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Also traded in: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Peru, Switzerland, UK

GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 6/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash-to-Debt 0.82
AMZN's Cash-to-Debt is ranked lower than
53% of the 991 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.02 vs. AMZN: 0.82 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash-to-Debt only.
AMZN' s Cash-to-Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.02  Med: 1.4 Max: No Debt
Current: 0.82
0.02
No Debt
Equity-to-Asset 0.21
AMZN's Equity-to-Asset is ranked lower than
86% of the 971 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.48 vs. AMZN: 0.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity-to-Asset only.
AMZN' s Equity-to-Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.88  Med: 0.2 Max: 0.41
Current: 0.21
-0.88
0.41
Debt-to-Equity 1.37
AMZN's Debt-to-Equity is ranked lower than
83% of the 715 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.48 vs. AMZN: 1.37 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-Equity only.
AMZN' s Debt-to-Equity Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -8.18  Med: 0.53 Max: 6.04
Current: 1.37
-8.18
6.04
Debt-to-EBITDA 2.35
AMZN's Debt-to-EBITDA is ranked higher than
50% of the 675 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.40 vs. AMZN: 2.35 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-EBITDA only.
AMZN' s Debt-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.16  Med: 1.27 Max: 2.58
Current: 2.35
0.16
2.58
Interest Coverage 4.84
AMZN's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
76% of the 842 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 28.48 vs. AMZN: 4.84 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
AMZN' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.85  Med: 8 Max: 36.21
Current: 4.84
0.85
36.21
Piotroski F-Score: 5
Altman Z-Score: 5.96
Beneish M-Score: -2.33
WACC vs ROIC
12.71%
19.56%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating Margin % 2.31
AMZN's Operating Margin % is ranked lower than
61% of the 990 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.67 vs. AMZN: 2.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating Margin % only.
AMZN' s Operating Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.2  Med: 2.2 Max: 5.02
Current: 2.31
0.2
5.02
Net Margin % 1.71
AMZN's Net Margin % is ranked lower than
56% of the 990 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.36 vs. AMZN: 1.71 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net Margin % only.
AMZN' s Net Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.27  Med: 1.51 Max: 3.68
Current: 1.71
-0.27
3.68
ROE % 13.02
AMZN's ROE % is ranked higher than
71% of the 968 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 6.78 vs. AMZN: 13.02 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE % only.
AMZN' s ROE % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -2.35  Med: 10.77 Max: 33.34
Current: 13.02
-2.35
33.34
ROA % 3.04
AMZN's ROA % is ranked higher than
50% of the 996 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.03 vs. AMZN: 3.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA % only.
AMZN' s ROA % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.51  Med: 2.85 Max: 8.72
Current: 3.04
-0.51
8.72
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % 12.06
AMZN's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
53% of the 992 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 13.34 vs. AMZN: 12.06 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.71  Med: 14.56 Max: 139.16
Current: 12.06
0.71
139.16
3-Year Revenue Growth Rate 23.30
AMZN's 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate is ranked higher than
93% of the 854 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.70 vs. AMZN: 23.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 16.8  Med: 28.8 Max: 304.2
Current: 23.3
16.8
304.2
3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate 46.10
AMZN's 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate is ranked higher than
92% of the 748 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.00 vs. AMZN: 46.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0  Med: 22.3 Max: 57.3
Current: 46.1
0
57.3
GuruFocus has detected 4 Warning Signs with Amazon.com Inc AMZN.
More than 500,000 people have already joined GuruFocus to track the stocks they follow and exchange investment ideas.
» AMZN's 30-Y Financials

Financials (Next Earnings Date: 2018-04-27)


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Operating Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow
Operating Cash Flow & Net Income

