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GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 5/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash-to-Debt 0.72
NYSE:HLF's Cash-to-Debt is ranked higher than
52% of the 1622 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.63 vs. NYSE:HLF: 0.72 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash-to-Debt only.
NYSE:HLF' s Cash-to-Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.28  Med: 0.62 Max: 1.59
Current: 0.72
0.28
1.59
Equity-to-Asset 0.06
NYSE:HLF's Equity-to-Asset is ranked lower than
95% of the 1597 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.52 vs. NYSE:HLF: 0.06 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity-to-Asset only.
NYSE:HLF' s Equity-to-Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.18  Med: 0.21 Max: 0.43
Current: 0.06
-0.18
0.43
Debt-to-Equity 10.41
NYSE:HLF's Debt-to-Equity is ranked lower than
99% of the 1204 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 0.51 vs. NYSE:HLF: 10.41 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-Equity only.
NYSE:HLF' s Debt-to-Equity Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -30.32  Med: 1.21 Max: 43.9
Current: 10.41
-30.32
43.9
Debt-to-EBITDA 3.09
NYSE:HLF's Debt-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
55% of the 1266 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.60 vs. NYSE:HLF: 3.09 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-EBITDA only.
NYSE:HLF' s Debt-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.32  Med: 1.2 Max: 3.09
Current: 3.09
0.32
3.09
Interest Coverage 4.41
NYSE:HLF's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
72% of the 1420 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 18.35 vs. NYSE:HLF: 4.41 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
NYSE:HLF' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.41  Med: 28.63 Max: 57
Current: 4.41
4.41
57
Piotroski F-Score: 6
Altman Z-Score: 3.56
Beneish M-Score: -2.59
WACC vs ROIC
4.02%
57.85%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating Margin % 14.30
NYSE:HLF's Operating Margin % is ranked higher than
81% of the 1615 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 5.66 vs. NYSE:HLF: 14.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating Margin % only.
NYSE:HLF' s Operating Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 10.21  Med: 14.13 Max: 16.28
Current: 14.3
10.21
16.28
Net Margin % 8.60
NYSE:HLF's Net Margin % is ranked higher than
75% of the 1613 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.91 vs. NYSE:HLF: 8.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net Margin % only.
NYSE:HLF' s Net Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 5.79  Med: 9.15 Max: 12.01
Current: 8.6
5.79
12.01
ROE % 187.15
NYSE:HLF's ROE % is ranked higher than
100% of the 1580 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 8.59 vs. NYSE:HLF: 187.15 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE % only.
NYSE:HLF' s ROE % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 67.66  Med: 98.34 Max: 364.15
Current: 187.15
67.66
364.15
ROA % 12.16
NYSE:HLF's ROA % is ranked higher than
88% of the 1647 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 3.91 vs. NYSE:HLF: 12.16 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA % only.
NYSE:HLF' s ROA % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 10.31  Med: 19.29 Max: 30.79
Current: 12.16
10.31
30.79
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % 170.12
NYSE:HLF's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % is ranked higher than
97% of the 1635 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 13.31 vs. NYSE:HLF: 170.12 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % only.
NYSE:HLF' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 129.39  Med: 192.8 Max: 306.98
Current: 170.12
129.39
306.98
3-Year Revenue Growth Rate 5.10
NYSE:HLF's 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate is ranked higher than
62% of the 1446 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.60 vs. NYSE:HLF: 5.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate only.
NYSE:HLF' s 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 5.1  Med: 14.9 Max: 27.6
Current: 5.1
5.1
27.6
3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate -5.40
NYSE:HLF's 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate is ranked lower than
74% of the 1286 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 6.50 vs. NYSE:HLF: -5.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate only.
NYSE:HLF' s 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -5.4  Med: 14.3 Max: 29.8
Current: -5.4
-5.4
29.8
3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate -15.00
NYSE:HLF's 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate is ranked lower than
77% of the 1186 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 6.80 vs. NYSE:HLF: -15.00 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate only.
NYSE:HLF' s 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -15  Med: 23.15 Max: 40.7
Current: -15
-15
40.7
GuruFocus has detected 2 Warning Signs with Herbalife Ltd NYSE:HLF.
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» NYSE:HLF's 30-Y Financials

Financials (Next Earnings Date: 2018-02-23)


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Operating Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow
Operating Cash Flow & Net Income

» Details

Guru Trades

Q4 2016

HLF Guru Trades in Q4 2016

Lee Ainslie 7,120 sh (+22.13%)
Carl Icahn 22,500,000 sh (+14.73%)
George Soros Sold Out
Paul Singer Sold Out
Jim Simons 2,579,200 sh (-10.41%)
Paul Tudor Jones 10,292 sh (-68.57%)
Ken Heebner 141,000 sh (-73.89%)
David Dreman 83 sh (-86.42%)
» More
Q1 2017

HLF Guru Trades in Q1 2017

Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss 353 sh (New)
Leucadia National 8,991 sh (New)
George Soros 5,100 sh (New)
Paul Tudor Jones 33,228 sh (+222.85%)
Carl Icahn 22,872,324 sh (+1.65%)
David Dreman Sold Out
Ken Heebner Sold Out
Lee Ainslie 6,490 sh (-8.85%)
Jim Simons 1,156,200 sh (-55.17%)
» More
Q2 2017

HLF Guru Trades in Q2 2017

David Dreman 83 sh (New)
Lee Ainslie 20,080 sh (+209.40%)
Paul Tudor Jones 34,009 sh (+2.35%)
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss 353 sh (unchged)
Carl Icahn 22,872,324 sh (unchged)
George Soros Sold Out
Leucadia National 7,471 sh (-16.91%)
Jim Simons 438,100 sh (-62.11%)
» More
Q3 2017

HLF Guru Trades in Q3 2017

Leucadia National 11,840 sh (+58.48%)
David Dreman 83 sh (unchged)
Carl Icahn 22,872,324 sh (unchged)
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss 353 sh (unchged)
Lee Ainslie Sold Out
Jim Simons 364,600 sh (-16.78%)
Paul Tudor Jones 27,639 sh (-18.73%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with NYSE:HLF

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)

GuruDate Trades Impact to Portfolio Price Range * (?) Current Price Change from Average Current Shares
Leucadia National 2017-09-30 Add 58.48%0.03%$61.95 - $73.34 $ 65.84-4%11,840
Leucadia National 2017-06-30 Reduce -16.91%0.01%$57.13 - $74.11 $ 65.84-2%7,471
David Dreman 2017-06-30 New Buy$57.13 - $74.11 $ 65.84-2%83
George Soros 2017-06-30 Sold Out 0.01%$57.13 - $74.11 $ 65.84-2%0
Carl Icahn 2017-03-31 Add 1.65%0.11%$49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%22,872,324
Leucadia National 2017-03-31 New Buy0.04%$49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%8,991
George Soros 2017-03-31 New Buy0.01%$49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%5,100
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss 2017-03-31 New Buy$49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%353
David Dreman 2017-03-31 Sold Out $49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%0
Ken Heebner 2017-03-31 Sold Out 0.3%$49.19 - $61.73 $ 65.8418%0
Carl Icahn 2017-03-10 Add 1.65%0.09%Premium Member Access $51.35 $ 65.8428%22,872,324
Carl Icahn 2017-03-10 Add 1.65%0.09%Premium Member Access $52.27 $ 65.8426%22,872,324
Carl Icahn 2016-12-31 Add 14.73%0.62%$47.99 - $63.86 $ 65.8421%22,500,000
Ken Heebner 2016-12-31 Reduce -73.89%1.17%$47.99 - $63.86 $ 65.8421%141,000
David Dreman 2016-12-31 Reduce -86.42%0.02%$47.99 - $63.86 $ 65.8421%83
George Soros 2016-12-31 Sold Out 0.04%$47.99 - $63.86 $ 65.8421%0
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Business Description

Industry: Consumer Packaged Goods » Household & Personal Products    NAICS: 424210 
Compare:NYSE:SPB, BOM:531642, OSTO:SCA B, TSE:4922, TSE:4912, TSE:4927, MEX:KIMBER A, XPAR:BB, SHSE:603868, XKRX:002795, TSE:4967, BOM:500830, BOM:531162, BSP:NATU3, NSE:PGHH, TSE:7956, BOM:500096, SHSE:600315, NYSE:EPC, NYSE:NUS » details
Traded in other countries:HOO.Germany,
Headquarter Location:Cayman Islands
Herbalife Ltd is a nutrition company. The company has five revenue segments: Weight Management; Targeted Nutrition; Energy, Sports, and Fitness; Outer Nutrition; and Literature, Promotional, and Other.

