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Also traded in: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Peru, Switzerland, UK

GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 7/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash-to-Debt 1.04
AMZN's Cash-to-Debt is ranked higher than
51% of the 979 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.99 vs. AMZN: 1.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash-to-Debt only.
AMZN' s Cash-to-Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.02  Med: 1.4 Max: No Debt
Current: 1.04
0.02
No Debt
Equity-to-Asset 0.27
AMZN's Equity-to-Asset is ranked lower than
83% of the 961 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.49 vs. AMZN: 0.27 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity-to-Asset only.
AMZN' s Equity-to-Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.88  Med: 0.21 Max: 0.41
Current: 0.27
-0.88
0.41
Debt-to-Equity 0.91
AMZN's Debt-to-Equity is ranked lower than
65% of the 744 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.43 vs. AMZN: 0.91 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-Equity only.
AMZN' s Debt-to-Equity Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -8.18  Med: 0.66 Max: 6.18
Current: 0.91
-8.18
6.18
Debt-to-EBITDA 1.42
AMZN's Debt-to-EBITDA is ranked higher than
69% of the 662 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.50 vs. AMZN: 1.42 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-EBITDA only.
AMZN' s Debt-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.16  Med: 1.35 Max: 2.58
Current: 1.42
0.16
2.58
Interest Coverage 8.76
AMZN's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
72% of the 814 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 27.47 vs. AMZN: 8.76 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
AMZN' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.85  Med: 8 Max: 38.77
Current: 8.76
0.85
38.77
Piotroski F-Score: 7
Altman Z-Score: 6.22
Beneish M-Score: -2.88
WACC vs ROIC
12.00%
31.81%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 9/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating Margin % 5.33
AMZN's Operating Margin % is ranked lower than
51% of the 978 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.64 vs. AMZN: 5.33 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating Margin % only.
AMZN' s Operating Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.2  Med: 2.21 Max: 5.33
Current: 5.33
0.2
5.33
Net Margin % 4.33
AMZN's Net Margin % is ranked higher than
56% of the 980 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.32 vs. AMZN: 4.33 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net Margin % only.
AMZN' s Net Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.27  Med: 1.51 Max: 4.33
Current: 4.33
-0.27
4.33
ROE % 28.48
AMZN's ROE % is ranked higher than
85% of the 962 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 6.49 vs. AMZN: 28.48 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE % only.
AMZN' s ROE % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -2.35  Med: 10.77 Max: 28.48
Current: 28.48
-2.35
28.48
ROA % 7.21
AMZN's ROA % is ranked higher than
65% of the 986 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.90 vs. AMZN: 7.21 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA % only.
AMZN' s ROA % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.51  Med: 2.85 Max: 8.15
Current: 7.21
-0.51
8.15
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % 22.99
AMZN's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % is ranked higher than
55% of the 982 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 13.80 vs. AMZN: 22.99 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.71  Med: 14.56 Max: 111.47
Current: 22.99
0.71
111.47
3-Year Revenue Growth Rate 27.60
AMZN's 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate is ranked higher than
91% of the 874 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.20 vs. AMZN: 27.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 16.8  Med: 28.2 Max: 304.2
Current: 27.6
16.8
304.2
3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate 47.60
AMZN's 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate is ranked higher than
93% of the 764 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.90 vs. AMZN: 47.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0  Med: 23.65 Max: 47.6
Current: 47.6
0
47.6
3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate 152.60
AMZN's 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate is ranked lower than
99.99% of the 673 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 4.90 vs. AMZN: 152.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0  Med: -46.15 Max: 152.6
Current: 152.6
0
152.6
GuruFocus has detected 1 Warning Sign with Amazon.com Inc AMZN.
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» AMZN's 30-Y Financials

Financials (Next Earnings Date: 2019-04-26)


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Operating Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow
Operating Cash Flow & Net Income