» Details

Guru Trades

Q2 2017

AMZN Guru Trades in Q2 2017

George Soros 7,500 sh (New)
Lee Ainslie 4,150 sh (New)
John Buckingham 481 sh (New)
Paul Tudor Jones 85,867 sh (+986.37%)
John Burbank 12,209 sh (+939.95%)
Steven Cohen 102,664 sh (+426.00%)
Caxton Associates 7,350 sh (+194.00%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 120,003 sh (+68.78%)
John Paulson 7,800 sh (+41.82%)
Tom Gayner 70,000 sh (+18.64%)
Ron Baron 83,616 sh (+13.74%)
First Eagle Investment 1,017 sh (+10.91%)
Murray Stahl 502 sh (+3.93%)
Alan Fournier 75,000 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 100,000 sh (unchged)
John Hussman Sold Out
Mairs and Power 475 sh (-2.06%)
Diamond Hill Capital 436 sh (-5.22%)
PRIMECAP Management 298,978 sh (-5.86%)
Wallace Weitz 11,660 sh (-6.42%)
Dodge & Cox 880 sh (-7.85%)
Louis Moore Bacon 53,500 sh (-8.05%)
Chase Coleman 1,242,880 sh (-8.14%)
Ruane Cunniff 402,054 sh (-8.86%)
Jim Simons 299,555 sh (-9.02%)
Chris Davis 1,550,760 sh (-10.27%)
Frank Sands 1,954,735 sh (-10.35%)
Ken Fisher 1,700,511 sh (-16.01%)
Pioneer Investments 581,957 sh (-23.76%)
David Carlson 82,000 sh (-28.70%)
Mario Gabelli 3,312 sh (-35.71%)
Andreas Halvorsen 618,046 sh (-43.32%)
Leon Cooperman 10,500 sh (-45.88%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 195,912 sh (-47.38%)
John Griffin 118,400 sh (-67.30%)
Spiros Segalas 1,414,503 sh (-17.59%)
» More
Q3 2017

AMZN Guru Trades in Q3 2017

Louis Moore Bacon 170,500 sh (+218.69%)
Steven Cohen 291,304 sh (+183.75%)
John Burbank 25,027 sh (+104.99%)
Caxton Associates 12,750 sh (+73.47%)
George Soros 10,000 sh (+33.33%)
Chase Coleman 1,537,700 sh (+23.72%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 145,803 sh (+21.50%)
Tom Gayner 80,000 sh (+14.29%)
Ken Fisher 1,755,405 sh (+3.23%)
Leon Cooperman 10,640 sh (+1.33%)
Ruane Cunniff 403,919 sh (+0.46%)
PRIMECAP Management 299,078 sh (+0.03%)
First Eagle Investment 1,017 sh (unchged)
Wallace Weitz 11,660 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 100,000 sh (unchged)
Signature Select Canadian Fund 4,450 sh (unchged)
Jim Simons Sold Out
Lee Ainslie Sold Out
John Paulson Sold Out
Ron Baron 82,451 sh (-1.39%)
Chris Davis 1,507,337 sh (-2.80%)
David Carlson 79,000 sh (-3.66%)
Mario Gabelli 3,177 sh (-4.08%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 185,757 sh (-5.18%)
Frank Sands 1,846,411 sh (-5.54%)
Dodge & Cox 830 sh (-5.68%)
Diamond Hill Capital 407 sh (-6.65%)
Mairs and Power 429 sh (-9.68%)
John Buckingham 427 sh (-11.23%)
Murray Stahl 406 sh (-19.12%)
Pioneer Investments 388,517 sh (-33.24%)
Andreas Halvorsen 399,747 sh (-35.32%)
John Griffin 58,000 sh (-51.01%)
Paul Tudor Jones 3,489 sh (-95.94%)
Spiros Segalas 1,345,036 sh (-4.91%)
» More
Q4 2017

AMZN Guru Trades in Q4 2017

Tom Russo 75 sh (New)
Steve Mandel 769,996 sh (New)
Joel Greenblatt 25,788 sh (New)
Ruane Cunniff 783,747 sh (+94.04%)
Wallace Weitz 16,650 sh (+42.80%)
Mario Gabelli 4,252 sh (+33.84%)
Andreas Halvorsen 518,220 sh (+29.64%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 168,003 sh (+15.23%)
Steven Cohen 327,617 sh (+12.47%)
Paul Tudor Jones 3,918 sh (+12.30%)
John Griffin 64,000 sh (+10.34%)
First Eagle Investment 1,102 sh (+8.36%)
Frank Sands 1,969,357 sh (+6.66%)
Ken Fisher 1,793,557 sh (+2.17%)
PRIMECAP Management 299,978 sh (+0.30%)
David Carlson 79,000 sh (unchged)
Tom Gayner 80,000 sh (unchged)
Leon Cooperman 10,640 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 35,000 sh (unchged)
Dodge & Cox 830 sh (unchged)
John Burbank Sold Out
George Soros Sold Out
Chris Davis 1,486,864 sh (-1.36%)
Mairs and Power 419 sh (-2.33%)
John Buckingham 398 sh (-6.79%)
Diamond Hill Capital 353 sh (-13.27%)
Murray Stahl 344 sh (-15.27%)
Chase Coleman 1,116,150 sh (-27.41%)
Pioneer Investments 254,321 sh (-34.54%)
Ron Baron 49,942 sh (-39.43%)
Louis Moore Bacon 90,500 sh (-46.92%)
Caxton Associates 500 sh (-96.08%)
Spiros Segalas 1,172,299 sh (-12.84%)
» More
2018

AMZN Guru Trades in 2018

Spiros Segalas 1,022,336 sh (-12.79%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with AMZN