Herbalife is an international nutrition company, using mainly direct selling. The company has five revenue segments: weight management; targeted nutrition; energy, sports, and fitness; outer nutrition; and literature, promotional, and other. The most important segment, weight management, contributing more than 50% of revenue, has as representative products protein drinks, powder, and bars, and herbal tea concentrates, among others. The targeted nutrition segment offers dietary and nutritional supplements rich in herbs, minerals, and vitamins. Energy, sports, and fitness offers energy drinks, while outer nutrition offers facial skin-care, body-care, and hair-care products. Geographically, the main segments are North America, Mexico, South and Central America, EMEA, Asia-Pacific, and China.

Guru Investment Theses on Herbalife Ltd

Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Nov 16, 2017

During the course of our short position in Herbalife (NYSE:HLF), we have held the investment in various forms, principally a mix of short stock and/or options. Recently we disclosed that we have restructured our short position in Herbalife, and our exposure is now represented entirely by put options. The current market value of the put position is approximately 5% of consolidated fund capital.

We have structured the position in this form so that our exposure to Herbalife is limited, and we are no longer exposed to the risks and costs of borrowing shares. Assuming we do not extend the options beyond their initial term, the maximum potential loss for our current position is its current market value.

The options are privately negotiated, over-the-counter options, which are not traded or reported on any exchange. The options’ expiration dates can be extended upon or before their maturity. Because the options are deep-in-the-money, the amount of time premium reflected in the options’ current market value is a small percentage of the position. As a result, we will lose only a small portion of our current capital invested in Herbalife if the stock stays at the current price until the options expire. If the stock declines substantially, we can make multiples of our current investment. If the stock increases in price, our loss is limited to the current market value of the puts. As such, we believe the investment as currently structured offers a favorable risk-reward ratio.

Over the past several years, a number of events have occurred which would make any short seller optimistic about a short position in Herbalife, namely:

(1)Herbalife’s financial performance has deteriorated significantly;

(2)Despite the company having repurchased ~33% of outstanding shares since we shorted the stock, GAAP and Adjusted EPS are down ~19% and ~16%, respectively, based on management’s guidance for 2017 as compared to Herbalife’s reported 2013 earnings;

(3)The FTC settlement, which took effect on May 25, 2017, appears to be severely impacting the company’s business. US sales for the second and third quarters were down 18% year-over-year, and third quarter sales were down 9% sequentially compared to the second quarter;

(4)The Chinese government recently launched an investigation of multi-level marketing firms which operate in China – a market which represents about 20% of Herbalife’s revenues;

(5)The company has been subject to a tremendous amount of criticism and negative public relations in the media, including from John Oliver (his Herbalife segment, available here, has been viewed 11.6 million times in English and Spanish on YouTube), and in the documentary film Betting onZero; and

(6)On September 20, 2017, the company and its top distributors were sued in a class action complaint over alleged civil racketeering (RICO) violations.

Despite this deterioration in financial performance, adverse publicity, and negative regulatory and legal developments, Herbalife stock has remained at prices that we believe do not make sense from a fundamental investment point of view. We believe the elevated valuation can largely be explained due to technical factors, namely the stock’s substantially reduced free float, and the market’s perception, up until recently, that we would be forced to cover our (once) large short stock position in the company.

We made the decision to convert our short position to put options because of the reduced free float of the stock, and to eliminate the incentive for market participants to attempt to squeeze us out of the position. Because we now own the position through the outright ownership of put options, we cannot be squeezed, even if the stock price were to increase substantially, as our exposure is capped at the current market value of the put options.

The Reduction in Herbalife’s Effective Free Float

Over time, Herbalife, along with Carl Icahn (Trades, Portfolio), has substantially reduced the effective free float of its shares. This has been achieved through Mr. Icahn’s open market purchases of 22.9 million shares, company buybacks in the open market and in a recent tender offer, and as a result of a large forward contract and related hedging transaction that were entered into at the time of the company’s issuance of $1.15 billion of convertible notes in February 2014.

Recently, the effective free float was reduced further because we, together with other short sellers, paid “Take No Action” fees of approximately seven cents per share so that our stock lending counterparties would not tender their shares into Herbalife’s recent tender offer.3 For the last five or so years, we have borrowed shares from the most stable sources of borrow, namely index funds, and other funds that closely track the indices. Because these stock lenders were paid to not tender their shares, the shares purchased in the tender offer came out of the remaining free float of the company, and, as a result, index funds (and other effectively permanent owners) now comprise a substantially greater percentage of the float. The result of all of the above factors is that the effective free float of Herbalife (shares that are actually free to trade) is substantially smaller than current investors in the stock may be aware.

Typically, it becomes more difficult to borrow shares as free float declines; however, in this instance shares remain easy to borrow at low cost because of the large percentage of the float held by index funds who lend their shares. Indices typically adjust their components to account for changes in free float. In the case of Herbalife, however, most of the reductions in effective free float are not evident, and therefore, do not appear to have been accounted for by indices and the index funds that track them.

For example, Herbalife completed its recent 4.6 million share open market purchases through the use of an indirect, until recently undisclosed, wholly-owned subsidiary of the company - HBL Swiss Financing GmbH (“HBL”). After the Herbalife tender offer was completed the share count was reduced, causing HBL’s ownership to exceed 5% of outstanding shares. As a result, HBL was required to file a 13G reporting its Herbalife holdings. The media interpreted this filing as a new investor acquiring a large stake in Herbalife when in fact the purchases represented shares repurchased by Herbalife itself.

While shares held by HBL are reflected as treasury shares under US GAAP and, therefore, reduce the number of common shares used to calculate earnings per share, they remain outstanding on the books and records of the company and create the appearance of a larger free float as reported on Bloomberg and other data services. As a result, index funds likely own more shares than they would if the indices adjusted their free float calculations to account for Herbalife’s effective free float. Once indices, and the index funds that follow them, adjust their free float calculations for these shares, index funds will likely adjust their Herbalife ownership downward.

At the time we disclosed our short position, Herbalife had 108 million common shares4 outstanding. As reported in the third quarter 2017 10Q, shares outstanding as of October 26, 2017 had declined to 87,197,196 million5, as a result of share repurchases net of issuances due to stock option exercises and restricted stock grants since that time. This share count, however, is not an accurate reflection of the effective free float of the company because of a number of factors, some of which we believe are not well understood by most Herbalife shareholders.

The most recently reported shares outstanding do not reflect 14.5 million shares that are effectively no longer outstanding and are or will be removed from the float available for trading as a result of:

(1)a forward contract for 9.9 million shares the company entered into in connection with the issuance of $1.15 billion of convertible notes in early 2014; and

(2)4.6 million shares purchased by the company in the open market in 2017, but held by HBL in treasury (as described above).

After adjusting for these factors, there are approximately 72.7 million shares of Herbalife outstanding. This does not, however, account for shares withheld from the float as a result of shares held by Mr. Icahn and various index funds, and a so-called “capped call” transaction that was entered into at the time of Herbalife convertible note issuance. We describe each of these factors in greater detail below.


The Forward Contract

When the company issued a $1.15 billion convert in February 2014, it used $685.8 million of the proceeds to purchase a forward contract on 9.9 million shares, which expires when the convertible note comes due on August 15, 2019. The convert was not sold to so-called “real money” buyers, but rather to convertible arbitrageurs. The banks that sold Herbalife the 9.9 million share forward contract hedged this sale by purchasing a total return swap on the same number of shares from the buyers of the convertible notes, enabling these convertible arbitrageurs to synthetically hedge the equity conversion feature of the notes. While these shares are considered officially outstanding, we do not consider these shares to be part of the effective free float because they will be purchased by the bank counterparties during the months leading up to the forward contract’s August 2019 expiration date and then delivered to the company.

The Capped Call or Call Spread

The company also used $123.8 million of the proceeds of the convert sale to purchase a “capped call” or call spread on 13.3 million shares. The call spread was designed to reduce the dilution of the convertible notes by synthetically increasing their conversion price from $86.28 to $120.79. The call spread was purchased by the company from derivative counterparties who hedge their exposure to the call spread by dynamically holding a certain number of HLF shares – in order to hedge, they must own more at higher prices and less at lower prices. At the current price of $65.03, we estimate that these counterparties are required to hold approximately 4 million shares to hedge the 13.3 million call spreads that they have sold to HLF, reducing the effective free float by this amount.

