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Also traded in: Austria, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Mexico, Peru, Switzerland, UK

GuruFocus Financial Strength Rank measures how strong a company’s financial situation is. It is based on these factors

1. The debt burden that the company has as measured by its Interest coverage (current year).
2. Debt to revenue ratio. The lower, the better
3. Altman Z-score.

A company ranks high with financial strength is likely to withstand any business slowdowns and recessions.

Financial Strength : 6/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Cash-to-Debt 2.79
AMZN's Cash-to-Debt is ranked higher than
63% of the 940 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.95 vs. AMZN: 2.79 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Cash-to-Debt only.
AMZN' s Cash-to-Debt Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0  Med: 1.57 Max: No Debt
Current: 2.79
Equity-to-Asset 0.26
AMZN's Equity-to-Asset is ranked lower than
82% of the 929 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.49 vs. AMZN: 0.26 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Equity-to-Asset only.
AMZN' s Equity-to-Asset Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -1.08  Med: 0.22 Max: 0.72
Current: 0.26
-1.08
0.72
Debt-to-Equity 0.33
AMZN's Debt-to-Equity is ranked higher than
59% of the 707 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.46 vs. AMZN: 0.33 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Debt-to-Equity only.
AMZN' s Debt-to-Equity Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -23.89  Med: 0.33 Max: 255
Current: 0.33
-23.89
255
Interest Coverage 6.50
AMZN's Interest Coverage is ranked lower than
70% of the 795 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 28.32 vs. AMZN: 6.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Interest Coverage only.
AMZN' s Interest Coverage Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.85  Med: 8.58 Max: 36.05
Current: 6.5
0.85
36.05
Piotroski F-Score: 6
Altman Z-Score: 6.27
Beneish M-Score: -3.08
WACC vs ROIC
10.25%
24.83%
WACC
ROIC
GuruFocus Profitability Rank ranks how profitable a company is and how likely the company’s business will stay that way. It is based on these factors:

1. Operating Margin
2. Trend of the Operating Margin (5-year average). The company with an uptrend profit margin has a higher rank.
••3. Consistency of the profitability
4. Piotroski F-Score
5. Predictability Rank•

The maximum rank is 10. A rank of 7 or higher means a higher profitability and may stay that way. A rank of 3 or lower indicates that the company has had trouble to make a profit.

Profitability Rank is not directly related to the Financial Strength Rank. But if a company is consistently profitable, its financial strength will be stronger.

Profitability & Growth : 8/10

vs
industry
vs
history
Operating Margin % 2.31
AMZN's Operating Margin % is ranked lower than
56% of the 941 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.50 vs. AMZN: 2.31 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Operating Margin % only.
AMZN' s Operating Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.2  Med: 2.59 Max: 4.61
Current: 2.31
0.2
4.61
Net Margin % 1.28
AMZN's Net Margin % is ranked lower than
55% of the 942 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.26 vs. AMZN: 1.28 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Net Margin % only.
AMZN' s Net Margin % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.27  Med: 1.53 Max: 3.68
Current: 1.28
-0.27
3.68
ROE % 9.76
AMZN's ROE % is ranked higher than
74% of the 923 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 6.44 vs. AMZN: 9.76 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROE % only.
AMZN' s ROE % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -2.35  Med: 11.58 Max: 58.48
Current: 9.76
-2.35
58.48
ROA % 2.48
AMZN's ROA % is ranked higher than
55% of the 947 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.82 vs. AMZN: 2.48 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROA % only.
AMZN' s ROA % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -0.51  Med: 3.03 Max: 8.78
Current: 2.48
-0.51
8.78
ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % 12.60
AMZN's ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % is ranked higher than
54% of the 944 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 12.91 vs. AMZN: 12.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s ROC (Joel Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.71  Med: 23.22 Max: 147.4
Current: 12.6
0.71
147.4
3-Year Revenue Growth Rate 20.60
AMZN's 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate is ranked higher than
93% of the 794 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.20 vs. AMZN: 20.60 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Revenue Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 16.8  Med: 28.85 Max: 304.2
Current: 20.6
16.8
304.2
3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate 45.50
AMZN's 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate is ranked higher than
93% of the 684 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.50 vs. AMZN: 45.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year EBITDA Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.7  Med: 32.4 Max: 220.1
Current: 45.5
15.7
220.1
3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate 102.50
AMZN's 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate is ranked higher than
97% of the 606 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.50 vs. AMZN: 102.50 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate only.
AMZN' s 3-Year EPS without NRI Growth Rate Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -43.3  Med: 42.55 Max: 318.6
Current: 102.5
-43.3
318.6
GuruFocus has detected 3 Warning Signs with Amazon.com Inc $AMZN.
More than 500,000 people have already joined GuruFocus to track the stocks they follow and exchange investment ideas.
» AMZN's 30-Y Financials

Financials (Next Earnings Date: 2017-10-27 Est.)


