entirely an unforced error as we found ourselves largely restricted from trading during this period. During the summer, we were made aware of a large potential transaction that Valeant was working on, and as a result, we were restricted from trading at a time when it would have been prudent to take some money off the table. In retrospect, in light of Valeant (NYSE:VRX)’s leverage and the regulatory and political sensitivity of its underlying business, we should have avoided becoming restricted to preserve trading flexibility, or alternatively, we should have made a smaller initial investment in the company.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square Annual Investor Letter 2015.

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Wallace Weitz Comments on Valeant Pharmaceuticals - Jan 22, 2016

Valeant Pharmaceuticals (NYSE:VRX) is a multinational, specialty pharmaceutical and medical device company that develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of brand name, generic, branded generic and over-the-counter (OTC) products in over 100 countries. We closed the firm’s position in Valeant toward the end of October. The stock came under heavy selling pressure in September as a result of increased political scrutiny regarding the increasing cost of prescription drugs. We believed pricing risks were (and are) real and growing but navigable. Our base-case business value estimate assumed (and had always assumed) minimal contribution from future price increases. In October, however, questions arose about the possibility of wrongdoing and questionable disclosure regarding Philidor, an “alternative fulfillment” pharmacy Valeant used to distribute portions of its dermatology medications. Our decision to sell was ultimately based on a combination of difficult to answer questions, Valeant’s potential long-term reputational impact, future business model uncertainty, and financial leverage. We also had competing uses for capital in healthcare with more attractive risk-reward profiles. While our investment in Valeant ended on a disappointing note, it was a healthy multi-year contributor to performance.

From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s fourth quarter 2015 Value Fund commentary.

Check out Wallace Weitz latest stock trades

Bill Ackman Comments on Valeant - Dec 16, 2015

Valeant (NYSE:VRX)

Valeant’s stock price declined significantly in the quarter as a result of statements by politicians regarding drug price increases, subpoenas from regulators, attacks by short sellers, and the termination of Valeant’s relationship with Philidor, a specialty pharmacy distribution channel used for dermatology products. On October 30, 2015, we held an investor conference call to answer the many questions we received about our investment in Valeant.

Approximately six weeks ago, Valeant’s board formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the recent allegations made against Philidor, including claims that Valeant management was involved in the alleged wrongdoing at Philidor. The committee has hired former U.S. Deputy Attorney General and Kirkland & Ellis partner Mark Filip to lead the investigation.

Valeant will hold an in-person, half-day investor meeting tomorrow, Wednesday, December 16th, to provide updated financial guidance for 2016, review the company’s strategy, and answer investor questions. We believe that this is an important step for Valeant to restore investor confidence.

On November 23rd, we filed a 13D reflecting our increased stake in Valeant. Before we increased our position, we did substantial due diligence by re-underwriting our investment in the company. In particular, we reviewed all of the short sellers’ allegations, the potential political and regulatory risks, the impact of the shutdown of Philidor, and the company’s capital structure, debt covenants, and overall financial risk. We updated our financial model in light of recent business developments in order to better assess free cash flows, how quickly the company would be able to reduce leverage, the probability of financial distress, and to determine a conservative estimate of Valeant’s intrinsic value.

Ultimately, we concluded that the risk of bankruptcy or financial distress was de minimis in light of (1) the highly cash-flow-generative nature of the business, (2) the minimal debt maturities over the next several years, (3) the nature of Valeant’s financial covenants, and the highly diversified (both by therapeutic area and geography) product portfolio. Because Valeant owns a highly diversified, divisible, and desirable portfolio of products that can be sold product -by-product and/or division-by-division in an industry with many well-capitalized buyers, it could deleverage at an even more rapid rate if it chose to do so. Once we determined that the risk of financial default was extremely small and the stock was trading at an enormous discount to intrinsic value, we considered various approaches to increasing our investment.

Generally, we purchase stocks outright to get exposure to a particular investment. In this case, we took advantage of the high volatility of Valeant stock, its extremely low share price, and the high degree of market uncertainty in choosing to build a position that offered us a compelling reward for the potential risk. Rather than purchase common stock outright, we increased our investment through a contemporaneous series of over-the-counter option transactions. The bulk of the increase in our investment in Valeant was created through the sale of European-style put options struck at a $60 stock price, the purchase of American-style call options at a $95 stock price, and the sale of European -style call options at $165 stock price, all of which expire in January 2017. This derivative position gives us the upside of the stock from $95 per share up to $165 per share until January 2017. The net purchase price of the options was $6.75.

In summary, if the stock rises to $ 165 or more by January 2017, we will make more than 10 times our net investment over this period. Our downside is equal to the net purchase price of each option plus the decline in the stock price, if any, below $60 per share as of January 2017. By selling European-style put options, the shares cannot be put to us until January of 2017. By then, we estimate that Valeant’s stock price will be substantially in excess of $60 per share, potentially several multiples of this price.