Icahn and Index Funds

Carl Icahn (Trades, Portfolio) owns 22.9 million shares, which reduces the effective free float to 45.9 million shares. The effective free float is further reduced by shares held by index funds who are effectively permanent holders of the shares unless and until adjustments are made to the indices. Removing Vanguard, Blackrock, State Street and Northern Trust, the well-known index funds, from the float reduces it by an additional 9.9 million shares to 35.9 million shares. This amount excludes other index funds (including Fidelity, which owns 7.8 million shares, a portion of which are likely owned by certain Fidelity index funds) which would reduce the effective free float even further. We summarize the effective free float of Herbalife on the table below:

As a result of the above factors, over the last four years Herbalife has become an extremely closely held company where the company’s largest investors, excluding Mr. Icahn: Capital Group (11.77 million shares), Fidelity (7.84 million shares), Deccan Value Investors (7.82 million shares), and Route One (7.15 million shares), each own large percentages of the 35.9 million effective free float of the company. We view each of these investors as a large overhang on the stock.

Recent Stock Price Volatility

The implication of Herbalife’s small effective float is that small purchases or sales have a large impact on the stock price. The recent 16% spike in the stock price in the days after the Herbalife self-tender was completed, and the subsequent large decline and daily volatility thereafter are emblematic of the extremely small float and the difficulty in selling or acquiring shares without a substantial market impact.

Herbalife Share Price Since the Announced Preliminary Results of Herbalife’s Tender

When Herbalife announced that it had purchased only 6.7 million shares out of a possible 8.8 million in its recent tender offer, investors viewed it as a bullish sign; they apparently concluded that Herbalife shareholders who did not tender must believe that the stock is worth more than the tender price of $68. We believe that the failure of the tender offer to be fully subscribed is more likely due to the limited effective free float and large amount of shares held by index funds.

We understand that certain arbitrageurs shorted the stock when the tender offer was launched. They expected to cover their short when the offer was completed, anticipating that the stock would decline once the upward pressure of the tender ended. When the stock rose instead of declining, these investors sought to cover their short positions. In light of the extremely limited float, we believe these purchases drove the stock price up more than 11% in one day, and more on the following days.

As the stock price rose over the course of this year, we believe that Herbalife longs likely believed that increases in the stock price would force Pershing Square to cover its short position. The more the stock price went up, the more likely they believed we would be forced to cover. As we now own the position through put options, this dynamic no longer has any effect. As a result, we believe that Herbalife fundamentals will now play a much larger role in the stock’s trading price.

Over the last few weeks the stock has declined as the upward pressure from short covering abated, the company reported a weak quarter – with below expectations earnings guidance for 2018, and we disclosed the conversion of our short position to puts.

In light of the fact that the four largest holders (excluding Icahn) own 34.6 million shares, representing 50% of actual shares outstanding, (or 75% of the effective free float of the company, net of Icahn’s ownership) it is difficult for even one of these owners to exit without a substantial negative market impact.

While some investors may have held out hope for a going private transaction, this appears unlikely. According to disclosures in the company’s recently filed tender offer documents, the company’s attempts to sell the company to financial buyers have not succeeded. In sum, we believe there is no longer a technical or fundamental case for being long Herbalife shares.

Going forward we intend to substantially limit our comments on Herbalife in light of the reduced capital in the investment and because we believe that further comments from us may distract investors from Herbalife’s deteriorating business fundamentals. In that this may be our last detailed communication on Herbalife, in the appendix to this letter, we provide a detailed description of Herbalife fundamentals from the beginning of our investment to the present for those who are interested in a more in-depth analysis.


From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s third quarter 2017 shareholder letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Aug 18, 2017

On Monday, August 14, 2017, Chinese media outlets reported that the Chinese government has launched an investigation and crackdown on multi-level marketing and pyramid selling companies. HLF (NYSE:HLF)’s stock declined 5.25% on the day’s news. As we previously noted in our first quarter letter, Herbalife updated its risk-factor disclosures in its first quarter 10Q, adding new language about regulatory risk in China. China is approximately 20% of Herbalife’s revenues. A substantial decline or shutdown of HLF’s China business would have a material adverse effect on the company.

With the implementation of the FTC mandated injunctive relief in late May, the second quarter provided the first opportunity for investors to witness its partial effects on Herbalife’s financial performance. While the changes to its U.S. business practices were only in place for a fraction of the second quarter, Q2 results were disappointing to HLF investors and analysts from a top line perspective as volume declined 8% year-over-year. Year-over-year constant currency sales declines in North America (-18%), South & Central America (-9%), Mexico (-1%) and Asia Pacific (-1%) were partially offset by growth in EMEA (+4%) and China (+5%). Note that China benefited in the quarter from the recognition of certain revenue for product which was shipped in Q1 (ahead of a price increase) but was in transit at quarter end; for context, China volume declined 14% year-over-year, a more accurate measure of current trending.

We expect the U.S. business to continue to suffer as distributors attempt to comply with the new restrictive elements of the FTC consent order, with the full impact more evident in Q3 and thereafter. The company materially reduced Q3 implied and full year top-line guidance as the business begins to adapt to the significant changes required in its largest market (the U.S.). Other regions of the world remain weak including major markets such as China, South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico. We expect sequential operational deterioration to continue and to weigh further on Herbalife’s share price.

During the second quarter, HLF stock increased significantly after the company announced a large share buyback despite a reduction in guidance and substantial insider selling. While Herbalife’s share price has declined approximately 16% from its June high, it has still appreciated approximately 30% year-to-date. We believe this result is largely due to technical factors and financial engineering, as significant share repurchases, more than 5% of shares outstanding since February, cost deferrals and one-time tax benefits have enabled the company to meet and increase EPS targets despite deteriorating underlying business performance.

HLF continues to trade at a high valuation multiple particularly when compared to its actual GAAP earnings. Remarkably, investors appear to have accepted the company’s Non-GAAP EPS metric which excludes interest expense on its $1.15 billion substantially out-of-the-money convertible note that is due in 2019. Adding back interest expense to earnings as if it were not an expense is perhaps the most aggressive example we have seen of Non-GAAP earnings addbacks. Herbalife also adds back expenses “related to regulatory inquiries,” expenses “related to the FTC settlement implementation,” and “expenses related to challenges to the company’s business model.”

We expect continued business deterioration and ongoing regulatory and public relations issues for the company, which should lead to further stock price declines. This is likely to be compounded by Herbalife’s aggressive buyback program.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s second quarter 2017 shareholder letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife Ltd. - May 12, 2017

Herbalife Ltd. (NYSE:HLF) Short

Despite weak financial performance in Q1, Herbalife’s share price has appreciated by more than 50% year-to-date. We believe this is due in part to Herbalife’s misleading portrayal of its first quarter operating performance and the company’s share repurchase program. Below, we summarize this quarter’s recent developments, and provide further detail in an attached exhibit for those who would like to learn more.

For the first quarter, Herbalife reported flat year- over-year constant-currency sales growth across the business. Growth in some markets (Mexico, EMEA and China) was offset by substantial declines in others (South & Central America, North America, and Asia Pacific). The company reported significant persistent declines in South Korea and Brazil (historically large growth markets for the company), and stopped reporting individual market results for the United Kingdom this quarter after sales declined substantially. As recently as 2010 and 2013, respectively, South Korea and the U.K. were trumpeted as high growth markets for Herbalife with 82% growth and 81% growth, respectively. We expect that Herbalife will also eliminate the disclosure of South Korea’s sales when they drop below reporting thresholds. Herbalife’s Management Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) disclosures in its SEC filings do not accurately describe the causes for these declines, often relying on the same factors to describe why certain markets are growing and others are declining.

The dramatic “pop” and “drop” reflected in Herbalife’s individual markets are highly characteristic of pyramid schemes, which achieve accelerated growth until a market reaches saturation, after which there is a dramatic decline in volumes as participants recognize that being a distributor is a money-losing proposition. Bullish analysts on Herbalife have attempted to characterize the company as comparable to a consumer packaged goods companies (as these companies often trade at 20+ P/E multiples), which do not experience massive growth followed by massive declines.

On a consolidated basis, modest volume gains in the quarter were offset by price/mix and foreign exchange (“FX”) headwinds. Herbalife’s business declined across most geographic regions. Adjusting for the pull -forward of volume in China (described below), worldwide constant-currency growth was negative ~4% year-over-year, a sequential decline compared to Q4’2016 which was negative 1%.

For the quarter, the company reported headline “adjusted” EPS of $1.24, including $0.26 of add-backs, the magnitude of which has become highly material in recent years. Although management increased full-year guidance by $0.40 (now $4.05-$4.45), this actually represents a reduction in expected future performance when one factors in Q1 outperformance (which is overstated for the reasons we describe in detail in the attached exhibit), certain one-time tax benefits, a revised FX outlook for the balance of the year (itself a ~$0.35 positive adjustment to guidance), and the impact of share buybacks to date.