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)

GuruDate Trades Impact to Portfolio Price Range * (?) Current Price Change from Average Current Shares
Ken Fisher 2017-12-31 Add 2.17%0.06%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%1,793,557
Chris Davis 2017-12-31 Reduce -1.36%0.08%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%1,486,864
Ruane Cunniff 2017-12-31 Add 94.04%3.64%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%783,747
Steve Mandel 2017-12-31 New Buy4.7%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%769,996
Ron Baron 2017-12-31 Reduce -39.43%0.15%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%49,942
Joel Greenblatt 2017-12-31 New Buy0.44%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%25,788
Wallace Weitz 2017-12-31 Add 42.80%0.25%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%16,650
Mario Gabelli 2017-12-31 Add 33.84%0.01%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%4,252
First Eagle Investment 2017-12-31 Add 8.36%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%1,102
George Soros 2017-12-31 Sold Out 0.29%$957.1 - $1195.83 $ 1527.4939%0
Ken Fisher 2017-09-30 Add 3.23%0.08%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%1,755,405
Chris Davis 2017-09-30 Reduce -2.80%0.18%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%1,507,337
Ruane Cunniff 2017-09-30 Add 0.46%0.02%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%403,919
Ron Baron 2017-09-30 Reduce -1.39%0.01%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%82,451
Tom Gayner 2017-09-30 Add 14.29%0.19%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%80,000
Leon Cooperman 2017-09-30 Add 1.33%0.01%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%10,640
George Soros 2017-09-30 Add 33.33%0.07%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%10,000
Mario Gabelli 2017-09-30 Reduce -4.08%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%3,177
Dodge & Cox 2017-09-30 Reduce -5.68%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%830
John Paulson 2017-09-30 Sold Out 0.1%$938.6 - $1052.8 $ 1527.4956%0
Ken Fisher 2017-06-30 Reduce -16.01%0.48%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%1,700,511
Chris Davis 2017-06-30 Reduce -10.27%0.68%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%1,550,760
Ruane Cunniff 2017-06-30 Reduce -8.86%0.33%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%402,054
Ron Baron 2017-06-30 Add 13.74%0.05%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%83,616
Tom Gayner 2017-06-30 Add 18.64%0.23%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%70,000
Wallace Weitz 2017-06-30 Reduce -6.42%0.03%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%11,660
Leon Cooperman 2017-06-30 Reduce -45.88%0.32%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%10,500
John Paulson 2017-06-30 Add 41.82%0.03%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%7,800
George Soros 2017-06-30 New Buy0.16%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%7,500
Mario Gabelli 2017-06-30 Reduce -35.71%0.01%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%3,312
First Eagle Investment 2017-06-30 Add 10.91%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%1,017
Dodge & Cox 2017-06-30 Reduce -7.85%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 1527.4960%880
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Business Description

Industry: Retail - Apparel & Specialty » Specialty Retail    NAICS: 454110    SIC: 5961
Compare:NYSE:BABA, NAS:EBAY, NAS:ORLY, SZSE:002024, NYSE:BBY, NYSE:AZO, NAS:MELI, NYSE:GPC, NAS:ULTA, NAS:QRTEA, NYSE:VIPS, TSE:4755, ADX:ADNOCDIST, TSX:CTC.A, LSE:ASC, NYSE:AAP, TSE:3092, NAS:TSCO, NYSE:KAR, XSWX:DUFN » details
Traded in other countries:AMZN.Austria, AMZO34.Brazil, AMZN.Chile, AMZ.Germany, AMZ N.Mexico, AMZN.Peru, AMZN.Switzerland, 0R1O.UK,
Headquarter Location:USA
Amazon.com Inc is an online retailer. The Company sells its products through the website which provides services, such as advertising services and co-branded credit card agreements. It also offers electronic devices like Kindle e-readers and Fire tablets.

Amazon is among the world's highest-grossing online retailers, with $178 billion in net sales and $320 billion in estimated GMV in 2017. Online retail sales accounted for 61% of net revenue in 2017, followed by third-party seller services (18%), Amazon Web Services (10%), Prime membership fees and other subscription-based services (6%), Whole Foods and other retail formats (3%), and advertising/cobranded credit cards (3%). International segments totaled 33% of Amazon's non-AWS sales in 2017.

Guru Investment Theses on Amazon.com Inc

Wally Weitz Comments on Amazon - Jan 24, 2018

Our lone portfolio addition, Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN), requires little introduction. Amazon has built an unassailable global competitive advantage in its core retail business, and we believe it will continue to gain worldwide retail (not just e-commerce) market share for many years to come. In addition, Amazon Web Services has also built a significant share in the large and rapidly growing “infrastructure as a service” market. We foresee Amazon’s unique technical capabilities, global scale and culture of customer obsession will allow the company to grow its business value for many years.