» Details

Guru Trades

Q1 2018

AMZN Guru Trades in Q1 2018

George Soros 44,200 sh (New)
Jim Simons 509,955 sh (New)
First Pacific Advisors 600 sh (New)
Julian Robertson 500 sh (New)
Ken Fisher 1,853,073 sh (+3.32%)
Ron Baron 73,947 sh (+48.07%)
Joel Greenblatt 29,324 sh (+13.71%)
Murray Stahl 410 sh (+19.19%)
Tom Gayner 84,720 sh (+5.90%)
PRIMECAP Management 308,478 sh (+2.83%)
Chase Coleman 1,197,150 sh (+7.26%)
Paul Tudor Jones 21,528 sh (+449.46%)
Mairs and Power 586 sh (+39.86%)
Caxton Associates 4,400 sh (+780.00%)
Louis Moore Bacon 105,428 sh (+16.50%)
Diamond Hill Capital 392 sh (+11.05%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 170,853 sh (+1.70%)
Pioneer Investments 263,781 sh (+3.72%)
George Soros 7,000 sh (unchged)
Julian Robertson 1,500 sh (unchged)
Leon Cooperman 10,640 sh (unchged)
First Eagle Investment Sold Out
Tom Russo Sold Out
John Griffin Sold Out
Wallace Weitz 11,633 sh (-30.13%)
Ruane Cunniff 676,409 sh (-13.70%)
Dodge & Cox 780 sh (-6.02%)
Chris Davis 1,139,761 sh (-23.34%)
John Buckingham 316 sh (-20.60%)
Steve Mandel 577,796 sh (-24.96%)
Andreas Halvorsen 35,751 sh (-93.10%)
Spiros Segalas 1,022,336 sh (-12.79%)
David Carlson 60,000 sh (-24.05%)
Steven Cohen 171,591 sh (-47.62%)
Mario Gabelli 4,228 sh (-0.56%)
Frank Sands 1,829,563 sh (-7.10%)
Signature Select Canadian Fund 4,350 sh (-2.25%)
Philippe Laffont 497,378 sh (-0.84%)
Al Gore 53,716 sh (-56.76%)
» More
Q2 2018

AMZN Guru Trades in Q2 2018

Ray Dalio 1,042 sh (New)
Alan Fournier 5,000 sh (New)
Jeff Auxier 121 sh (New)
Ron Baron 78,871 sh (+6.66%)
Joel Greenblatt 34,371 sh (+17.21%)
Tom Gayner 87,420 sh (+3.19%)
Andreas Halvorsen 160,446 sh (+348.79%)
Spiros Segalas 1,157,647 sh (+13.24%)
Steven Cohen 200,731 sh (+16.98%)
Mairs and Power 606 sh (+3.41%)
Caxton Associates 6,753 sh (+53.48%)
First Pacific Advisors 1,570 sh (+161.67%)
Diamond Hill Capital 423 sh (+7.91%)
Pioneer Investments 266,097 sh (+0.88%)
Julian Robertson 1,000 sh (+100.00%)
Al Gore 55,050 sh (+2.48%)
Dodge & Cox 780 sh (unchged)
John Buckingham 316 sh (unchged)
PRIMECAP Management 308,478 sh (unchged)
Chase Coleman 1,197,150 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 132,800 sh (unchged)
Julian Robertson 1,000 sh (unchged)
Ken Fisher 1,563,076 sh (-15.65%)
Wallace Weitz 11,620 sh (-0.11%)
Ruane Cunniff 482,899 sh (-28.61%)
George Soros 29,900 sh (-32.35%)
Chris Davis 903,022 sh (-20.77%)
Murray Stahl 380 sh (-7.32%)
Steve Mandel 424,704 sh (-26.50%)
David Carlson 57,000 sh (-5.00%)
Paul Tudor Jones 7,994 sh (-62.87%)
Louis Moore Bacon 91,000 sh (-13.69%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 155,253 sh (-9.13%)
Mario Gabelli 4,108 sh (-2.84%)
Leon Cooperman 10,525 sh (-1.08%)
Frank Sands 1,742,337 sh (-4.77%)
Philippe Laffont 343,034 sh (-31.03%)
Jim Simons 183,555 sh (-64.01%)
» More
Q3 2018