While bullish investors in Herbalife have suggested that the company’s recent results show that it can manage effectively through the requirements of the FTC settlement, North American performance in the quarter, which declined 7%, does not yet reflect the impact of the FTC permanent injunction. Nearly all of the business model changes required by the FTC do not take effect until May 25th. The company’s Q2 results will include five weeks of operations subject to these structural changes, but the run-rate impact of the FTC injunction will not be fully reflected in operating performance until Q3 results are released in the fall.

China, at 20% of sales, is Herbalife’s second largest segment after North America. While China realized +17% volume growth in Q1, management noted that there was a significant pull-forward in volume ahead of a 5% price increase in April. On a normalized basis, excluding the pull-forward, China would have declined 17% to 20% in Q1 on a constant-currency basis. Given the volume pull-forward and other factors, reported Q2’2017 results for China are likely to be down significantly compared to Q2’2016.

Herbalife’s 10-Q included a number of significant notable changes to risk disclosures with respect to China, including language which now identifies “uncertainties relating to interpretation and enforcement of legislation in China governing direct selling and anti-pyramiding(emphasis added). We have described at length in a prior presentation, available here, the fact that Herbalife operates illegally in China. As such, we were not surprised to see these changes in risk disclosures. We would not be surprised to learn that Herbalife is under investigation by Chinese authorities, particularly in light of the recently announced Foreign Corrupt Practices investigation of Herbalife’s China operations by the Department of Justice and the SEC. Management increased its projected “Expenses Related to Regulatory Inquiries” from $0.06 (~$5m) as of February 2017 to $0.11 (~$9m) implying that the company expects regulatory scrutiny to increase. Herbalife, of course, adds these costs back in calculating Adjusted Earnings. Every large-scale business incurs regulatory oversight costs in the ordinary course. The notion that these should not be counted as part of a company’s ongoing expenses is ludicrous in our view.

We believe the injunctive relief imposed by the FTC is likely to weigh significantly on Herbalife’s financial performance in the coming quarters. Coupled with decelerating growth and substantial deterioration in many international markets (including China), we expect earnings to decline on an operational basis in 2017. Despite the above issues, Herbalife is now trading at ~17 times the midpoint of management’s adjusted guidance (~21x on unadjusted EPS). It is currently trading at the highest P/E ratio in its history as a result of the recent stock price increase and its declining earnings.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s first quarter 2017 shareholder letter.


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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - May 08, 2017

On July 15, 2016 the FTC filed a damning Complaint against Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) and simultaneously entered into a Stipulation to Entry of Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment (the “Permanent Injunction”). The FTC alleged that Herbalife operates illegally and alleged violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. Notably, the findings of the FTC substantially agree with our long held assertion that Herbalife operates as a pyramid scheme. Select assertions by the FTC include that:

  • “[Herbalife] does not offer participants a viable retail-based business opportunity.”

  • “Herbalife’s business model primarily compensated members for recruiting new distributors to purchase product, not for selling product at retail…”

  • “[P]articipants’ wholesale purchases from Herbalife are primarily a payment to participate in a business opportunity that rewards recruiting at the expense of retail sales.”

  • “The overwhelming majority of Distributors who attempt to retail the product make little or no net income, or even lose money, from retailing the product.”

The Permanent Injunction, as described by the FTC, represents Herbalife’s agreement to engage in a “top to bottom” restructuring of its business model in the United States to “start complying with the law.”

In November 2016, Herbalife announced that Michael Johnson will transition to Executive Chairman in June 2017 (shortly after the FTC Permanent Injunction takes full effect in May) at which point Rich Goudis, the current COO, will take over as CEO.

Also in November, John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight aired a 30-minute segment on multi-level-marketing companies with a specific focus on Herbalife which has been viewed more than 9.5 million times on YouTube (including 2 million views in Spanish). We believe this segment, coupled with the recent theatrical release of “Betting on Zero” on March 17, 2017 (with AppleTV and Amazon distribution to follow in April), will continue to shape the public narrative and highlight the tremendous harm Herbalife has and continues to inflict upon millions of Americans.

From a financial perspective, HLF’s operating results in 2016 were disappointing to long investors as mid-single-digit topline organic growth was negatively impacted by significant foreign exchange headwinds causing sales to be relatively unchanged vs. 2015. Organic growth decelerated across most regions as the year progressed, declining 1% in Q4. The deceleration of Herbalife’s China business was particularly notable, posting a -6% organic decline in Q4 (-12% actual). Adjusted EPS, which for Herbalife substantially overstates economic earnings, declined modestly in 2016.

Management has guided to 4% to 7% 2017 constant currency revenue growth and currency neutral EPS growth of -13% to - 5%. HLF’s 2017 EPS guidance of $3.65 to $4.05 implies realized EPS declines of -25% to -16%. This guidance includes the incremental interest expense associated with the company’s $1.3 billion refinancing completed in February 2017, but does not include any benefit from potential share buybacks (the board has put in place a $1.5 billion normal-course authorization). Actual EPS will likely be better than current guidance if the company repurchases shares.

In February 2017, Herbalife disclosed a new investigation by the SEC and Department of Justice related to Herbalife’s anti-corruption compliance in China. While it’s difficult to know the specific focus of the probe, any disruption to Herbalife’s China business would likely impact the company’s financial performance given the large size of the China market for Herbalife (~19% of revenue).

Pyramid schemes are confidence games. The newly disclosed SEC/DOJ corruption probe, the CEO departure, declining earnings, and the deteriorating popular perception of Herbalife will likely impair distributor confidence. Furthermore, we believe the injunctive relief demanded by the FTC is likely to affect Herbalife’s financial performance beginning in the second quarter of 2017. With decelerating growth in many international markets, Herbalife’s earnings will likely decline in 2017. We remain short Herbalife because we believe its intrinsic value is meaningfully below the current share price, and we believe the stock should eventually decline to zero.

Herbalife’s total shareholder return was -10.2% in 2016.

From 2016 annual letter to shareholders of Pershing Square by Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio).

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Mar 30, 2017

On July 15, 2016 the FTC filed a damning Complaint against Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) and simultaneously entered into a Stipulation to Entry of Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment (the “Permanent Injunction”). The FTC alleged that Herbalife operates illegally and alleged violations of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. Notably, the findings of the FTC substantially agree with our long held assertion that Herbalife operates as a pyramid scheme. Select assertions by the FTC include that:

  • “[Herbalife] does not offer participants a viable retail-based business opportunity.”

  • “Herbalife’s business model primarily compensated members for recruiting new distributors to purchase product, not for selling product at retail…”

  • “[P]articipants’ wholesale purchases from Herbalife are primarily a payment to participate in a business opportunity that rewards recruiting at the expense of retail sales.”

  • “The overwhelming majority of Distributors who attempt to retail the product make little or no net income, or even lose money, from retailing the product.”

The Permanent Injunction, as described by the FTC, represents Herbalife’s agreement to engage in a “top to bottom” restructuring of its business model in the United States to “start complying with the law.”

In November 2016, Herbalife announced that Michael Johnson will transition to Executive Chairman in June 2017 (shortly after the FTC Permanent Injunction takes full effect in May) at which point Rich Goudis, the current COO, will take over as CEO.

Also in November, John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight aired a 30-minute segment on multi-level-marketing companies with a specific focus on Herbalife which has been viewed more than 9.5 million times on YouTube (including 2 million views in Spanish). We believe this segment, coupled with the recent theatrical release of “Betting on Zero” on March 17, 2017 (with AppleTV and Amazon distribution to follow in April), will continue to shape the public narrative and highlight the tremendous harm Herbalife has and continues to inflict upon millions of Americans.

From a financial perspective, HLF’s operating results in 2016 were disappointing to long investors as mid-single-digit topline organic growth was negatively impacted by significant foreign exchange headwinds causing sales to be relatively unchanged vs. 2015. Organic growth decelerated across most regions as the year progressed, declining 1% in Q4. The deceleration of Herbalife’s China business was particularly notable, posting a -6% organic decline in Q4 (-12% actual). Adjusted EPS, which for Herbalife substantially overstates economic earnings, declined modestly in 2016.

Management has guided to 4% to 7% 2017 constant currency revenue growth and currency neutral EPS growth of -13% to - 5%. HLF’s 2017 EPS guidance of $3.65 to $4.05 implies realized EPS declines of -25% to -16%. This guidance includes the incremental interest expense associated with the company’s $1.3 billion refinancing completed in February 2017, but does not include any benefit from potential share buybacks (the board has put in place a $1.5 billion normal-course authorization). Actual EPS will likely be better than current guidance if the company repurchases shares.

In February 2017, Herbalife disclosed a new investigation by the SEC and Department of Justice related to Herbalife’s anti-corruption compliance in China. While it’s difficult to know the specific focus of the probe, any disruption to Herbalife’s China business would likely impact the company’s financial performance given the large size of the China market for Herbalife (~19% of revenue).

