The Reform Of China's State-Owned Enterprises – Emerging Markets Guru Mark Mobius

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Jun 11, 2015

Chinese stocks have been soaring in the first half of this year, and I’ve often been asked about whether I expect a correction –Â or whether there’s more room to run. It’s important to note that China’s stock market is really multiple markets – the Shanghai (A Share) and Hong Kong (H Share) markets are dominated by State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) considered “blue chip” stocks, while the Shenzhen (A Share) market is home to smaller domestic stocks. Many investors’ interest in China’s SOEs has no doubt been piqued by guidance from sources close to the government that reform plans foreshadowed in the government’s November 2013 program could soon begin to assume a more concrete shape, helping drive the recent gains in the Shanghai and Hong Kong share markets. In fact, many SOEs have already experienced significant share price volatility in recent weeks and given the extent of the market’s rally this year, it certainly would not surprise me to see more volatility ahead in China’s markets.

The SOEs are a crucial instrument of Chinese government policy and we think reform is crucial to the overall improvement of the economy. Representing perhaps two fifths of China’s economic output and a fifth of the country’s jobs,1 they have been a key mechanism for transmitting stimulus to China’s wider economy, through mandated investment plans, financed through the medium of preferential loans from state banks. On the other hand, ill-thought out and politically motivated investment has caused returns on SOE assets to fall from around parity with the private sector in 2008 to little more than half the level achieved by private businesses at present,2 with a number of SOEs appearing to be in financial difficulty due to rising debt loads and weak profitability. More than ever, the government now appears determined to tackle management shortcomings within SOEs in order to reshape China’s economy to a more market-oriented and entrepreneurial mold.

The present composition of China’s SOE system is the result of an earlier reform push that goes back nearly two decades. In 2014, the nature of the reforms planned by the Chinese government was unclear. Subsequent activity suggests that “privatization” as recognized in the West, with enterprises bought and sold in part or in full to the private sector, and the state withdrawing from involvement in management, does not appear to be on the agenda, at least for central government-controlled businesses.

In six enterprise pilot schemes of SOE reforms announced in April 2014, only two involved private capital, with the companies looking to inject additional assets into existing quoted subsidiaries leaving a mixed ownership overwhelmingly dominated by state shareholders. Two other companies experimented with an independent board focused on capital management, providing a barrier between the business and its state owners, somewhat akin to the model developed in Singapore. Yet another pilot kept the SOE structure more or less in place, but gave the SOE board rather than the state owner the power to appoint and incentivize the management team.3 The reforms appear to reflect a view in government circles that the key is to place circuit breakers between the CEO management and their government owners, with either the management themselves or an intervening level of asset management companies charged with enforcing a market-oriented business strategy.

Various individual SOEs have undertaken their own initiatives since the pilot scheme was announced. A major nuclear power engineering business and a financial services business have adopted similar schemes, with the assets of the state-owned holding companies injected into the quoted subsidiaries. A major oil company sold a minority stake in its petrol retailing subsidiary to a group of investors, with a view to an eventual initial public offering (IPO). A cement company underwent a capital restructure, leaving an employee-controlled body as the largest shareholder of the business. Yet other companies appear to be following a more traditional route of inviting private capital into specific joint ventures, with, in a number of cases, management granted an equity share in the businesses they run.

In recent months, China’s government seems to have been leaning toward another route to reform. The merger of two state railway engineering businesses was carried out in order to avoid duplication of resources to create greater scale in overseas markets. This proved extremely popular with investors, and commentary in well-connected journals has pointed to further initiatives along the same lines. In one report, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) was reported to be planning a drastic cut in the number of centrally controlled SOEs from the present 112 to perhaps only 40, although the report, in the state-controlled Economic Information Daily, was subsequently downplayed in a SASAC release.4 Rumors of merger plans have nevertheless persisted.

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