The upside of our derivative investment is approximately equal to that of owning the stock outright at $95 per share with 30% less downside, i.e., if the stock were to go zero, we would lose approximately $67 per share, (the put strike price plus the net option premium). By selling two options for every option that we have purchased, we have also minimized the effective cost of this investment and limited the impact of rapid time value decay which is characteristic of an outright option purchase on a highly volatile stock. In a worse-case scenario, which we believe is extremely unlikely to occur, we risked approximately 4% of additional capital on this investment while increasing our notional exposure to Valeant by about 6% of the portfolio.

We added to our investment because we believe that Valeant shares are enormously undervalued. While we expect a degree of disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business, we believe that the fundamentals of Valeant’s overall business remain strong. Just this morning, Valeant announced a 20-year agreement with Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., the largest pharmacy chain in the U.S. with more than 8,000 units, which will “more than replace” Valeant’s Philidor specialty pharmacy distribution. We believe that this agreement will go a long way to addressing concerns about the disruption to Valeant’s dermatology business by expanding convenient and affordable access to Valeant products, and will help restore credibility by the company partnering with the largest and best-managed pharmacy chain. The agreement provides for discounted pricing for Valeant’s dermatology and ophthalmology products reducing costs for the health care system.

Valeant’s stock price is currently impacted by the high degree of uncertainty created by the shutdown of Philidor and the corresponding investigation of allegations, recent political scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry, negative press coverage of Valeant, and technical trading factors. These technical factors include: (1) the large amount of tax-loss selling which will likely continue until year end, (2) redemption-related sales from funds whose performance was affected by the decline in Valeant’s stock price, (3) “window dressing” where investment managers who held Valeant stock sell it before year-end so they do not need to show their investors the actual losses they incurred holding the position, and (4) the inherent complexity of the company that requires substantial due diligence before new investors establish their investment.

Because of the controversy around Valeant, many portfolio managers have been unwilling to retain an investment in the company as client scrutiny and headline risk became intolerable. In light of the above technical factors, we believe that most new investors would prefer to wait to establish an investment in Valeant until after the upcoming analyst day and when year-end technical factors abate.

There are a number of relatively short-term catalysts that we believe may lift the overhang on Valeant shares. We expect that this morning’s announcement will reduce if not eliminate concerns about disruptions in the distribution of Valeant’s dermatology products. We expect that additional uncertainty will begin to dissipate at tomorrow’s analyst day when the company will announce its revenues and earnings guidance for 2016 and answer questions from existing and prospective investors. In addition, we expect the results of the Philidor investigation to be announced sometime in the first quarter of next year. The company will likely file its 10-K in February with the results of Price Waterhouse’s year-end audit. This should comfort investors who have concerns about Valeant’s accounting.

While we expect a messy fourth quarter due to the shutdown of Philidor and investigative costs, the company should be able to post “clean” quarters beginning in the second quarter of next year. With the passage of time, the reduction in uncertainty, increased transparency, the reporting of operating results which we anticipate to be strong, along with the deleveraging of the balance sheet, we expect Valeant stock to rise substantially.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square Holdings third quarter 2015 letter to shareholders.