From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s Partner III Opportunity Fund fourth-quarter commentary.

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GAMCO Growth Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Nov 14, 2017

Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) (3.3% of net assets as of September 30, 2017%) (AMZN – $961.35 – NASDAQ) launched in 1995 as an online book retailer and has evolved into a dominant e-commerce platform. CEO Jeff Bezos guides the company on customer obsession rather than competitor focus and is long-term oriented. Amazon’s competitive advantage within e-commerce is Amazon Prime, which benefits from a virtuous cycle as the continuously expanding selection of inventory drives traffic, which attracts more sellers, who add yet more selection. Amazon continues to invest in the Prime value proposition (free and faster shipping, free video and music streaming, libraries of free books and magazines, and a host of other benefits). Prime members spend more than non-Prime customers and their purchasing volume tends to increase over time. In addition to its retailing operations, Amazon pioneered the concept of hyperscale public cloud with its Amazon Web Services (AWS) and continues to be the dominant market share leader within that rapidly growing industry.



From GAMCO Growth Fund third quarter 2017 commentary.



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Chris Davis Comments on Amazon - Aug 09, 2017

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN), an e-commerce giant that has profoundly reshaped the retail industry over the years, is another example of a market leader in the Portfolio. Borrowing a concept from Costco, Amazon offers an optional membership-based business model through its Amazon Prime service. In addition to its retail business, Amazon has a state-of-the-art, rapidly growing web services business that enables companies and other organizations to outsource their computer systems to Amazon’s digital cloud.


From Chris Davis (Trades, Portfolio)' Davis Opportunity Fund 2017 semi-annual report.

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FPA Capital Comments on Amazon - Jul 28, 2017

For the second quarter, as mentioned earlier, large-capitalized stocks performed better than small-cap stocks. The NASDAQ was the best performer, helped by the gain achieved by the omnipresent Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) and other mega-cap technology stocks. While different styles generally have some dispersion in returns from quarter to quarter, this past period was very dramatic. We expect this wide dispersion in returns to narrow in the future.

In last quarter’s letter, we discussed the trend of investors allocating more of their capital to passive strategies like index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and away from active managers. AMZN and other stocks in the S&P 500 are where the large flows of capital have headed. It is worth noting that the 2017 ETF inflows, depicted below, are through the middle of June, so we are on pace to double the record inflows experienced last year.

Currently, passive investors own roughly 15% of AMZN’s equity through index funds, ETFs and the like— or roughly $70 billion worth of AMZN’s value. They hold nearly 18% if you exclude what Jeff Bezos owns. A decade ago, passive investors owned just a few percent of Amazon’s stock. Because index funds and ETFs buy and sell stocks in their respective index, or sector, based solely on flows of money into and out of their funds, by nature these passive strategies are indifferent to valuations—including outrageously over-valued securities. Obviously, AMZN is a dominant web retailer with a profitable cloud-service segment that is growing rapidly. However, AMZN is trading at 40x EV/EBITDA and 190x EPS. We believe some of AMZN’s rich valuation, and that of other stock’s as well, is attributable to the passive investment strategies’ indifference to valuations. These passive investors and benchmark-hugging active-management strategies are often the marginal buyer and, as mentioned earlier, they do not consider a stock’s valuation as a pre-requisite for buying or selling any security.

We recently analyzed the largest 15 U.S. publicly traded companies by market capitalization and found that the average P/E ratio was 36.3x versus 21.5 for the entire S&P 500 index. Moreover, passive investors own between 13% and 21% of the equity for each of these massive companies, or an average 17% ownership rate. Interestingly, just like with Amazon, passive investors owned just a few percent of each of these companies a decade ago.

We also found that the volatility, using the average five-year beta as a volatility proxy, of the 15 largest mega-cap companies in the S&P 500 in aggregate was identical to the market itself. The smallest market cap companies by decile of the S&P 500, on the other hand, had on average a beta 30% higher than the index.

This difference in volatility makes sense, and the following example illustrates why. Assume an active small-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position was a 5% weighting of a $1 billion market-cap company. Therefore, the manager has a $100 million investment in the company, which represents a 10% ownership stake. Depending on how fast the position is liquidated, the sale of 10% of the shares outstanding could have a very substantial impact on the price of the security. On the other hand, if an active large-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position is also a 5% weighting, but of a $200 billion market-cap stock, the impact on price will be negligible. The reason is that the manager’s largest position would represent only 0.5% of the company’s value. Clearly, we believe that there is an enormous difference in selling one-half of 1% of a company versus 10%, which often leads to greater volatility.