AMZN Guru Trades in Q3 2018

Jeremy Grantham 1,600 sh (New)
Ken Fisher 1,569,103 sh (+0.39%)
Tom Gayner 89,320 sh (+2.17%)
Diamond Hill Capital 468 sh (+10.64%)
Mairs and Power 616 sh (+1.65%)
Andreas Halvorsen 185,101 sh (+15.37%)
Pioneer Investments 300,855 sh (+13.06%)
Murray Stahl 546 sh (+43.68%)
Joel Greenblatt 36,118 sh (+5.08%)
Paul Tudor Jones 10,097 sh (+26.31%)
Dodge & Cox 1,030 sh (+32.05%)
PRIMECAP Management 308,478 sh (unchged)
First Pacific Advisors 1,570 sh (unchged)
Chase Coleman 1,197,150 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 144,000 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 30,000 sh (unchged)
Jeff Auxier 121 sh (unchged)
Jim Simons Sold Out
Julian Robertson Sold Out
Alan Fournier Sold Out
Spiros Segalas 1,080,281 sh (-6.68%)
David Carlson 54,000 sh (-5.26%)
Mario Gabelli 4,073 sh (-0.85%)
Chris Davis 730,620 sh (-19.09%)
Wallace Weitz 8,096 sh (-30.33%)
Ray Dalio 467 sh (-55.18%)
Philippe Laffont 272,550 sh (-20.55%)
Frank Sands 1,457,772 sh (-16.33%)
Leon Cooperman 10,100 sh (-4.04%)
Ruane Cunniff 346,141 sh (-28.32%)
Louis Moore Bacon 78,000 sh (-14.29%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 118,295 sh (-23.81%)
Ron Baron 47,563 sh (-39.70%)
George Soros 22,100 sh (-26.09%)
Steve Mandel 348,814 sh (-17.87%)
Steven Cohen 96,138 sh (-52.11%)
Caxton Associates 3,266 sh (-51.64%)
John Buckingham 305 sh (-3.48%)
Al Gore 55,012 sh (-0.07%)
Signature Select Canadian Fund 3,290 sh (-24.37%)
» More
Q4 2018

AMZN Guru Trades in Q4 2018

Richard Snow 600 sh (New)
Ken Fisher 1,620,827 sh (+3.30%)
Mario Gabelli 4,213 sh (+3.44%)
Tom Gayner 89,745 sh (+0.48%)
Wallace Weitz 13,817 sh (+70.66%)
Diamond Hill Capital 539 sh (+15.17%)
PRIMECAP Management 312,678 sh (+1.36%)
First Pacific Advisors 2,217 sh (+41.21%)
Murray Stahl 659 sh (+20.70%)
Andreas Halvorsen 663,784 sh (+258.61%)
Caxton Associates 77,819 sh (+2282.70%)
Philippe Laffont 466,642 sh (+71.21%)
Al Gore 74,343 sh (+35.14%)
Steven Cohen 104,770 sh (+8.98%)
Pioneer Investments 571,086 sh (+89.82%)
Joel Greenblatt 38,014 sh (+5.25%)
Steve Mandel 741,661 sh (+112.62%)
David Carlson 54,000 sh (unchged)
Jeremy Grantham 1,600 sh (unchged)
Mairs and Power 616 sh (unchged)
Dodge & Cox 1,030 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 55,000 sh (unchged)
Ray Dalio Sold Out
Jeff Auxier Sold Out
Paul Tudor Jones Sold Out
Spiros Segalas 1,045,013 sh (-3.26%)
Chris Davis 709,100 sh (-2.95%)
Ruane Cunniff 331,226 sh (-4.31%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 98,428 sh (-16.79%)
Chase Coleman 744,014 sh (-37.85%)
Leon Cooperman 7,500 sh (-25.74%)
Frank Sands 1,384,565 sh (-5.02%)
Louis Moore Bacon 52,950 sh (-32.12%)
Ron Baron 47,529 sh (-0.07%)
George Soros 16,000 sh (-27.60%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with NAS:AMZN