Revenue & Net Income
Cash & Debt
Operating Cash Flow & Free Cash Flow
Operating Cash Flow & Net Income

» Details

Guru Trades

Q3 2016

AMZN Guru Trades in Q3 2016

George Soros 39,510 sh (+215.15%)
Tom Gayner 34,000 sh (+74.36%)
Eric Mindich 56,800 sh (+35.89%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 470,358 sh (+33.58%)
Pioneer Investments 490,197 sh (+22.64%)
John Griffin 407,900 sh (+18.92%)
Frank Sands 2,498,277 sh (+5.04%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 35,800 sh (+1.13%)
Wallace Weitz 500 sh (unchged)
First Eagle Investment 917 sh (unchged)
Dodge & Cox 1,055 sh (unchged)
PRIMECAP Management 291,238 sh (unchged)
Mairs and Power 384 sh (unchged)
John Burbank 16,000 sh (unchged)
Joel Greenblatt Sold Out
John Hussman Sold Out
Robert Karr 3,988 sh (-0.05%)
Ken Fisher 1,977,341 sh (-0.37%)
Ron Baron 75,849 sh (-1.33%)
David Carlson 130,000 sh (-7.14%)
Chase Coleman 1,342,548 sh (-8.30%)
Chris Davis 2,031,382 sh (-9.13%)
Diamond Hill Capital 433 sh (-9.41%)
Andreas Halvorsen 2,929,305 sh (-10.66%)
Murray Stahl 519 sh (-13.93%)
Steve Mandel 1,292,728 sh (-21.36%)
Louis Moore Bacon 97,955 sh (-26.42%)
Jeremy Grantham 20,000 sh (-33.33%)
Signature Select Canadian Fund 6,400 sh (-39.05%)
Mario Gabelli 6,432 sh (-56.75%)
Jim Simons 102,555 sh (-56.92%)
Steven Cohen 266,668 sh (-60.00%)
Caxton Associates 4,500 sh (-77.09%)
Paul Tudor Jones 336 sh (-91.03%)
John Burbank 209 sh (-99.75%)
Spiros Segalas 2,088,624 sh (-4.17%)
» More
Q4 2016

AMZN Guru Trades in Q4 2016

Ruane Cunniff 447,506 sh (New)
Leon Cooperman 20,000 sh (New)
Wallace Weitz 12,460 sh (+2392.00%)
Caxton Associates 11,350 sh (+152.22%)
Diamond Hill Capital 823 sh (+90.07%)
Pioneer Investments 714,471 sh (+45.75%)
Tom Gayner 46,000 sh (+35.29%)
Mairs and Power 445 sh (+15.89%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 541,938 sh (+15.22%)
PRIMECAP Management 309,638 sh (+6.32%)
Murray Stahl 549 sh (+5.78%)
Chase Coleman 1,381,929 sh (+2.93%)
Ken Fisher 2,002,724 sh (+1.28%)
First Eagle Investment 917 sh (unchged)
Steve Mandel 1,292,728 sh (unchged)
David Carlson 130,000 sh (unchged)
Robert Karr Sold Out
Jeremy Grantham Sold Out
Steven Cohen Sold Out
Paul Tudor Jones Sold Out
Jim Simons Sold Out
Stanley Druckenmiller Sold Out
Eric Mindich Sold Out
John Burbank Sold Out
Mario Gabelli 6,327 sh (-1.63%)
Dodge & Cox 1,005 sh (-4.74%)
Chris Davis 1,911,921 sh (-5.88%)
Frank Sands 2,287,389 sh (-8.44%)
John Griffin 361,700 sh (-11.33%)
Ron Baron 56,481 sh (-25.53%)
George Soros 28,100 sh (-28.88%)
Andreas Halvorsen 1,626,269 sh (-44.48%)
Spiros Segalas 1,911,684 sh (-8.47%)
» More
Q1 2017