Pyramid schemes are confidence games. The newly disclosed SEC/DOJ corruption probe, the CEO departure, declining earnings, and the deteriorating popular perception of Herbalife will likely impair distributor confidence. Furthermore, we believe the injunctive relief demanded by the FTC is likely to affect Herbalife’s financial performance beginning in the second quarter of 2017. With decelerating growth in many international markets, Herbalife’s earnings will likely decline in 2017. We remain short Herbalife because we believe its intrinsic value is meaningfully below the current share price, and we believe the stock should eventually decline to zero.

Herbalife’s total shareholder return was -10.2% in 2016.



From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square 2016 annual report.


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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Dec 09, 2016

On November 1, 2016, Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) reported its third quarter financial results. Modest financial performance in the quarter, disappointing 2017 guidance and the unexpected announcement of a CEO transition caused the stock to decline. HLF stock has traded down more than 33% since the announcement of the company’s settlement with the FTC on July 15th, 2016, a 15% year-to-date decline, as investors have come to increasingly ignore the company’s fraudulent characterization of the FTC settlement. At its December 2, 2016, price of $47.99 per share, HLF currently trades at approximately the price at which we shorted the shares in 2012.

On a consolidated basis the company reported net sales of $1.1 billion for the quarter, up 1.7% year-over-year. Headline adjusted net income of $105 million for the quarter (down 3% YoY) translated into adjusted EPS of $1.21 (down 4% YoY). On a constant currency basis the company reported net sales growth of 5%, driven by EMEA (+15%), Mexico (+14%) and North America (+10%).

The deceleration of Herbalife’s China business during the quarter is notable. Once a high-flying growth market (regularly posting 20-30%+ top-line growth), the China business has slowed in recent quarters, achieving modest 1% currency-adjusted, year-over-year top-line growth in Q3 (or negative 5% on actual basis).

Along with earnings, Herbalife announced that Michael Johnson is slated to transition to Executive Chairman in June 2017 at which point Rich Goudis, the current COO, will take over as CEO. Goudis has been largely absent from the public eye in recent years.

Since HLF’s earnings call, two other notable events have taken place. First, on November 6th, John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight aired a 32-minute segment on multi-level-marketing companies with a focus on Herbalife. In his typically colorful style, John Oliver points out the hypocrisy and fraud inherent in Herbalife’s business and shines a spotlight on how the company harms hundreds of thousands of people every year. You can watch his scathing take-down of HLF here. To date, the John Oliver segment has been viewed on YouTube more than 8 million times including over 1.7 million views of the Spanish-language version representing about 11% of the Hispanic households in the U.S. These 8 million views are in addition to the 4.1 million viewers of Oliver’s show on HBO and millions more on Facebook.

Second, on November 7, 2016, the documentary film “Betting on Zero” secured distribution rights, which will include a 30 or so city theatrical release in early 2017 and online video-on-demand dissemination thereafter. We believe that the John Oliver segment and the wide distribution of the film are materially positive developments which will help elevate the Herbalife story beyond traditional financial news media.

Despite its weak financial outlook, Herbalife is trading at $47.99 or about 10 times the midpoint of management’s new 2017 guidance ($4.60 - $5.00). Importantly, however, this guidance does notassume a significant disruption in Herbalife’s U.S. business. We believe the negative earnings impact is likely to be substantial as the U.S. accounted for ~23% of Herbalife’s contribution margin this past quarter (a measure of profitability before general selling and administrative expenses), and a substantially higher portion of earnings when giving consideration to the inherent operating leverage of the business.

Furthermore, Herbalife’s “definition” of earnings continues to exclude certain items which we believe are actual ongoing costs of the business but which Herbalife adds-back (including ~$0.46 for “non-cash interest expense”). This excludes additional fines and/or injunctive relief that may arise from other regulatory agencies. On a pro-forma basis, assuming a modest decline in the U.S. business and expensing the add-backs, we estimate Herbalife is currently trading at 12 to 15 times 2017 pro forma earnings (and a potentially much higher multiple depending on the magnitude of the impending U.S. decline).

Fundamentally, pyramid schemes are confidence games. The CEO exit, deteriorating earnings, the declining stock price, and the John Oliver segment should materially impact Herbalife distributor confidence. When distributors reduce their purchases and/or leave the company, the financial results of the company should decline on an accelerated basis. Furthermore, we believe the injunctive relief demanded by the FTC is likely to significantly impact Herbalife’s financial performance beginning in the second quarter of 2017. Coupled with decelerating growth in many international markets, especially in China, we expect earnings to decline in 2017. We remain short Herbalife because we believe its intrinsic value is zero.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square third-quarter shareholder letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - Aug 29, 2016

We have made substantial progress with our short position in Herbalife (NYSE:HLF). On July 15, 2016, after a more than two-year investigation, the FTC found that Herbalife has been operating illegally, misleading consumers about the potential profitability of its so-called business opportunity, among other extremely critical findings. The FTC's settlement with Herbalife avoided using the words "pyramid scheme" to describe its business, but found that the company had all of the hallmarks of other pyramid schemes it has prosecuted recently. The FTC's findings confirm each of our principal allegations against the company.

The FTC stated that it chose to settle with Herbalife to avoid an extended period of litigation and to bring relief to consumers more rapidly. While Herbalife has to-date successfully spun the terms of the settlement as a victory for the company, the facts speak differently as the market appears to have recently begun to understand. While Herbalife stock rose more than 20% on the initial announcement of the settlement, it has declined since that time, and is now trading at approximately the same price as before the announcement.

Under the terms of the FTC settlement, the company is being required to totally restructure its business and compensate its distributors only for "profitable retail sales" to consumers who are not distributors pursuing the business opportunity (other than for a limited carve out for personal consumption of the product by distributors). In light of the fact that the FTC found little if any evidence of profitable retail sales, it is difficult to understand how the company can continue to motivate and recruit distributors to replace the more than 2,000,000 who quit each year when these aspiring distributors realize they cannot make money. As a result, we expect Herbalife to collapse as distributors leave as a result of the newly restructured compensation arrangements and required changes in marketing practices. While it is difficult to estimate a precise time frame for the company's demise, we believe it will not be years. We have already described the Complaint and Settlement Agreement in detail during our July 20, 2016 conference call and presentation which is available on the PSH website, www.pershingsquareholdings.com. In summary, the FTC fmdings make clear that Herbalife is a pyramid scheme.

A comparison of the FTC's fmdings about Herbalife with previous FTC pyramid scheme prosecutions reveals similar and often nearly identical language. The FTC Complaint alleged that Herbalife participants are "primarily compensated for successfully recruiting" new participants and not for selling products, the defming attribute of a pyramid scheme which has been alleged in each of the most recent FTC pyramid scheme cases. Exhibit I, which starts on page 32 of this report, compares the FTC's allegations against Herbalife and other companies the FTC deemed to be pyramid schemes. Most notably, the count against Herbalife for Unfair Practices closely mirrors the Illegal Pyramid counts in previous cases. It is clear from Exhibit I that the FTC found Herbalife to be an illegal pyramid scheme and alleged the necessary fmdings to support that charge but, as part of the settlement, agreed to avoid using the phrase "pyramid scheme." FTC Chairwoman Ramirez's public comments corroborate this conclusion.

We believe the implementation of the Settlement Agreement — the most comprehensive business model reform required by the FTC against any multi-level marketing company — will cause Herbalife's U.S. business to collapse and contribute to the eventual failure of the entire company. The settlement represents Herbalife's agreement to engage in a "top to bottom' restructuring of its business model in the United States. Key elements include:

  • Compensation to distributors is limited to verifiable, "Profitable Retail Salesn

  • Present compensation levels remain only if 80% or more of U.S. sales are verifiable, "Profitable Retail Sales";

  • At least two-thirds of rewards paid by Herbalife to distributors must be based on Profitable Retail Sales of Herbalife products that are tracked and verified;

  • Qualification purchases are prohibited;

  • Misleading income claims are prohibited; and

  • An Independent Compliance Auditor will be hired to oversee compensation plan changes for a period of seven years.

Since the day of the FTC settlement announcement, Herbalife has orchestrated a coordinated media campaign to misrepresent the findings of the FTC and the inevitable business impact of the relief demanded by the FTC.

On August 3, 2016, Herbalife reported its second quarter financial results. On the conference call, Herbalife management was consistently upbeat and bullish on the prospects for the business in the face of the FTC settlement, noting "these changes are good for our company," and "we have the greatest confidence in our ability to comply with the agreement and continue to grow our business in the U.S. and around the world." Management's latest commentary is a continuation of prior misrepresentations.