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)

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Impact Price Range
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Change from Average Comment Current Shares
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Business Description

Industry: Retail - Apparel & Specialty » Specialty Retail    NAICS: 454110    SIC: 5961
Compare:NYSE:BABA, NAS:EBAY, NYSE:BBY, NAS:ORLY, SZSE:002024, NYSE:AZO, NAS:MELI, NAS:ULTA, NYSE:GPC, NAS:QRTEA, NYSE:VIPS, TSE:4755, TSX:CTC.A, TSE:3092, NYSE:AAP, HKSE:01528, NAS:TSCO, ADX:ADNOCDIST, XSWX:DUFN, XTER:FIE » details
Traded in other countries:AMZN.Austria, AMZO34.Brazil, AMZN.Chile, AMZ.Germany, AMZ N.Mexico, AMZN.Peru, AMZN.Switzerland, 0R1O.UK,
Headquarter Location:USA
Amazon.com Inc is an online retailer. The Company sells its products through the website which provides services, such as advertising services and co-branded credit card agreements. It also offers electronic devices like Kindle e-readers and Fire tablets.

Amazon is among the world's highest-grossing online retailers, with $178 billion in net sales and $320 billion in estimated GMV in 2017. Online retail sales accounted for 61% of net revenue in 2017, followed by third-party seller services (18%), Amazon Web Services (10%), Prime membership fees and other subscription-based services (6%), Whole Foods and other retail formats (3%), and advertising/cobranded credit cards (3%). International segments totaled 33% of Amazon's non-AWS sales in 2017.

Guru Investment Theses on Amazon.com Inc

Wally Weitz Comments on Amazon - Jan 24, 2018

Our lone portfolio addition, Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN), requires little introduction. Amazon has built an unassailable global competitive advantage in its core retail business, and we believe it will continue to gain worldwide retail (not just e-commerce) market share for many years to come. In addition, Amazon Web Services has also built a significant share in the large and rapidly growing “infrastructure as a service” market. We foresee Amazon’s unique technical capabilities, global scale and culture of customer obsession will allow the company to grow its business value for many years.

From Wallace Weitz (Trades, Portfolio)'s Partner III Opportunity Fund fourth-quarter commentary.

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GAMCO Growth Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Nov 14, 2017

Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) (3.3% of net assets as of September 30, 2017%) (AMZN – $961.35 – NASDAQ) launched in 1995 as an online book retailer and has evolved into a dominant e-commerce platform. CEO Jeff Bezos guides the company on customer obsession rather than competitor focus and is long-term oriented. Amazon’s competitive advantage within e-commerce is Amazon Prime, which benefits from a virtuous cycle as the continuously expanding selection of inventory drives traffic, which attracts more sellers, who add yet more selection. Amazon continues to invest in the Prime value proposition (free and faster shipping, free video and music streaming, libraries of free books and magazines, and a host of other benefits). Prime members spend more than non-Prime customers and their purchasing volume tends to increase over time. In addition to its retailing operations, Amazon pioneered the concept of hyperscale public cloud with its Amazon Web Services (AWS) and continues to be the dominant market share leader within that rapidly growing industry.



From GAMCO Growth Fund third quarter 2017 commentary.