AMZN Guru Trades in Q1 2017

John Paulson 5,500 sh (New)
John Hussman 5,000 sh (New)
Steven Cohen 19,518 sh (New)
Paul Tudor Jones 7,904 sh (New)
Jim Simons 329,255 sh (New)
Stanley Druckenmiller 71,100 sh (New)
John Burbank 1,174 sh (New)
Ron Baron 73,518 sh (+30.16%)
Tom Gayner 59,000 sh (+28.26%)
Mairs and Power 485 sh (+8.99%)
Pioneer Investments 763,353 sh (+6.84%)
PRIMECAP Management 317,588 sh (+2.57%)
Ken Fisher 2,024,756 sh (+1.10%)
John Griffin 362,100 sh (+0.11%)
Wallace Weitz 12,460 sh (unchged)
First Eagle Investment 917 sh (unchged)
George Soros Sold Out
Steve Mandel Sold Out
Ruane Cunniff 441,116 sh (-1.43%)
Chase Coleman 1,353,000 sh (-2.09%)
Leon Cooperman 19,400 sh (-3.00%)
Frank Sands 2,180,434 sh (-4.68%)
Dodge & Cox 955 sh (-4.98%)
Chris Davis 1,728,229 sh (-9.61%)
David Carlson 115,000 sh (-11.54%)
Murray Stahl 483 sh (-12.02%)
Mario Gabelli 5,152 sh (-18.57%)
Signature Select Canadian Fund 4,450 sh (-30.47%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 372,345 sh (-31.29%)
Andreas Halvorsen 1,090,507 sh (-32.94%)
Louis Moore Bacon 58,183 sh (-40.60%)
Diamond Hill Capital 460 sh (-44.11%)
Caxton Associates 2,500 sh (-77.97%)
Spiros Segalas 1,716,360 sh (-10.22%)
» More
Q2 2017

AMZN Guru Trades in Q2 2017

George Soros 7,500 sh (New)
Lee Ainslie 4,150 sh (New)
John Buckingham 481 sh (New)
Paul Tudor Jones 85,867 sh (+986.37%)
John Burbank 12,209 sh (+939.95%)
Steven Cohen 102,664 sh (+426.00%)
Caxton Associates 7,350 sh (+194.00%)
Stanley Druckenmiller 120,003 sh (+68.78%)
John Paulson 7,800 sh (+41.82%)
Tom Gayner 70,000 sh (+18.64%)
Ron Baron 83,616 sh (+13.74%)
First Eagle Investment 1,017 sh (+10.91%)
Murray Stahl 502 sh (+3.93%)
Alan Fournier 75,000 sh (unchged)
Steven Cohen 100,000 sh (unchged)
John Hussman Sold Out
Mairs and Power 475 sh (-2.06%)
Diamond Hill Capital 436 sh (-5.22%)
PRIMECAP Management 298,978 sh (-5.86%)
Wallace Weitz 11,660 sh (-6.42%)
Dodge & Cox 880 sh (-7.85%)
Louis Moore Bacon 53,500 sh (-8.05%)
Chase Coleman 1,242,880 sh (-8.14%)
Ruane Cunniff 402,054 sh (-8.86%)
Jim Simons 299,555 sh (-9.02%)
Chris Davis 1,550,760 sh (-10.27%)
Frank Sands 1,954,735 sh (-10.35%)
Ken Fisher 1,700,511 sh (-16.01%)
Pioneer Investments 581,957 sh (-23.76%)
David Carlson 82,000 sh (-28.70%)
Mario Gabelli 3,312 sh (-35.71%)
Andreas Halvorsen 618,046 sh (-43.32%)
Leon Cooperman 10,500 sh (-45.88%)
Manning & Napier Advisors, Inc 195,912 sh (-47.38%)
John Griffin 118,400 sh (-67.30%)
Spiros Segalas 1,414,503 sh (-17.59%)
» More
» Details

Insider Trades

Latest Guru Trades with AMZN

(List those with share number changes of more than 20%, or impact to portfolio more than 0.1%)