Herbalife's 10Q provided revised disclosure pertaining to the FTC settlement and updated risk disclosures. It struck a more balanced, and at times cautionary, tone compared with management commentary on the call, noting that "there is no guarantee that we will be able to fully comply with the Consent Order," and "Nile impact of the Consent Order on our business ... could be significant." All the same, the 10Q reiterated that Herbalife "neither admitted nor denied the allegations in the FTC's complaint' in agreeing to the terms of the Consent Order," and repeated the company line that "we do not believe the Consent Order changes our business model as a direct selling

company." The 10Q included new language noting that the Consent Order does not prevent "other third-parties from bringing actions against us, whether in the form of other state, federal or foreign regulatory investigations or proceedings, or private litigation, any of which could lead to, among other things, monetary settlements, fines, penalties or injunctions."

At a minimum, we believe the injunctive relief demanded by the FTC is likely to significantly weigh on Herbalife's financial performance in the coming quarters. Moreover, we believe that the FTC complaint and settlement provide a roadmap for other state Attorneys General and regulators in 93 other countries around the world to seek similar relief and to enforce similar protections for their consumers.

Despite a bleak financial outlook, Herbalife is trading at —13.5x the midpoint of management's revised 2016 guidance ($4.50 to $4.80) or —16 times 2016 guidance excluding certain items (which we believe are ongoing costs to the business but which Herbalife management inappropriately adds back). The implied multiple represents an even higher multiple of 2017 earnings, as Herbalife's future earnings are likely to be significantly lower as changes to the business model reduce the company's earnings power. These estimates exclude additional fines and/or the impact of additional injunctive relief that may arise from other regulatory agencies.

Herbalife stock price hit a recent high in the low $70s per share on the day of the settlement, but has declined to less than $62 currently. Putting aside the short case for Herbalife, it has become extremely difficult to comprehend the logic behind the bull case on Herbalife.

The bulls had believed that the FTC settlement would exonerate the company and otherwise not require any material changes to the company's business practices. This is defmitively false based on the FTC Settlement and Order.

Second, the bulls believed that the company would announce a large leveraged recap at the time of a settlement. When pressed about buybacks on the recent earnings call, the CFO demurred and reminded investors about the maturity of its credit facility in March 2017 and the $1.15 billion out-of-the-money convertible debt issue which is due within three years. We do not believe that banks and/or bondholders are likely to be willing to provide a material amount of debt financing to Herbalife in light of the FTC findings, and without knowing the revenues, earnings, and cash flow implications of the FTC's required business changes, which will not be fully implemented until May of next year.

Third, China, which has been the growth engine of the company in recent years, showed dramatically decelerated growth for the quarter calling into question its sustainability. Herbalife management stated that investors are likely to see "a significantly lower growth rate going forward" and that they do not believe China's growth rate is "sustainable at the current levels."'

Fourth, long-only institutional investors appear to be exiting, with Fidelity, a long-time shareholder selling nearly 40% of its holdings as disclosed in its recently updated 13G filing. Fidelity will not be required to notify the market of additional sales until mid-November. Capital Research has also been a substantial seller. In light of the FTC's findings of wrongdoing, we do not believe that legitimate institutional investors will continue to own Herbalife. The substantial majority of other holders appear to be fast-money investors who we believe mistakenly bought on the announced settlement, betting on a buyback, when more than 50% of the float on that day changed hands at prices nearly 20% above current levels.

Lastly, at current prices it is difficult to make a compelling argument for owning Herbalife even if one does not believe it is a pyramid scheme. The stock trades at about a 50 percent multiple premium to legitimate supplement retailers like GNC, which, unlike Herbalife, is not being required to completely change the way it compensates its distributors as well as its marketing practices.

While it has been a long road, we see multiple paths to an eventually successful outcome with this investment.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s mid-year 2016 letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - May 11, 2016

On May 5th, Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) reported improved financial performance for the first quarter of the year and updated their regulatory disclosures as follows:

“The Company is currently in discussions with the FTC regarding a potential resolution of these matters. The possible range of outcomes include the filing by the FTC of a contested civil complaint and further discussions leading to a settlement which would likely include a monetary payment and injunctive and other relief. The Company is cooperating with the investigation and at this time it is difficult to predict the timing, and the likely outcome, of these matters. The discussions with the FTC are in the advanced stages, but there are still a number of material open issues that could preclude reaching final agreement. If discussions with the FTC do not continue to progress, it is likely that litigation would ensue. Although we are confident in our legal position, litigation outcomes by their very nature are difficult to predict and there can be no assurance of a particular outcome.

“The outcome of these matters with the FTC, whether by mutual resolution or through litigation, could have a material adverse impact on the Company’s business operations, its results of operations or its financial condition. The Company believes it is reasonably possible that it may have incurred a loss.

At the present time, the Company’s best estimate of the payment amount that would be made by the Company under a mutual resolution with the FTC is $200 million. The Company has not accrued any amounts with respect to any potential monetary payments relating to this matter. If a resolution is not attained and litigation ensues, the Company is unable to estimate a range of potential loss, if any, relating to these matters.”

The company’s language provides greater specificity and introduces a narrower range of outcomes versus the company’s 10-K, filed on February 25th, which stated:

“The possible range of outcomes include the filing by the FTC of a contested civil complaint, further discussions leading to a settlement which could include a monetary payment and other relief or the closure of these matters without action.”

It is notable that the company removed the “closure of these matters without action” language from the recent 10-Q.

Investors reacted favorably to the company’s disclosure apparently focusing on the modest size of Herbalife’s estimate of the monetary portion of the settlement, less than two quarters of earnings, suggestive of an overall settlement that would be no more than a “slap on the wrist.” While a $200 million settlement would be one of the highest ever in an FTC consumer protection action, it would be immaterial to Herbalife. Investors, however, appear to ignore the fact that the company may not be able to settle with the FTC, and instead, will be sued by the FTC for being a pyramid scheme, or, alternatively, that a settlement’s “injunctive and other relief” may materially impair HLF’s future profitability and growth potential.

Recently, the FTC obtained significant injunctive and other relief in its Vemma pyramid scheme litigation, which, we believe, if applied to Herbalife would significantly harm the company’s ability to operate profitability. We expect the FTC to demand similar safeguards and restrictions for Herbalife as it has required in the Vemma case.

On the evening of May 6th, shortly after HLF’s press statement about a possible resolution with the FTC and the stock price’s substantial increase, Justin Cole, the FTC’s Director of the Office of Public Affairs, provided an on-the-record statement to the media:

“Injunctive relief can be just as significant as the money obtained for consumers and even more influential on a company’s future operations.”

We believe it is very unusual for the FTC to respond to a public company’s characterization of settlement negotiations. The FTC’s reaction may signal its concern that Herbalife or investors are minimizing the significance of potential injunctive relief. The key question is what “injunctive and other relief” may be. We expect that the relief imposed by the FTC will require modifications to HLF’s business practices which will be materially adverse to HLF.

The company reported net sales of $1.12 billion for the quarter, up ~1% year-over-year (after the impact of FX), off a relatively easy comp, beating management’s and analysts’ guidance by 6% and 4%, respectively. A combination of better-than-expected volume growth and a less severe FX environment contributed to this result. China (+39%) and EMEA (+17%) continue to be the strongest regions. Notably, North America (+9%) posted its best quarter since Q1’2014. Driven by higher-than-expected volume and net sales, Net Income grew ~7% year-over-year (“YoY”) and adjusted EPS was up ~5%.

From a cash flow perspective, results were less favorable, as operating cash flow and free cash flow declined ~12% and ~20% YoY, respectively. Total cash on HLF’s balance sheet decreased 13% to $774 million after the company paid down $230 million of debt in the quarter as requiredend, at which point HHC will begin to generate a significant amount of cash flow from condo closings. Anaha, a 317-unit project, is expected to be completed by the summer of 2017. In February 2016, HHC began construction of Ae’o, the third of four mixed-use residential towers planned for the first phase of the Ward Village development. Whole Foods has pre-leased a substantial portion of the retail space at the base of this tower, which is scheduled for completion in 2018. The fourth condo tower, the 424-unit Ke Kilohana, sold 90% of its units in five days (in April 2016). Ke Kilohana is a workforce residential tower with 375 of its units designated for local residents.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s first quarter shareholder letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife - May 11, 2016

On May 5th, Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) reported improved financial performance for the first quarter of the year and updated their regulatory disclosures as follows:

“The Company is currently in discussions with the FTC regarding a potential resolution of these matters. The possible range of outcomes include the filing by the FTC of a contested civil complaint and further discussions leading to a settlement which would likely include a monetary payment and injunctive and other relief. The Company is cooperating with the investigation and at this time it is difficult to predict the timing, and the likely outcome, of these matters. The discussions with the FTC are in the advanced stages, but there are still a number of material open issues that could preclude reaching final agreement. If discussions with the FTC do not continue to progress, it is likely that litigation would ensue. Although we are confident in our legal position, litigation outcomes by their very nature are difficult to predict and there can be no assurance of a particular outcome.