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Chris Davis Comments on Amazon - Aug 09, 2017

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN), an e-commerce giant that has profoundly reshaped the retail industry over the years, is another example of a market leader in the Portfolio. Borrowing a concept from Costco, Amazon offers an optional membership-based business model through its Amazon Prime service. In addition to its retail business, Amazon has a state-of-the-art, rapidly growing web services business that enables companies and other organizations to outsource their computer systems to Amazon’s digital cloud.


From Chris Davis (Trades, Portfolio)' Davis Opportunity Fund 2017 semi-annual report.

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FPA Capital Comments on Amazon - Jul 28, 2017

For the second quarter, as mentioned earlier, large-capitalized stocks performed better than small-cap stocks. The NASDAQ was the best performer, helped by the gain achieved by the omnipresent Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) and other mega-cap technology stocks. While different styles generally have some dispersion in returns from quarter to quarter, this past period was very dramatic. We expect this wide dispersion in returns to narrow in the future.

In last quarter’s letter, we discussed the trend of investors allocating more of their capital to passive strategies like index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and away from active managers. AMZN and other stocks in the S&P 500 are where the large flows of capital have headed. It is worth noting that the 2017 ETF inflows, depicted below, are through the middle of June, so we are on pace to double the record inflows experienced last year.

Currently, passive investors own roughly 15% of AMZN’s equity through index funds, ETFs and the like— or roughly $70 billion worth of AMZN’s value. They hold nearly 18% if you exclude what Jeff Bezos owns. A decade ago, passive investors owned just a few percent of Amazon’s stock. Because index funds and ETFs buy and sell stocks in their respective index, or sector, based solely on flows of money into and out of their funds, by nature these passive strategies are indifferent to valuations—including outrageously over-valued securities. Obviously, AMZN is a dominant web retailer with a profitable cloud-service segment that is growing rapidly. However, AMZN is trading at 40x EV/EBITDA and 190x EPS. We believe some of AMZN’s rich valuation, and that of other stock’s as well, is attributable to the passive investment strategies’ indifference to valuations. These passive investors and benchmark-hugging active-management strategies are often the marginal buyer and, as mentioned earlier, they do not consider a stock’s valuation as a pre-requisite for buying or selling any security.

We recently analyzed the largest 15 U.S. publicly traded companies by market capitalization and found that the average P/E ratio was 36.3x versus 21.5 for the entire S&P 500 index. Moreover, passive investors own between 13% and 21% of the equity for each of these massive companies, or an average 17% ownership rate. Interestingly, just like with Amazon, passive investors owned just a few percent of each of these companies a decade ago.

We also found that the volatility, using the average five-year beta as a volatility proxy, of the 15 largest mega-cap companies in the S&P 500 in aggregate was identical to the market itself. The smallest market cap companies by decile of the S&P 500, on the other hand, had on average a beta 30% higher than the index.

This difference in volatility makes sense, and the following example illustrates why. Assume an active small-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position was a 5% weighting of a $1 billion market-cap company. Therefore, the manager has a $100 million investment in the company, which represents a 10% ownership stake. Depending on how fast the position is liquidated, the sale of 10% of the shares outstanding could have a very substantial impact on the price of the security. On the other hand, if an active large-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position is also a 5% weighting, but of a $200 billion market-cap stock, the impact on price will be negligible. The reason is that the manager’s largest position would represent only 0.5% of the company’s value. Clearly, we believe that there is an enormous difference in selling one-half of 1% of a company versus 10%, which often leads to greater volatility.

We believe the mega-cap’s lower volatility is also a significant factor in attracting capital from passive strategies, as well as capital from active-management strategies that are trying to keep up with the benchmarks. As more capital flows into these mega-cap stocks, the valuation for most of them becomes richer. Thus, the lower volatility of these mega-caps feeds a self-perpetuating cycle of more money being funneled into these mega-cap equities, which then helps drive the return of the passive strategies.