GuruDate Trades Impact to Portfolio Price Range * (?) Current Price Change from Average Current Shares
Ken Fisher 2017-06-30 Reduce -16.01%0.48%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%1,700,511
Chris Davis 2017-06-30 Reduce -10.27%0.68%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%1,550,760
Ruane Cunniff 2017-06-30 Reduce -8.86%0.33%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%402,054
Ron Baron 2017-06-30 Add 13.74%0.05%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%83,616
Tom Gayner 2017-06-30 Add 18.64%0.23%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%70,000
Wallace Weitz 2017-06-30 Reduce -6.42%0.03%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%11,660
Leon Cooperman 2017-06-30 Reduce -45.88%0.32%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%10,500
John Paulson 2017-06-30 Add 41.82%0.03%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%7,800
George Soros 2017-06-30 New Buy0.16%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%7,500
Mario Gabelli 2017-06-30 Reduce -35.71%0.01%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%3,312
First Eagle Investment 2017-06-30 Add 10.91%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%1,017
Dodge & Cox 2017-06-30 Reduce -7.85%$884.67 - $1011.34 $ 958.331%880
Ken Fisher 2017-03-31 Add 1.10%0.03%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%2,024,756
Chris Davis 2017-03-31 Reduce -9.61%0.6%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%1,728,229
Ruane Cunniff 2017-03-31 Reduce -1.43%0.04%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%441,116
Ron Baron 2017-03-31 Add 30.16%0.08%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%73,518
Tom Gayner 2017-03-31 Add 28.26%0.26%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%59,000
Leon Cooperman 2017-03-31 Reduce -3.00%0.02%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%19,400
John Paulson 2017-03-31 New Buy0.07%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%5,500
Mario Gabelli 2017-03-31 Reduce -18.57%0.01%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%5,152
Dodge & Cox 2017-03-31 Reduce -4.98%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%955
Steve Mandel 2017-03-31 Sold Out 5.06%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%0
George Soros 2017-03-31 Sold Out 0.69%$753.67 - $886.54 $ 958.3315%0
Ken Fisher 2016-12-31 Add 1.28%0.03%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%2,002,724
Chris Davis 2016-12-31 Reduce -5.88%0.44%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%1,911,921
Ruane Cunniff 2016-12-31 New Buy3.15%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%447,506
Ron Baron 2016-12-31 Reduce -25.53%0.09%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%56,481
Tom Gayner 2016-12-31 Add 35.29%0.22%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%46,000
George Soros 2016-12-31 Reduce -28.88%0.35%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%28,100
Leon Cooperman 2016-12-31 New Buy0.66%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%20,000
Wallace Weitz 2016-12-31 Add 2392.00%0.36%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%12,460
Mario Gabelli 2016-12-31 Reduce -1.63%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%6,327
Dodge & Cox 2016-12-31 Reduce -4.74%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%1,005
Robert Karr 2016-12-31 Sold Out 0.66%$719.07 - $844.36 $ 958.3322%0
Chris Davis 2016-09-30 Reduce -9.13%0.64%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%2,031,382
Ken Fisher 2016-09-30 Reduce -0.37%0.01%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%1,977,341
Steve Mandel 2016-09-30 Reduce -21.36%1.16%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%1,292,728
Ron Baron 2016-09-30 Reduce -1.33%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%75,849
George Soros 2016-09-30 Add 215.15%0.83%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%39,510
Tom Gayner 2016-09-30 Add 74.36%0.31%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%34,000
Mario Gabelli 2016-09-30 Reduce -56.75%0.04%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%6,432
Robert Karr 2016-09-30 Reduce -0.05%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%3,988
Joel Greenblatt 2016-09-30 Sold Out 0.06%$725.68 - $837.31 $ 958.3325%0
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Business Description

Industry: Retail - Apparel & Specialty » Specialty Retail    NAICS: 454111    SIC: 5961
Compare:NAS:EBAY, NAS:ORLY, NYSE:BBY, NYSE:AZO, NAS:ULTA, NYSE:GPC, NAS:QVCA, NAS:TSCO, NYSE:AAP, NYSE:W, NAS:SPLS, NYSE:KAR, NYSE:CAB, NYSE:WSM, NAS:BBBY, NAS:MIK, NYSE:DKS, NAS:FIVE, NYSE:SBH, NYSE:MUSA » details
Traded in other countries:AMZN.Austria, AMZO34.Brazil, AMZN.Chile, AMZ.Germany, AMZ N.Mexico, AMZN.Peru, AMZN.Switzerland, 0R1O.UK,
Headquarter Location:USA
Amazon.com Inc is an online retailer. The Company sells its products through the website which provides services, such as advertising services and co-branded credit card agreements. It also offers electronic devices like Kindle e-readers and Fire tablets.