“The outcome of these matters with the FTC, whether by mutual resolution or through litigation, could have a material adverse impact on the Company’s business operations, its results of operations or its financial condition. The Company believes it is reasonably possible that it may have incurred a loss.

At the present time, the Company’s best estimate of the payment amount that would be made by the Company under a mutual resolution with the FTC is $200 million. The Company has not accrued any amounts with respect to any potential monetary payments relating to this matter. If a resolution is not attained and litigation ensues, the Company is unable to estimate a range of potential loss, if any, relating to these matters.”

The company’s language provides greater specificity and introduces a narrower range of outcomes versus the company’s 10-K, filed on February 25th, which stated:

“The possible range of outcomes include the filing by the FTC of a contested civil complaint, further discussions leading to a settlement which could include a monetary payment and other relief or the closure of these matters without action.”

It is notable that the company removed the “closure of these matters without action” language from the recent 10-Q.

Investors reacted favorably to the company’s disclosure apparently focusing on the modest size of Herbalife’s estimate of the monetary portion of the settlement, less than two quarters of earnings, suggestive of an overall settlement that would be no more than a “slap on the wrist.” While a $200 million settlement would be one of the highest ever in an FTC consumer protection action, it would be immaterial to Herbalife. Investors, however, appear to ignore the fact that the company may not be able to settle with the FTC, and instead, will be sued by the FTC for being a pyramid scheme, or, alternatively, that a settlement’s “injunctive and other relief” may materially impair HLF’s future profitability and growth potential.

Recently, the FTC obtained significant injunctive and other relief in its Vemma pyramid scheme litigation, which, we believe, if applied to Herbalife would significantly harm the company’s ability to operate profitability. We expect the FTC to demand similar safeguards and restrictions for Herbalife as it has required in the Vemma case.

On the evening of May 6th, shortly after HLF’s press statement about a possible resolution with the FTC and the stock price’s substantial increase, Justin Cole, the FTC’s Director of the Office of Public Affairs, provided an on-the-record statement to the media:

“Injunctive relief can be just as significant as the money obtained for consumers and even more influential on a company’s future operations.”

We believe it is very unusual for the FTC to respond to a public company’s characterization of settlement negotiations. The FTC’s reaction may signal its concern that Herbalife or investors are minimizing the significance of potential injunctive relief. The key question is what “injunctive and other relief” may be. We expect that the relief imposed by the FTC will require modifications to HLF’s business practices which will be materially adverse to HLF.

The company reported net sales of $1.12 billion for the quarter, up ~1% year-over-year (after the impact of FX), off a relatively easy comp, beating management’s and analysts’ guidance by 6% and 4%, respectively. A combination of better-than-expected volume growth and a less severe FX environment contributed to this result. China (+39%) and EMEA (+17%) continue to be the strongest regions. Notably, North America (+9%) posted its best quarter since Q1’2014. Driven by higher-than-expected volume and net sales, Net Income grew ~7% year-over-year (“YoY”) and adjusted EPS was up ~5%.

From a cash flow perspective, results were less favorable, as operating cash flow and free cash flow declined ~12% and ~20% YoY, respectively. Total cash on HLF’s balance sheet decreased 13% to $774 million after the company paid down $230 million of debt in the quarter as requiredend, at which point HHC will begin to generate a significant amount of cash flow from condo closings. Anaha, a 317-unit project, is expected to be completed by the summer of 2017. In February 2016, HHC began construction of Ae’o, the third of four mixed-use residential towers planned for the first phase of the Ward Village development. Whole Foods has pre-leased a substantial portion of the retail space at the base of this tower, which is scheduled for completion in 2018. The fourth condo tower, the 424-unit Ke Kilohana, sold 90% of its units in five days (in April 2016). Ke Kilohana is a workforce residential tower with 375 of its units designated for local residents.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s first quarter shareholder letter.

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife Short - Dec 16, 2015

Herbalife (NYSE:HLF) Short

Our thesis on HLF remains unchanged. We believe that Herbalife will ultimately be subject to regulatory action or will collapse because of fundamental deterioration in its business which relies on the continual recruitment of new victims. During the quarter, the potential for regulatory action increased while business fundamentals deteriorated.

From a regulatory perspective, we view the Complaint that the FTC filed on August 17th against Vemma Nutrition Company (“Vemma”), another MLM whose structure is similar to HLF’s, as a very positive development. The preliminary injunction issued against Vemma on September 18th is likely to make Vemma’s business totally unviable and provides a template for claims the FTC could bring against Herbalife.

On October 27th, New York State Senator Jeff Klein, working with Public Advocate Letitia James and a non-profit community group called Make The Road New York, released a critical report on Herbalife titled: "The American Scheme: Herbalife's Pyramid Shakedown". Based on its hidden camera investigations of more than 60 nutrition clubs located in New York City, the report concluded that Herbalife distributors are “running an illegal pyramid scheme.” The report was supported by data from 56 victims who individually lost as much as $100,000. On December 9th, Sen. Klein held a public roundtable to advance his campaign to stop Herbalife’s deceptive tactics. Senator Klein has proposed New York State legislation that would amend the New York State General Business Law to better protect New York State residents.

Despite predictions from Herbalife supporters that regulatory investigations would end during the quarter, they appear to have intensified. The company has now spent a total of $101 million defending itself, including $11.2 million in the quarter. Expenses related to “responding to governmental inquiries” increased from $5.8 million last quarter to $7.6 million this quarter which reflects the growing intensity of ongoing investigations. Assuming Herbalife is spending about $500 per hour on lawyers, $ 7.6 million represents 15,200 hours of legal time during the quarter, or 168 hours of legal time per day, seven days per week.

Herbalife’s fundamentals continued to decline during the quarter. Notably “total members” – perhaps Herbalife’s most important operating metric – declined from 4.1 million in the second quarter to 4.0 million in third quarter indicating that Herbalife churned through at least 500,000 members as the rate of member churn exceeded Herbalife’s ability to find new victims.3 On its conference call, the company also began using a new operating metric called ‘active members,’ suggesting that Herbalife concedes that a proportion – we expect, a large proportion – of its members are inactive. In our experience, companies that change the standards by which they measure themselves do so only when the old metric shows business deterioration that they would rather not disclose.

With respect to third quarter earnings, Herbalife posted weak revenues, but was able to reduce or defer certain expenses in order to generate earnings that exceeded analyst estimates. Among other questionable add-backs, Herbalife excludes regulatory and costs to “defend its business model” from its earnings estimates despite the fact that these expenses are likely to continue. On a consolidated basis, the company reported net sales of $1.1 billion, down 12% year-over-year, which was worse than Street expectations and below management guidance. The negative variance was largely attributable to foreign exchange headwinds. Similar to last quarter, China continues to be the key driver of Herbalife’s growth. While China’s year-over-year growth was 25%, Herbalife China revenues declined 5% when compared to the previous quarter.

Notably, HLF’s South Korean market continued to show substantial deterioration in the quarter. South Korea has been one of Herbalife’s largest markets and a significant driver of the company’s revenue and earnings growth. Over the last several years, South Korea has been Herbalife’s third or fourth largest market and one of its most profitable with approximately 56% contribution margins versus 43% for the rest of the company. Beginning a year ago, Herbalife Korea began to decline. This deterioration accelerated notably this quarter, down 39% versus last year on a constant-currency basis, and down 46% on an actual basis.

While management continues to blame the decline in Korea on “changes in the business model,” to us this looks like the classic “pop-and-drop” that is pervasive in pyramid schemes, a phrase that CEO Michael Johnson previously used to describe Herbalife’s rapid growth and inevitable decline in certain geographical regions. If one is looking for obvious evidence that Herbalife is a pyramid scheme, one need only look at the massive growth and rapid decline of Herbalife’s South Korea business and compare it with Unilever or another legitimate consumer packaged goods company.

From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s Pershing Square Holdings third quarter 2015 letter to shareholders.

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Top Ranked Articles about Herbalife Ltd

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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife Guru stock highlight
During the course of our short position in Herbalife (NYSE:HLF), we have held the investment in various forms, principally a mix of short stock and/or options. Recently we disclosed that we have restructured our short position in Herbalife, and our exposure is now represented entirely by put options. The current market value of the put position is approximately 5% of consolidated fund capital.