We believe the mega-cap’s lower volatility is also a significant factor in attracting capital from passive strategies, as well as capital from active-management strategies that are trying to keep up with the benchmarks. As more capital flows into these mega-cap stocks, the valuation for most of them becomes richer. Thus, the lower volatility of these mega-caps feeds a self-perpetuating cycle of more money being funneled into these mega-cap equities, which then helps drive the return of the passive strategies.



From FPA Capital's second quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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David Rolfe Comments on Amazon - Jul 17, 2017

We certainly follow Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) with great interest, and have owned shares in the past, however we struggle to understand how its $470 billion enterprise value can be justified by future profitability – let alone current profits, at just $2.6 billion trailing 12-month net income. Looking at comparably sized businesses, for example, Apple, first eclipsed $470 billion enterprise value in the midst of generating $40 billion in GAAP net income over a 12-month period (fiscal 2012) and went on to post another $220 billion in cumulative GAAP net income, since. Alphabet, also a portfolio holding, only recently eclipsed $470 billion EV in 2015, in the middle of $16 billion in bottom-line value creation, and then posted another nearly $20 billion in GAAP income, a year later. Clearly, Apple and Alphabet are both growing businesses that have substantial, and consistent profit generating value propositions.3 In addition, and more importantly, the reinvestment requirements to maintain those profits appear to be substantially lower than what Amazon apparently requires. According to Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO:

“We get to monetize in a very unusual way. When [Amazon] wins a Golden Globe, it helps us sell more shoes.”

This sounds not far from the strategy brands have been executing for decades in endorsing celebrities and athletes (i.e., content) to sell more products. What is unusual, relative to brands, is that Amazon doesn’t appear to have the high levels of merchandise margins available to produce television content that wins Golden Globes. So, maintaining a high-cost fly-wheel that monetizes by selling commodity products (Amazon Prime) – or makes a market for others to sell commodity products (Amazon Fulfillment) – makes us very skeptical that Amazon’s retail unit can generate the magnitude of long- term profits we think are necessary to justify today’s enterprise value. Using our best estimates, we believe Amazon currently holds less than 2% market share of U.S. retail sales, using the U.S. Department of Commerce’s definition of retail sales, excluding cars and fuel. The exact share and/or exact definition of the size of the market is not particularly important; the relevant point, to us, is that the absolute share is not significant. Even if we assume, for example, that Amazon quintuples its U.S. market share, that would leave 90% of the U.S. retail market up for grabs. We think that investors and retailers alike obviously must be aware of Amazon – now, and for the last 10-15 years, for that matter – but both also should be aware of the size of the opportunity to be found in the substantial portions of the market where Amazon is not. As we consider our own retail exposure, we take the same approach: we have not invested in traditional retailers in suburban malls pursuing business-as-usual strategies; rather, our holdings have differentiated models based upon non-traditional buying strategies (T.J. Maxx, Ross Stores) or upon targeting underserved rural populations with merchandise assortments that are often difficult for, or unattractive to, competitors (Tractor Supply Company). These companies have taken a thoughtful approach to their operations and to their competitive position in relation to online retail, and they have found ways to remain relevant. Finally, we would point out that Amazon just wrote a $14 billion check to Whole Foods to admit, very publicly and very clearly, that online retail is not as suitable in some categories as it is in others, and this was after they tried to do it their own way for ten years.



From David Rolfe (Trades, Portfolio)'s Wedgewood Partners second-quarter 2017 shareholder letter.

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Baron Opportunity Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Apr 20, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer and cloud services provider, rose during the first quarter after the company reported strong financial results. Amazon continues to benefit from its flywheel strategy, where more participation from Prime members drives greater loyalty and purchasing on Amazon.com. Indeed, according to recent surveys, Amazon captured 53% of U.S. e-commerce sales growth in 2016 (EMarketer, Inc.) and a full 55% of U.S. online shoppers begin their product discovery right on Amazon’s site (Activate Tech and Media Outlook). Moreover, Amazon is the world’s dominant provider of cloud computing services, with its Amazon Web Services (AWS) segment achieving an over $14 billion run rate and still growing almost 50%. We believe AWS will be a significant incremental contributor to Amazon’s overall value creation. Finally, the company also continues to invest in new and potentially large business opportunities, such as TV content, voice-controlled services (Echo and Alexa), digital advertising, e-finance, business supplies and apparel. (Ashim Mehra)