Amazon is among the world's highest-grossing online retailers, with $136 billion in net sales and $245 billion in estimated GMV in 2016. Media products account for 18% of sales, and electronics and other general merchandise make up 72%. The other 10% is derived from Amazon Web Services ($12.2 billion in 2016), advertising, and cobranded credit cards. International segments totaled 32% of sales in 2016. In June 2017, the company announced its intention to acquire Whole Foods.

Guru Investment Theses on Amazon.com Inc

Chris Davis Comments on Amazon - Aug 09, 2017

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN), an e-commerce giant that has profoundly reshaped the retail industry over the years, is another example of a market leader in the Portfolio. Borrowing a concept from Costco, Amazon offers an optional membership-based business model through its Amazon Prime service. In addition to its retail business, Amazon has a state-of-the-art, rapidly growing web services business that enables companies and other organizations to outsource their computer systems to Amazon’s digital cloud.


From Chris Davis (Trades, Portfolio)' Davis Opportunity Fund 2017 semi-annual report.

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FPA Capital Comments on Amazon - Jul 28, 2017

For the second quarter, as mentioned earlier, large-capitalized stocks performed better than small-cap stocks. The NASDAQ was the best performer, helped by the gain achieved by the omnipresent Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) and other mega-cap technology stocks. While different styles generally have some dispersion in returns from quarter to quarter, this past period was very dramatic. We expect this wide dispersion in returns to narrow in the future.

In last quarter’s letter, we discussed the trend of investors allocating more of their capital to passive strategies like index funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and away from active managers. AMZN and other stocks in the S&P 500 are where the large flows of capital have headed. It is worth noting that the 2017 ETF inflows, depicted below, are through the middle of June, so we are on pace to double the record inflows experienced last year.

Currently, passive investors own roughly 15% of AMZN’s equity through index funds, ETFs and the like— or roughly $70 billion worth of AMZN’s value. They hold nearly 18% if you exclude what Jeff Bezos owns. A decade ago, passive investors owned just a few percent of Amazon’s stock. Because index funds and ETFs buy and sell stocks in their respective index, or sector, based solely on flows of money into and out of their funds, by nature these passive strategies are indifferent to valuations—including outrageously over-valued securities. Obviously, AMZN is a dominant web retailer with a profitable cloud-service segment that is growing rapidly. However, AMZN is trading at 40x EV/EBITDA and 190x EPS. We believe some of AMZN’s rich valuation, and that of other stock’s as well, is attributable to the passive investment strategies’ indifference to valuations. These passive investors and benchmark-hugging active-management strategies are often the marginal buyer and, as mentioned earlier, they do not consider a stock’s valuation as a pre-requisite for buying or selling any security.

We recently analyzed the largest 15 U.S. publicly traded companies by market capitalization and found that the average P/E ratio was 36.3x versus 21.5 for the entire S&P 500 index. Moreover, passive investors own between 13% and 21% of the equity for each of these massive companies, or an average 17% ownership rate. Interestingly, just like with Amazon, passive investors owned just a few percent of each of these companies a decade ago.

We also found that the volatility, using the average five-year beta as a volatility proxy, of the 15 largest mega-cap companies in the S&P 500 in aggregate was identical to the market itself. The smallest market cap companies by decile of the S&P 500, on the other hand, had on average a beta 30% higher than the index.

This difference in volatility makes sense, and the following example illustrates why. Assume an active small-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position was a 5% weighting of a $1 billion market-cap company. Therefore, the manager has a $100 million investment in the company, which represents a 10% ownership stake. Depending on how fast the position is liquidated, the sale of 10% of the shares outstanding could have a very substantial impact on the price of the security. On the other hand, if an active large-cap manager with $2 billion in assets is fired, and the manager’s largest position is also a 5% weighting, but of a $200 billion market-cap stock, the impact on price will be negligible. The reason is that the manager’s largest position would represent only 0.5% of the company’s value. Clearly, we believe that there is an enormous difference in selling one-half of 1% of a company versus 10%, which often leads to greater volatility.

We believe the mega-cap’s lower volatility is also a significant factor in attracting capital from passive strategies, as well as capital from active-management strategies that are trying to keep up with the benchmarks. As more capital flows into these mega-cap stocks, the valuation for most of them becomes richer. Thus, the lower volatility of these mega-caps feeds a self-perpetuating cycle of more money being funneled into these mega-cap equities, which then helps drive the return of the passive strategies.