We have structured the position in this form so that our exposure to Herbalife is limited, and we are no longer exposed to the risks and costs of borrowing shares. Assuming we do not extend the options beyond their initial term, the maximum potential loss for our current position is its current market value.

The options are privately negotiated, over-the-counter options, which are not traded or reported on any exchange. The options’ expiration dates can be extended upon or before their maturity. Because the options are deep-in-the-money, the amount of time premium reflected in the options’ current market value is a small percentage of the position. As a result, Read more...
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Bill Ackman Comments on Herbalife Guru stock highlight
On Monday, August 14, 2017, Chinese media outlets reported that the Chinese government has launched an investigation and crackdown on multi-level marketing and pyramid selling companies. HLF (NYSE:HLF)’s stock declined 5.25% on the day’s news. As we previously noted in our first quarter letter, Herbalife updated its risk-factor disclosures in its first quarter 10Q, adding new language about regulatory risk in China. China is approximately 20% of Herbalife’s revenues. A substantial decline or shutdown of HLF’s China business would have a material adverse effect on the company. Read more...

Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
PE Ratio 14.97
HLF's PE Ratio is ranked higher than
67% of the 1294 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 19.68 vs. HLF: 14.97 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio only.
HLF' s PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.06  Med: 14.22 Max: 25.26
Current: 14.97
4.06
25.26
Forward PE Ratio 11.22
HLF's Forward PE Ratio is ranked higher than
88% of the 156 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 18.55 vs. HLF: 11.22 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward PE Ratio only.
N/A
PE Ratio without NRI 14.97
HLF's PE Ratio without NRI is ranked higher than
67% of the 1291 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 19.76 vs. HLF: 14.97 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio without NRI only.
HLF' s PE Ratio without NRI Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.01  Med: 14.2 Max: 25.26
Current: 14.97
4.01
25.26
Price-to-Owner-Earnings 19.68
HLF's Price-to-Owner-Earnings is ranked lower than
94% of the 717 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 21.00 vs. HLF: 19.68 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Owner-Earnings only.
HLF' s Price-to-Owner-Earnings Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 3.86  Med: 13.4 Max: 149.25
Current: 19.68
3.86
149.25
PB Ratio 26.20
HLF's PB Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 1570 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.75 vs. HLF: 26.20 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PB Ratio only.
HLF' s PB Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.99  Med: 11.59 Max: 178.04
Current: 26.2
2.99
178.04
PS Ratio 1.29
HLF's PS Ratio is ranked lower than
58% of the 1560 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.05 vs. HLF: 1.29 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PS Ratio only.
HLF' s PS Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.37  Med: 1.26 Max: 2.47
Current: 1.29
0.37
2.47
Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow 13.30
HLF's Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
69% of the 647 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 21.47 vs. HLF: 13.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow only.
HLF' s Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 3.81  Med: 12.7 Max: 36.58
Current: 13.3
3.81
36.58
Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow 10.77
HLF's Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
74% of the 862 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 12.32 vs. HLF: 10.77 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow only.
HLF' s Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.8  Med: 10.18 Max: 23.05
Current: 10.77
2.8
23.05
EV-to-EBIT 10.01
HLF's EV-to-EBIT is ranked higher than
69% of the 1363 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 15.31 vs. HLF: 10.01 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
HLF' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 3.1  Med: 9.8 Max: 15.4
Current: 10.01
3.1
15.4
EV-to-EBITDA 8.65
HLF's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked higher than
65% of the 1416 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 12.00 vs. HLF: 8.65 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
HLF' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 2.6  Med: 8.6 Max: 13.2
Current: 8.65
2.6
13.2
EV-to-Revenue 1.46
HLF's EV-to-Revenue is ranked lower than
59% of the 1597 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.24 vs. HLF: 1.46 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-Revenue only.
HLF' s EV-to-Revenue Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.4  Med: 1.3 Max: 2.4
Current: 1.46
0.4
2.4
PEG Ratio 2.87
HLF's PEG Ratio is ranked lower than
63% of the 633 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.84 vs. HLF: 2.87 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG Ratio only.
HLF' s PEG Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.15  Med: 0.73 Max: 9.25
Current: 2.87
0.15
9.25
Shiller PE Ratio 19.34
HLF's Shiller PE Ratio is ranked higher than
64% of the 338 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 26.07 vs. HLF: 19.34 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller PE Ratio only.
HLF' s Shiller PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.14  Med: 20.46 Max: 37.7
Current: 19.34
12.14
37.7
Current Ratio 2.65
HLF's Current Ratio is ranked higher than
76% of the 1474 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.58 vs. HLF: 2.65 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
HLF' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1  Med: 1.32 Max: 2.65
Current: 2.65
1
2.65
Quick Ratio 2.24
HLF's Quick Ratio is ranked higher than
79% of the 1474 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.07 vs. HLF: 2.24 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
HLF' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.66  Med: 0.96 Max: 2.24
Current: 2.24
0.66
2.24
Days Inventory 161.83
HLF's Days Inventory is ranked lower than
86% of the 1517 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 64.96 vs. HLF: 161.83 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
HLF' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 103.75  Med: 123.13 Max: 161.83
Current: 161.83
103.75
161.83
Days Sales Outstanding 7.93
HLF's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked higher than
90% of the 1192 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 37.42 vs. HLF: 7.93 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
HLF' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 5.71  Med: 9.73 Max: 12.08
Current: 7.93
5.71
12.08
Days Payable 26.49
HLF's Days Payable is ranked lower than
55% of the 1086 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 43.95 vs. HLF: 26.49 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
HLF' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 26.49  Med: 29.89 Max: 33.78
Current: 26.49
26.49
33.78

Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
3-Year Dividend Growth Rate -100.00
HLF's 3-Year Dividend Growth Rate is ranked lower than
84% of the 719 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 4.60 vs. HLF: -100.00 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Dividend Growth Rate only.
HLF' s 3-Year Dividend Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0  Med: -100 Max: 44.2
Current: -100
0
44.2
5-Year Yield-on-Cost % 0.51
HLF's 5-Year Yield-on-Cost % is ranked lower than
91% of the 2184 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 2.34 vs. HLF: 0.51 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 5-Year Yield-on-Cost % only.
HLF' s 5-Year Yield-on-Cost % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.51  Med: 2.33 Max: 8.23
Current: 0.51
0.51
8.23
3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio 2.70
HLF's 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio is ranked higher than
94% of the 808 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: -1.80 vs. HLF: 2.70 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio only.
HLF' s 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -10.2  Med: 3.2 Max: 7.3
Current: 2.7
-10.2
7.3

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF 1.12
HLF's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF is ranked higher than
67% of the 700 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.55 vs. HLF: 1.12 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF only.
HLF' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.46  Med: 0.98 Max: 1.93
Current: 1.12
0.46
1.93
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) 0.75
HLF's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) is ranked higher than
86% of the 123 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.51 vs. HLF: 0.75 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) only.
HLF' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.48  Med: 1.04 Max: 1.61
Current: 0.75
0.48
1.61
Price-to-Median-PS-Value 1.02
HLF's Price-to-Median-PS-Value is ranked higher than
54% of the 1397 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 1.09 vs. HLF: 1.02 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Median-PS-Value only.
HLF' s Price-to-Median-PS-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.34  Med: 0.97 Max: 1.87
Current: 1.02
0.34
1.87
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % 9.99
HLF's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % is ranked higher than
74% of the 1643 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 5.53 vs. HLF: 9.99 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % only.
HLF' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 6.5  Med: 10.2 Max: 32.1
Current: 9.99
6.5
32.1
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % 9.90
HLF's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % is ranked higher than
55% of the 847 Companies
in the Global Household & Personal Products industry.

( Industry Median: 7.84 vs. HLF: 9.90 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % only.
HLF' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 8.8  Med: 24.4 Max: 42
Current: 9.9
8.8
42

More Statistics

Revenue (TTM) (Mil) $4,379.40
EPS (TTM) $ 4.40
Beta0.25
Short Percentage of Float21.91%
52-Week Range $47.62 - 79.64
Shares Outstanding (Mil)87.20

Analyst Estimate

Dec17 Dec18
Revenue (Mil $) 4,428 4,664
EPS ($) 4.25 5.85
EPS without NRI ($) 4.25 5.85
EPS Growth Rate
(Future 3Y To 5Y Estimate)
N/A
Dividends per Share ($)

Piotroski F-Score Details

Piotroski F-Score: 66
Positive ROAY
Positive CFROAY
Higher ROA yoyY
CFROA > ROAY
Lower Leverage yoyN
Higher Current Ratio yoyY
Less Shares Outstanding yoyY
Higher Gross Margin yoyN
Higher Asset Turnover yoyN

Personalized Checklist

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