Check out Bill Ackman latest stock trades

Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
PE Ratio 5.23
VRX's PE Ratio is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 570 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 25.41 vs. VRX: 5.23 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio only.
VRX' s PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 3.04  Med: 18.66 Max: 710.87
Current: 5.23
3.04
710.87
Forward PE Ratio 5.65
VRX's Forward PE Ratio is ranked higher than
96% of the 74 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 19.53 vs. VRX: 5.65 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward PE Ratio only.
N/A
PE Ratio without NRI 5.23
VRX's PE Ratio without NRI is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 566 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 25.56 vs. VRX: 5.23 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio without NRI only.
VRX' s PE Ratio without NRI Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 3.04  Med: 18.66 Max: 710.87
Current: 5.23
3.04
710.87
Price-to-Owner-Earnings 4.25
VRX's Price-to-Owner-Earnings is ranked higher than
85% of the 310 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 33.43 vs. VRX: 4.25 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Owner-Earnings only.
VRX' s Price-to-Owner-Earnings Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.5  Med: 21.74 Max: 805.48
Current: 4.25
2.5
805.48
PB Ratio 1.39
VRX's PB Ratio is ranked higher than
85% of the 798 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.86 vs. VRX: 1.39 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PB Ratio only.
VRX' s PB Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.76  Med: 2.58 Max: 14.44
Current: 1.39
0.76
14.44
PS Ratio 0.81
VRX's PS Ratio is ranked higher than
92% of the 756 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.79 vs. VRX: 0.81 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PS Ratio only.
VRX' s PS Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.32  Med: 3.6 Max: 10.51
Current: 0.81
0.32
10.51
Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow 3.52
VRX's Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow is ranked higher than
97% of the 212 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 25.72 vs. VRX: 3.52 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow only.
VRX' s Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.44  Med: 13.37 Max: 276.26
Current: 3.52
1.44
276.26
Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow 3.00
VRX's Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow is ranked higher than
98% of the 290 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 17.64 vs. VRX: 3.00 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow only.
VRX' s Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.22  Med: 10.85 Max: 48.3
Current: 3
1.22
48.3
EV-to-EBIT 55.50
VRX's EV-to-EBIT is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 572 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 19.28 vs. VRX: 55.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
VRX' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -1211.6  Med: 12.85 Max: 379.5
Current: 55.5
-1211.6
379.5
EV-to-EBITDA 9.48
VRX's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked higher than
56% of the 596 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 16.61 vs. VRX: 9.48 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
VRX' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -31  Med: 16.1 Max: 147.6
Current: 9.48
-31
147.6
EV-to-Revenue 3.57
VRX's EV-to-Revenue is ranked lower than
54% of the 775 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 3.07 vs. VRX: 3.57 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-Revenue only.
VRX' s EV-to-Revenue Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.3  Med: 5.55 Max: 14
Current: 3.57
1.3
14
PEG Ratio 0.12
VRX's PEG Ratio is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 317 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.89 vs. VRX: 0.12 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG Ratio only.
VRX' s PEG Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.1  Med: 1.48 Max: 262.78
Current: 0.12
0.1
262.78
Current Ratio 1.26
VRX's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
78% of the 738 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.53 vs. VRX: 1.26 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
VRX' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.72  Med: 1.54 Max: 9.68
Current: 1.26
0.72
9.68
Quick Ratio 1.03
VRX's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
72% of the 736 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.94 vs. VRX: 1.03 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
VRX' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.59  Med: 1.2 Max: 9.3
Current: 1.03
0.59
9.3
Days Inventory 160.31
VRX's Days Inventory is ranked lower than
73% of the 729 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 120.98 vs. VRX: 160.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
VRX' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 115.84  Med: 140.69 Max: 169.11
Current: 160.31
115.84
169.11
Days Sales Outstanding 85.22
VRX's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked lower than
58% of the 682 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 73.92 vs. VRX: 85.22 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
VRX' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 43.41  Med: 82.81 Max: 106.05
Current: 85.22
43.41
106.05
Days Payable 54.40
VRX's Days Payable is ranked lower than
64% of the 619 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 68.69 vs. VRX: 54.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
VRX' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 45.29  Med: 79.15 Max: 120.5
Current: 54.4
45.29
120.5

Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio -1.50
VRX's 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio is ranked higher than
67% of the 522 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: -4.80 vs. VRX: -1.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio only.
VRX' s 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -34.7  Med: -3 Max: 14
Current: -1.5
-34.7
14

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF 0.29
VRX's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF is ranked higher than
98% of the 306 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 2.32 vs. VRX: 0.29 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF only.
VRX' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.18  Med: 1.74 Max: 11.22
Current: 0.29
0.18
11.22
Price-to-Median-PS-Value 0.21
VRX's Price-to-Median-PS-Value is ranked higher than
98% of the 676 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.04 vs. VRX: 0.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Median-PS-Value only.
VRX' s Price-to-Median-PS-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.11  Med: 1.55 Max: 6.01
Current: 0.21
0.11
6.01
Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value 0.21
VRX's Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 183 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 1.58 vs. VRX: 0.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value only.
VRX' s Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.15  Med: 2.29 Max: 117.96
Current: 0.21
0.15
117.96
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % 1.81
VRX's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
71% of the 834 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 3.23 vs. VRX: 1.81 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % only.
VRX' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -11.8  Med: 1.4 Max: 22.8
Current: 1.81
-11.8
22.8
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % 54.74
VRX's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % is ranked higher than
97% of the 397 Companies
in the Global Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic industry.

( Industry Median: 10.07 vs. VRX: 54.74 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % only.
VRX' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.5  Med: 21.2 Max: 97.3
Current: 54.74
2.5
97.3

More Statistics

Revenue (TTM) (Mil) $8,964.00
EPS (TTM) $ 3.90
Beta-1.06
Short Percentage of Float9.77%
52-Week Range $8.31 - 18.25
Shares Outstanding (Mil)348.59

Analyst Estimate

Dec17 Dec18 Dec19 Dec20
Revenue (Mil $) 8,730 8,501 8,880 9,077
EPS ($) 3.88 3.90 4.66 5.27
EPS without NRI ($) 3.88 3.90 4.66 5.27
EPS Growth Rate
(Future 3Y To 5Y Estimate)
N/A
Dividends per Share ($)

Piotroski F-Score Details

Piotroski F-Score: 55
Positive ROAY
Positive CFROAY
Higher ROA yoyY
CFROA > ROAY
Lower Leverage yoyY
Higher Current Ratio yoyN
Less Shares Outstanding yoyN
Higher Gross Margin yoyN
Higher Asset Turnover yoyN

Personalized Checklist

Checklist has been moved to "Checklist" tab.

Get WordPress Plugins for easy affiliate links on Stock Tickers and Guru Names | Earn affiliate commissions by embedding GuruFocus Charts
GuruFocus Affiliate Program: Earn up to $400 per referral. ( Learn More)

GF Chat

{{numOfNotice}}