From FPA Capital's second quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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David Rolfe Comments on Amazon - Jul 17, 2017

We certainly follow Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) with great interest, and have owned shares in the past, however we struggle to understand how its $470 billion enterprise value can be justified by future profitability – let alone current profits, at just $2.6 billion trailing 12-month net income. Looking at comparably sized businesses, for example, Apple, first eclipsed $470 billion enterprise value in the midst of generating $40 billion in GAAP net income over a 12-month period (fiscal 2012) and went on to post another $220 billion in cumulative GAAP net income, since. Alphabet, also a portfolio holding, only recently eclipsed $470 billion EV in 2015, in the middle of $16 billion in bottom-line value creation, and then posted another nearly $20 billion in GAAP income, a year later. Clearly, Apple and Alphabet are both growing businesses that have substantial, and consistent profit generating value propositions.3 In addition, and more importantly, the reinvestment requirements to maintain those profits appear to be substantially lower than what Amazon apparently requires. According to Jeff Bezos, Amazon CEO:

“We get to monetize in a very unusual way. When [Amazon] wins a Golden Globe, it helps us sell more shoes.”

This sounds not far from the strategy brands have been executing for decades in endorsing celebrities and athletes (i.e., content) to sell more products. What is unusual, relative to brands, is that Amazon doesn’t appear to have the high levels of merchandise margins available to produce television content that wins Golden Globes. So, maintaining a high-cost fly-wheel that monetizes by selling commodity products (Amazon Prime) – or makes a market for others to sell commodity products (Amazon Fulfillment) – makes us very skeptical that Amazon’s retail unit can generate the magnitude of long- term profits we think are necessary to justify today’s enterprise value. Using our best estimates, we believe Amazon currently holds less than 2% market share of U.S. retail sales, using the U.S. Department of Commerce’s definition of retail sales, excluding cars and fuel. The exact share and/or exact definition of the size of the market is not particularly important; the relevant point, to us, is that the absolute share is not significant. Even if we assume, for example, that Amazon quintuples its U.S. market share, that would leave 90% of the U.S. retail market up for grabs. We think that investors and retailers alike obviously must be aware of Amazon – now, and for the last 10-15 years, for that matter – but both also should be aware of the size of the opportunity to be found in the substantial portions of the market where Amazon is not. As we consider our own retail exposure, we take the same approach: we have not invested in traditional retailers in suburban malls pursuing business-as-usual strategies; rather, our holdings have differentiated models based upon non-traditional buying strategies (T.J. Maxx, Ross Stores) or upon targeting underserved rural populations with merchandise assortments that are often difficult for, or unattractive to, competitors (Tractor Supply Company). These companies have taken a thoughtful approach to their operations and to their competitive position in relation to online retail, and they have found ways to remain relevant. Finally, we would point out that Amazon just wrote a $14 billion check to Whole Foods to admit, very publicly and very clearly, that online retail is not as suitable in some categories as it is in others, and this was after they tried to do it their own way for ten years.



From David Rolfe (Trades, Portfolio)'s Wedgewood Partners second-quarter 2017 shareholder letter.

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Baron Opportunity Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Apr 20, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer and cloud services provider, rose during the first quarter after the company reported strong financial results. Amazon continues to benefit from its flywheel strategy, where more participation from Prime members drives greater loyalty and purchasing on Amazon.com. Indeed, according to recent surveys, Amazon captured 53% of U.S. e-commerce sales growth in 2016 (EMarketer, Inc.) and a full 55% of U.S. online shoppers begin their product discovery right on Amazon’s site (Activate Tech and Media Outlook). Moreover, Amazon is the world’s dominant provider of cloud computing services, with its Amazon Web Services (AWS) segment achieving an over $14 billion run rate and still growing almost 50%. We believe AWS will be a significant incremental contributor to Amazon’s overall value creation. Finally, the company also continues to invest in new and potentially large business opportunities, such as TV content, voice-controlled services (Echo and Alexa), digital advertising, e-finance, business supplies and apparel. (Ashim Mehra)



From the Baron Opportunity Fund first quarter 2017 shareholder letter.