From the Baron Opportunity Fund first quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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Baron Opportunity Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 21, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer and cloud services provider, declined in the fourth quarter. The company reported disappointing operating margins and guidance below Street expectations driven primarily by investments in India and abroad. In addition to India, Amazon is investing in several growth initiatives, including Amazon studios, Alexa (voice interface), Amazon Web Services and distribution center expansions. We see the company as the leading retail and cloud provider globally, and believe it possesses both deep moats and expansive addressable markets in both of these areas. (Ashim Mehra)



From Baron Funds' Baron Opportunity Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Baron Funds' Fifth Avenue Growth Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 13, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), declined 10% during the fourth quarter. After a streak of stellar quarterly earnings reports, which showed meaningful margin and profitability upside, Amazon reported mixed results with operating margins and guidance slightly below Street’s heightened expectations driven by weaker retail margins and investments in India and abroad. Amazon is continuing to invest heavily in several growth initiatives, including Amazon studios, Alexa, India, Amazon Web Services, and distribution and fulfilment center expansions. We see the company as the undisputed global leader in the two, secularly growing, multi-trillion dollar markets of e-commerce and cloud computing, and it remains our highest conviction long-term investment idea.



From Baron Funds' Fifth Avenue Growth Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Ruane Cunniff Comments on Amazon - Feb 07, 2017

In the fall, we exited our small position in Walmart and replaced it with a similarly small position in Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN). The company’s e-commerce operation (Amazon.com) and its cloud computing platform (Amazon Web Services) are two of the most advantaged businesses we’ve analyzed in quite some time. Both are growing fast and have miles of runway ahead of them. And they are run by arguably the most talented, customer-focused and long term-oriented businessman of his generation.

At a consolidated level, Amazon produces very little in the way of reported profits. Amazon Web Services, whose financials are disclosed separately, earns very rich margins, but the larger e-commerce business reports scant earnings. Our research indicates that the company’s e-commerce business has substantial earnings power that is being masked by a variety of ambitious growth investments. The Fund purchased shares at what we believe to be a reasonable multiple of underlying earnings power excluding those investments. Estimating the long-term potential of Amazon’s many investments is an inherently imprecise exercise, which is why the investment thus far has been a small one.


From Ruane Cunniff (Trades, Portfolio)'s Sequoia Fund 4th quarter shareholder letter.


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Weitz Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Jan 26, 2017

Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) is an e-commerce and cloud computing company. We believe that Amazon has built a global competitive advantage that will allow it to obtain a material share of the worldwide retail (not just e-commerce) market over a long period of organic growth. Amazon’s strong, customer-obsessed culture is unique among technology and retail firms, which has provided several new long-term investment opportunities. In addition to the retail business, the company’s Amazon Web Service (AWS) business has built significant share and scale within the infrastructure as a service market. AWS business is highly profitable and participates in a large and growing market.



From Weitz Investment Management's Value Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com Inc. - Oct 25, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest online retailer and cloud services provider, rose in the third quarter after reporting strong revenue growth (28% year-over-year) and improving margins in its core e-commerce business. Amazon’s other major business segment, Amazon Web Services (AWS), the disruptive cloud computing offering, continues to gain traction with enterprise customers, and had another strong quarter of growth (58% year-over-year in currency-neutral dollars). Given our belief that the shift in enterprise IT spending has passed the tipping point towards cloud computing, we expect AWS to be an even larger contributor to value creation than Amazon’s core e-commerce segment. (Ashim Mehra)







From Baron Opportunity Fund third-quarter 2016 commentary.



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David Funds Comments on Amazon - Aug 31, 2016

Adaptability not only results in pricing power but also the ability to create new markets. Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) provides a prime example. Looking back at Amazon’s humble beginnings in 1994, clearly one of the reasons the company became the world’s largest bookseller was that Amazon created entirely new markets. The Kindle E-reader was not only a product innovation but also a business model innovation. Printing and shipping costs suddenly disappeared, combining improved convenience for consumers with higher profits for Amazon. Company founder Jeff Bezos and his team then proved they would not be satisfied to sit on their laurels by parlaying their expertise in cloud computing, gained from running their retail business, to an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) business for third parties. Thus, was born Amazon Web Services (AWS), which reached $10 billionin sales even faster than Amazon’s retail business and which one day might surpass the retail segment in size.7





From David Global Fund Semi-Annual Review 2016.



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Spiros Segalas Comments on Amazon - Aug 18, 2016

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) continues to invest to drive unit growth in its core retail business and through the proliferation of digital commerce via the mobile market. The stock has benefited as investors have shown an increased appreciation for Amazon’s strong execution, long-term revenue growth, margin-expansion potential, and development of a second meaningfully important business opportunity in cloud infrastructure. Earnings and revenue in the most recently reported quarter exceeded expectations, as did company estimates for future quarters.