From FPA Capital's second quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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David Rolfe Comments on Amazon - Jul 17, 2017

We certainly follow Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) with great interest, and have owned shares in the past, however we struggle to understand how its $470 billion enterprise value can be justified by future profitability – let alone current profits, at just $2.6 billion trailing 12-month net income. Looking at comparably sized businesses, for example, Apple, first eclipsed $470 billion enterprise value in the midst of generating $40 billion in GAAP net income over a 12-month period (fiscal 2012) and went on to post another $220 billion in cumulative GAAP net income, since. Alphabet, also a portfolio holding, only recently eclipsed $470 billion EV in 2015, in the middle of $16 billion in bottom-line value creation, and then posted another nearly $20 billion in GAAP income, a year later. Clearly, Apple and Alphabet are both growing businesses that have substantial, and consistent profit generating value propositions.3 In addition, and more importantly, the reinvestment requirements to maintain those profits appear to be substantially lower than what Amazon apparently requires. According to Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO:

“We get to monetize in a very unusual way. When [Amazon] wins a Golden Globe, it helps us sell more shoes.”

This sounds not far from the strategy brands have been executing for decades in endorsing celebrities and athletes (i.e., content) to sell more products. What is unusual, relative to brands, is that Amazon doesn’t appear to have the high levels of merchandise margins available to produce television content that wins Golden Globes. So, maintaining a high-cost fly-wheel that monetizes by selling commodity products (Amazon Prime) – or makes a market for others to sell commodity products (Amazon Fulfillment) – makes us very skeptical that Amazon’s retail unit can generate the magnitude of long- term profits we think are necessary to justify today’s enterprise value. Using our best estimates, we believe Amazon currently holds less than 2% market share of U.S. retail sales, using the U.S. Department of Commerce’s definition of retail sales, excluding cars and fuel. The exact share and/or exact definition of the size of the market is not particularly important; the relevant point, to us, is that the absolute share is not significant. Even if we assume, for example, that Amazon quintuples its U.S. market share, that would leave 90% of the U.S. retail market up for grabs. We think that investors and retailers alike obviously must be aware of Amazon – now, and for the last 10-15 years, for that matter – but both also should be aware of the size of the opportunity to be found in the substantial portions of the market where Amazon is not. As we consider our own retail exposure, we take the same approach: we have not invested in traditional retailers in suburban malls pursuing business-as-usual strategies; rather, our holdings have differentiated models based upon non-traditional buying strategies (T.J. Maxx, Ross Stores) or upon targeting underserved rural populations with merchandise assortments that are often difficult for, or unattractive to, competitors (Tractor Supply Company). These companies have taken a thoughtful approach to their operations and to their competitive position in relation to online retail, and they have found ways to remain relevant. Finally, we would point out that Amazon just wrote a $14 billion check to Whole Foods to admit, very publicly and very clearly, that online retail is not as suitable in some categories as it is in others, and this was after they tried to do it their own way for ten years.



From David Rolfe (Trades, Portfolio)'s Wedgewood Partners second-quarter 2017 shareholder letter.

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Baron Opportunity Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Apr 20, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer and cloud services provider, rose during the first quarter after the company reported strong financial results. Amazon continues to benefit from its flywheel strategy, where more participation from Prime members drives greater loyalty and purchasing on Amazon.com. Indeed, according to recent surveys, Amazon captured 53% of U.S. e-commerce sales growth in 2016 (EMarketer, Inc.) and a full 55% of U.S. online shoppers begin their product discovery right on Amazon’s site (Activate Tech and Media Outlook). Moreover, Amazon is the world’s dominant provider of cloud computing services, with its Amazon Web Services (AWS) segment achieving an over $14 billion run rate and still growing almost 50%. We believe AWS will be a significant incremental contributor to Amazon’s overall value creation. Finally, the company also continues to invest in new and potentially large business opportunities, such as TV content, voice-controlled services (Echo and Alexa), digital advertising, e-finance, business supplies and apparel. (Ashim Mehra)