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Baron Opportunity Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 21, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer and cloud services provider, declined in the fourth quarter. The company reported disappointing operating margins and guidance below Street expectations driven primarily by investments in India and abroad. In addition to India, Amazon is investing in several growth initiatives, including Amazon studios, Alexa (voice interface), Amazon Web Services and distribution center expansions. We see the company as the leading retail and cloud provider globally, and believe it possesses both deep moats and expansive addressable markets in both of these areas. (Ashim Mehra)



From Baron Funds' Baron Opportunity Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Baron Funds' Fifth Avenue Growth Fund Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 13, 2017

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), declined 10% during the fourth quarter. After a streak of stellar quarterly earnings reports, which showed meaningful margin and profitability upside, Amazon reported mixed results with operating margins and guidance slightly below Street’s heightened expectations driven by weaker retail margins and investments in India and abroad. Amazon is continuing to invest heavily in several growth initiatives, including Amazon studios, Alexa, India, Amazon Web Services, and distribution and fulfilment center expansions. We see the company as the undisputed global leader in the two, secularly growing, multi-trillion dollar markets of e-commerce and cloud computing, and it remains our highest conviction long-term investment idea.



From Baron Funds' Fifth Avenue Growth Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Ruane Cunniff Comments on Amazon - Feb 07, 2017

In the fall, we exited our small position in Walmart and replaced it with a similarly small position in Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN). The company’s e-commerce operation (Amazon.com) and its cloud computing platform (Amazon Web Services) are two of the most advantaged businesses we’ve analyzed in quite some time. Both are growing fast and have miles of runway ahead of them. And they are run by arguably the most talented, customer-focused and long term-oriented businessman of his generation.

At a consolidated level, Amazon produces very little in the way of reported profits. Amazon Web Services, whose financials are disclosed separately, earns very rich margins, but the larger e-commerce business reports scant earnings. Our research indicates that the company’s e-commerce business has substantial earnings power that is being masked by a variety of ambitious growth investments. The Fund purchased shares at what we believe to be a reasonable multiple of underlying earnings power excluding those investments. Estimating the long-term potential of Amazon’s many investments is an inherently imprecise exercise, which is why the investment thus far has been a small one.


From Ruane Cunniff (Trades, Portfolio)'s Sequoia Fund 4th quarter shareholder letter.


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Weitz Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Jan 26, 2017

Amazon.com (NASDAQ:AMZN) is an e-commerce and cloud computing company. We believe that Amazon has built a global competitive advantage that will allow it to obtain a material share of the worldwide retail (not just e-commerce) market over a long period of organic growth. Amazon’s strong, customer-obsessed culture is unique among technology and retail firms, which has provided several new long-term investment opportunities. In addition to the retail business, the company’s Amazon Web Service (AWS) business has built significant share and scale within the infrastructure as a service market. AWS business is highly profitable and participates in a large and growing market.



From Weitz Investment Management's Value Fund fourth quarter 2016 commentary.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com Inc. - Oct 25, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest online retailer and cloud services provider, rose in the third quarter after reporting strong revenue growth (28% year-over-year) and improving margins in its core e-commerce business. Amazon’s other major business segment, Amazon Web Services (AWS), the disruptive cloud computing offering, continues to gain traction with enterprise customers, and had another strong quarter of growth (58% year-over-year in currency-neutral dollars). Given our belief that the shift in enterprise IT spending has passed the tipping point towards cloud computing, we expect AWS to be an even larger contributor to value creation than Amazon’s core e-commerce segment. (Ashim Mehra)







From Baron Opportunity Fund third-quarter 2016 commentary.



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David Funds Comments on Amazon - Aug 31, 2016

Adaptability not only results in pricing power but also the ability to create new markets. Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) provides a prime example. Looking back at Amazon’s humble beginnings in 1994, clearly one of the reasons the company became the world’s largest bookseller was that Amazon created entirely new markets. The Kindle E-reader was not only a product innovation but also a business model innovation. Printing and shipping costs suddenly disappeared, combining improved convenience for consumers with higher profits for Amazon. Company founder Jeff Bezos and his team then proved they would not be satisfied to sit on their laurels by parlaying their expertise in cloud computing, gained from running their retail business, to an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) business for third parties. Thus, was born Amazon Web Services (AWS), which reached $10 billionin sales even faster than Amazon’s retail business and which one day might surpass the retail segment in size.7





From David Global Fund Semi-Annual Review 2016.



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Spiros Segalas Comments on Amazon - Aug 18, 2016

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) continues to invest to drive unit growth in its core retail business and through the proliferation of digital commerce via the mobile market. The stock has benefited as investors have shown an increased appreciation for Amazon’s strong execution, long-term revenue growth, margin-expansion potential, and development of a second meaningfully important business opportunity in cloud infrastructure. Earnings and revenue in the most recently reported quarter exceeded expectations, as did company estimates for future quarters.