From Spiros Segalas' second quarter 2015 Focus Fund commentary.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Jul 13, 2016

Ask your typical investor to name the Walmart online, and many will reflexively say Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) In one very narrow sense, we agree with that description. Amazon has been successful at attaining its original goal. Last year, it became the fastest company to reach $100 billion in annual sales, and it is now the world’s largest online retailer. But we think of Amazon as much more than that.



Take, for instance, Amazon Web Services, the cloud computing business that reached $10 billion in annual sales last year – a pace faster than the original Amazon. There’s also Amazon Prime, with 60 to 80 million members, the Kindle and other electronic devices, streaming videos with proprietary original content, and an online marketplace used by more than 70,000 third-party sellers. Amazon Logistics Services is starting to compete in the trillion-dollar freight industry. Most recently, it introduced its grocery delivery service AmazonFresh. Practically every month, it seems, Amazon unveils a new innovation, product, or service.



So what, exactly, is Amazon? We think Amazon has built an online/ digital service platform enabled by massively scalable IT and an unparalleled logistics infrastructure. This infrastructure enables Amazon to be not only the biggest online retailer, but also the largest public cloud service provider, a leading streaming service provider and digital content seller, and a major provider of fulfillment (and advertising) services to third-party retailers.



In addition to the lack of an obvious comparable and the mischaracterization of its business, Amazon’s stock has been subject to an over-emphasis on short-term results. We invested in Amazon in 2009, when the company had never turned a profit, because it was reinvesting in future growth. Amazon ignored its critics (as it always has) and continued to innovate, experiment, and place large bets against conventional wisdom. The stock has increased more than two and a half times since we first invested. Amazon remains our highest conviction investment idea.



From Baron Funds' Summer 2016 Newsletter.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - May 23, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer, declined in the first quarter despite reporting strong revenue growth likely due to retail margins being lower than anticipated. Amazon has responded by instituting substantial fulfillment and supply chain fee increases for merchants on the platform. We estimate that these fee increases should start to alleviate the recent pressure on retail margins in the upcoming quarters. Amazon’s other major business segment, Amazon Web Services (AWS) continues to gain traction with enterprise customers, and over time, we expect AWS to be the larger contributor to value creation for the company.



From Baron Fifth Avenue Growth Fund first quarter commentary 2016.



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Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
PE Ratio 247.98
AMZN's PE Ratio is ranked lower than
98% of the 742 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 20.46 vs. AMZN: 247.98 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 131.53 Max: 3732.43
Current: 247.98
25.94
3732.43
Forward PE Ratio 153.85
AMZN's Forward PE Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 193 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 16.34 vs. AMZN: 153.85 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward PE Ratio only.
N/A
PE Ratio without NRI 247.98
AMZN's PE Ratio without NRI is ranked lower than
98% of the 744 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 20.57 vs. AMZN: 247.98 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio without NRI only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio without NRI Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 131.53 Max: 3732.43
Current: 247.98
25.94
3732.43
PB Ratio 26.67
AMZN's PB Ratio is ranked lower than
98% of the 954 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.73 vs. AMZN: 26.67 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PB Ratio only.
AMZN' s PB Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 6.46  Med: 14.91 Max: 63.19
Current: 26.67
6.46
63.19
PS Ratio 4.23
AMZN's PS Ratio is ranked lower than
92% of the 958 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.71 vs. AMZN: 4.23 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PS Ratio only.
AMZN' s PS Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.9  Med: 2.16 Max: 4.38
Current: 4.23
0.9
4.38
Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow 117.39
AMZN's Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
93% of the 380 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 16.11 vs. AMZN: 117.39 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.53  Med: 48.61 Max: 555.04
Current: 117.39
15.53
555.04
Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow 41.03
AMZN's Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
90% of the 500 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 10.81 vs. AMZN: 41.03 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.45  Med: 27.02 Max: 42.42
Current: 41.03
12.45
42.42
EV-to-EBIT 160.64
AMZN's EV-to-EBIT is ranked lower than
97% of the 778 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 15.30 vs. AMZN: 160.64 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.1  Med: 92.2 Max: 2797.9
Current: 160.64
15.1
2797.9
EV-to-EBITDA 46.35
AMZN's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
91% of the 818 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 12.19 vs. AMZN: 46.35 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 11.8  Med: 34.7 Max: 50.7
Current: 46.35
11.8
50.7
EV-to-Revenue 4.21
AMZN's EV-to-Revenue is ranked lower than
91% of the 974 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.81 vs. AMZN: 4.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-Revenue only.
AMZN' s EV-to-Revenue Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.8  Med: 2.1 Max: 4.4
Current: 4.21
0.8
4.4
PEG Ratio 6.05
AMZN's PEG Ratio is ranked lower than
79% of the 297 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.22 vs. AMZN: 6.05 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG Ratio only.
AMZN' s PEG Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.96  Med: 3.88 Max: 191.01
Current: 6.05
0.96
191.01
Shiller PE Ratio 728.30
AMZN's Shiller PE Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 283 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 18.93 vs. AMZN: 728.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s Shiller PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 146.97  Med: 308.42 Max: 3461.75
Current: 728.3
146.97
3461.75
Current Ratio 1.04
AMZN's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
77% of the 932 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.59 vs. AMZN: 1.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
AMZN' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.04  Med: 1.33 Max: 3.09
Current: 1.04
1.04
3.09
Quick Ratio 0.76
AMZN's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
55% of the 931 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.87 vs. AMZN: 0.76 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
AMZN' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.75  Med: 1.06 Max: 2.89
Current: 0.76
0.75
2.89
Days Inventory 33.70
AMZN's Days Inventory is ranked higher than
78% of the 939 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 87.58 vs. AMZN: 33.70 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
AMZN' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 31.84  Med: 37 Max: 39.78
Current: 33.7
31.84
39.78
Days Sales Outstanding 27.01
AMZN's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked lower than
64% of the 773 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 14.41 vs. AMZN: 27.01 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
AMZN' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 14.71  Med: 20.95 Max: 27.01
Current: 27.01
14.71
27.01
Days Payable 92.10
AMZN's Days Payable is ranked higher than
84% of the 707 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 54.14 vs. AMZN: 92.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
AMZN' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 81.72  Med: 90.08 Max: 107.8
Current: 92.1
81.72
107.8

Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio -1.30
AMZN's 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio is ranked lower than
56% of the 542 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: -0.60 vs. AMZN: -1.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -18.6  Med: -2 Max: -0.5
Current: -1.3
-18.6
-0.5

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price-to-Tangible-Book 67.29
AMZN's Price-to-Tangible-Book is ranked lower than
98% of the 869 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.02 vs. AMZN: 67.29 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Tangible-Book only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Tangible-Book Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 10.6  Med: 26.41 Max: 257.65
Current: 67.29
10.6
257.65
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF 8.51
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF is ranked lower than
94% of the 487 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.29 vs. AMZN: 8.51 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.72  Med: 4.15 Max: 246.06
Current: 8.51
1.72
246.06
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) 23.17
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) is ranked lower than
99% of the 92 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.29 vs. AMZN: 23.17 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 14.27  Med: 34.13 Max: 63.2
Current: 23.17
14.27
63.2
Price-to-Median-PS-Value 1.96
AMZN's Price-to-Median-PS-Value is ranked lower than
88% of the 771 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.04 vs. AMZN: 1.96 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Median-PS-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Median-PS-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.54  Med: 1.13 Max: 11.92
Current: 1.96
0.54
11.92
Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value 9.92
AMZN's Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value is ranked lower than
98% of the 167 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.41 vs. AMZN: 9.92 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.35  Med: 5.08 Max: 32.24
Current: 9.92
1.35
32.24
Price-to-Graham-Number 27.23
AMZN's Price-to-Graham-Number is ranked lower than
100% of the 594 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.43 vs. AMZN: 27.23 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Graham-Number only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Graham-Number Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.03  Med: 12.89 Max: 29.77
Current: 27.23
4.03
29.77
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % 0.61
AMZN's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
76% of the 997 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.21 vs. AMZN: 0.61 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.1  Med: 1.1 Max: 6.6
Current: 0.61
0.1
6.6
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % 20.75
AMZN's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % is ranked higher than
89% of the 589 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.97 vs. AMZN: 20.75 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % only.
AMZN' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 20.1  Med: 21.2 Max: 24.1
Current: 20.75
20.1
24.1

More Statistics

Revenue (TTM) (Mil) $177,866.00
EPS (TTM) $ 6.16
Beta1.71
Volatility28.33%
52-Week Range $896.29 - 1617.54
Shares Outstanding (Mil)484.97

Analyst Estimate

Dec18 Dec19 Dec20
Revenue (Mil $) 232,814 281,806 327,635
EBIT (Mil $) 8,887 13,892 22,771
EBITDA (Mil $) 22,789 31,334 41,550
EPS ($) 10.48 19.47 29.18
EPS without NRI ($) 10.48 19.47 29.18
EPS Growth Rate
(Future 3Y To 5Y Estimate)
28.05%
Dividends per Share ($)

Piotroski F-Score Details

Piotroski F-Score: 55
Positive ROAY
Positive CFROAY
Higher ROA yoyN
CFROA > ROAY
Lower Leverage yoyN
Higher Current Ratio yoyN
Less Shares Outstanding yoyN
Higher Gross Margin yoyY
Higher Asset Turnover yoyY

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