From the Baron Opportunity Fund first quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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Chase Coleman Trims Amazon, Alibaba Positions, Sells Apple Guru's largest sales of the 4th quarter
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Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
PE Ratio 87.52
AMZN's PE Ratio is ranked lower than
96% of the 724 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 19.95 vs. AMZN: 87.52 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 143.72 Max: 3732.43
Current: 87.52
25.94
3732.43
Forward PE Ratio 60.24
AMZN's Forward PE Ratio is ranked lower than
98% of the 195 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 17.89 vs. AMZN: 60.24 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward PE Ratio only.
N/A
PE Ratio without NRI 87.52
AMZN's PE Ratio without NRI is ranked lower than
96% of the 727 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 19.89 vs. AMZN: 87.52 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio without NRI only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio without NRI Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 143.72 Max: 3732.43
Current: 87.52
25.94
3732.43
Price-to-Owner-Earnings 47.76
AMZN's Price-to-Owner-Earnings is ranked lower than
91% of the 440 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 19.71 vs. AMZN: 47.76 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Owner-Earnings only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Owner-Earnings Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.59  Med: 51.56 Max: 91.74
Current: 47.76
12.59
91.74
PB Ratio 19.86
AMZN's PB Ratio is ranked lower than
97% of the 952 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.63 vs. AMZN: 19.86 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PB Ratio only.
AMZN' s PB Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 6.46  Med: 14.96 Max: 28.01
Current: 19.86
6.46
28.01
PS Ratio 3.78
AMZN's PS Ratio is ranked lower than
93% of the 951 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.68 vs. AMZN: 3.78 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PS Ratio only.
AMZN' s PS Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.9  Med: 2.2 Max: 4.81
Current: 3.78
0.9
4.81
Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow 51.02
AMZN's Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
95% of the 437 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 18.20 vs. AMZN: 51.02 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.53  Med: 50.56 Max: 555.04
Current: 51.02
15.53
555.04
Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow 28.70
AMZN's Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
91% of the 552 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 10.71 vs. AMZN: 28.70 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.45  Med: 27.26 Max: 45.76
Current: 28.7
12.45
45.76
EV-to-EBIT 68.14
AMZN's EV-to-EBIT is ranked lower than
96% of the 758 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 14.76 vs. AMZN: 68.14 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.9  Med: 97.85 Max: 2797.9
Current: 68.14
15.9
2797.9
EV-to-EBITDA 30.83
AMZN's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
90% of the 794 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 11.82 vs. AMZN: 30.83 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.2  Med: 34.5 Max: 50.7
Current: 30.83
12.2
50.7
EV-to-Revenue 3.71
AMZN's EV-to-Revenue is ranked lower than
92% of the 961 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.77 vs. AMZN: 3.71 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-Revenue only.
AMZN' s EV-to-Revenue Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.8  Med: 2.1 Max: 4.8
Current: 3.71
0.8
4.8
PEG Ratio 1.89
AMZN's PEG Ratio is ranked lower than
66% of the 320 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.07 vs. AMZN: 1.89 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG Ratio only.
AMZN' s PEG Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1  Med: 3.93 Max: 192.89
Current: 1.89
1
192.89
Shiller PE Ratio 442.83
AMZN's Shiller PE Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 321 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 18.09 vs. AMZN: 442.83 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s Shiller PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 146.97  Med: 339.23 Max: 3461.75
Current: 442.83
146.97
3461.75
Current Ratio 1.10
AMZN's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
76% of the 972 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.63 vs. AMZN: 1.10 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
AMZN' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.04  Med: 1.33 Max: 3.09
Current: 1.1
1.04
3.09
Quick Ratio 0.85
AMZN's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
57% of the 972 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.94 vs. AMZN: 0.85 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
AMZN' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.75  Med: 1.04 Max: 2.89
Current: 0.85
0.75
2.89
Days Inventory 32.77
AMZN's Days Inventory is ranked higher than
84% of the 938 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 83.79 vs. AMZN: 32.77 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
AMZN' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 32.77  Med: 37.91 Max: 40.1
Current: 32.77
32.77
40.1
Days Sales Outstanding 26.14
AMZN's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked lower than
58% of the 932 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 16.10 vs. AMZN: 26.14 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
AMZN' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 14.71  Med: 22.15 Max: 27.01
Current: 26.14
14.71
27.01
Days Payable 80.49
AMZN's Days Payable is ranked higher than
61% of the 925 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 52.44 vs. AMZN: 80.49 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
AMZN' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 80.49  Med: 90.05 Max: 110.64
Current: 80.49
80.49
110.64

Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio -1.40
AMZN's 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio is ranked lower than
55% of the 568 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: -0.70 vs. AMZN: -1.40 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -7.5  Med: -1.7 Max: -0.5
Current: -1.4
-7.5
-0.5

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price-to-Tangible-Book 34.75
AMZN's Price-to-Tangible-Book is ranked lower than
98% of the 871 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.91 vs. AMZN: 34.75 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Tangible-Book only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Tangible-Book Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 10.6  Med: 28.4 Max: 225.6
Current: 34.75
10.6
225.6
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF 6.04
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF is ranked lower than
95% of the 558 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.23 vs. AMZN: 6.04 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.72  Med: 4.51 Max: 246.06
Current: 6.04
1.72
246.06
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) 8.18
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) is ranked lower than
100% of the 101 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.16 vs. AMZN: 8.18 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 6.97  Med: 17.74 Max: 63.2
Current: 8.18
6.97
63.2
Price-to-Median-PS-Value 1.72
AMZN's Price-to-Median-PS-Value is ranked lower than
90% of the 854 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.00 vs. AMZN: 1.72 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Median-PS-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Median-PS-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.53  Med: 1.12 Max: 11.74
Current: 1.72
0.53
11.74
Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value 3.50
AMZN's Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value is ranked lower than
95% of the 185 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.36 vs. AMZN: 3.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.35  Med: 4.19 Max: 33.6
Current: 3.5
1.35
33.6
Price-to-Graham-Number 11.62
AMZN's Price-to-Graham-Number is ranked lower than
100% of the 619 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.36 vs. AMZN: 11.62 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Graham-Number only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Graham-Number Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.03  Med: 12.56 Max: 29.39
Current: 11.62
4.03
29.39
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % 1.47
AMZN's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
74% of the 988 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.31 vs. AMZN: 1.47 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.1  Med: 1.1 Max: 6.3
Current: 1.47
0.1
6.3
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % 21.05
AMZN's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % is ranked higher than
89% of the 595 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.78 vs. AMZN: 21.05 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % only.
AMZN' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 19.7  Med: 21.1 Max: 24.1
Current: 21.05
19.7
24.1

More Statistics

Revenue (TTM) (Mil) $232,887.00
EPS (TTM) $ 20.13
Beta1.63
Volatility34.59%
52-Week Range $1307.00 - 2050.50
Shares Outstanding (Mil)491.20

Analyst Estimate

Dec19 Dec20 Dec21
Revenue (Mil $) 275,312 325,378 376,521
EBIT (Mil $) 19,399 26,256 37,993
EBITDA (Mil $) 39,906 49,328 58,706
EPS ($) 28.53 40.50 51.22
EPS without NRI ($) 28.53 40.50 51.22
EPS Growth Rate
(Future 3Y To 5Y Estimate)
33.01%
Dividends per Share ($)

Piotroski F-Score Details

Piotroski F-Score: 77
Positive ROAY
Positive CFROAY
Higher ROA yoyY
CFROA > ROAY
Lower Leverage yoyY
Higher Current Ratio yoyY
Less Shares Outstanding yoyN
Higher Gross Margin yoyY
Higher Asset Turnover yoyN

» More Articles for NAS:AMZN

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