From Spiros Segalas' second quarter 2015 Focus Fund commentary.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Jul 13, 2016

Ask your typical investor to name the Walmart online, and many will reflexively say Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) In one very narrow sense, we agree with that description. Amazon has been successful at attaining its original goal. Last year, it became the fastest company to reach $100 billion in annual sales, and it is now the world’s largest online retailer. But we think of Amazon as much more than that.



Take, for instance, Amazon Web Services, the cloud computing business that reached $10 billion in annual sales last year – a pace faster than the original Amazon. There’s also Amazon Prime, with 60 to 80 million members, the Kindle and other electronic devices, streaming videos with proprietary original content, and an online marketplace used by more than 70,000 third-party sellers. Amazon Logistics Services is starting to compete in the trillion-dollar freight industry. Most recently, it introduced its grocery delivery service AmazonFresh. Practically every month, it seems, Amazon unveils a new innovation, product, or service.



So what, exactly, is Amazon? We think Amazon has built an online/ digital service platform enabled by massively scalable IT and an unparalleled logistics infrastructure. This infrastructure enables Amazon to be not only the biggest online retailer, but also the largest public cloud service provider, a leading streaming service provider and digital content seller, and a major provider of fulfillment (and advertising) services to third-party retailers.



In addition to the lack of an obvious comparable and the mischaracterization of its business, Amazon’s stock has been subject to an over-emphasis on short-term results. We invested in Amazon in 2009, when the company had never turned a profit, because it was reinvesting in future growth. Amazon ignored its critics (as it always has) and continued to innovate, experiment, and place large bets against conventional wisdom. The stock has increased more than two and a half times since we first invested. Amazon remains our highest conviction investment idea.



From Baron Funds' Summer 2016 Newsletter.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - May 23, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN), the world’s largest retailer, declined in the first quarter despite reporting strong revenue growth likely due to retail margins being lower than anticipated. Amazon has responded by instituting substantial fulfillment and supply chain fee increases for merchants on the platform. We estimate that these fee increases should start to alleviate the recent pressure on retail margins in the upcoming quarters. Amazon’s other major business segment, Amazon Web Services (AWS) continues to gain traction with enterprise customers, and over time, we expect AWS to be the larger contributor to value creation for the company.



From Baron Fifth Avenue Growth Fund first quarter commentary 2016.



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Meridian Funds Comments on Amazon.com Inc. - Mar 08, 2016

Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) continues to move the needle on many fronts, including cloud computing. Amazon Web Services (AWS), which rents computing power and storage for corporate customers, is the leader in this space and continues to strengthen its competitive advantage through major feature releases, more data centers, and price cuts for several of its services. Although AWS recently announced annual revenue growth of approximately 60% and a profit margin of greater than 50%, we believe this segment of the business has much more room to grow. Another positive development for the stock was a significant shift in consumer buying trends during the holiday season as more people chose to do their shopping in the e-commerce marketplace rather than in bricks-and-mortar stores. This shift helped Amazon exceed earning expectations during the third quarter.



From the Meridian Equity Income Fund fourth quarter commentary.



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Eddie Lampert Comments on Amazon - Feb 26, 2016

Companies like Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) were able to grow rapidly without having to collect sales tax, while traditional retail companies had the dual disadvantages of having to report profits and to collect sales tax from their customers. While it is true that Amazon’s customers, by law, were required to calculate and pay sales tax in states that required it, many commentators conveniently ignored these laws in their coverage of Amazon and the state and local authorities did little to enforce the existing laws. The consequence? We are now seeing more and more retail stores shut down and the tax base of many municipalities eroding due to the hollowing out of the sales tax base as the Wall Street Journal recently reported. Even the largest and most successful retailers, like Walmart, are shuttering stores all over the world.

From Edward Lampert (Trades, Portfolio)'s 2015 annual letter for Sears Holdings.

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Investor Chris Davis Comments on Amazon - Feb 18, 2016

Today technology is accelerating the pace of disruption. This change is best seen by contrasting the history of a past disrupter Walmart with a new disrupter Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN). Walmart opened its first store in 1962 and, with its everyday low pricing model, strong management and tight cost control, enjoyed real competitive advantages relative to the much larger and better regarded existing competition. Eighteen years later, the company reached $1 billion in sales and today has sales approaching $500 billion, dwarfing its competitors such as Kmart and Sears that have largely been left in the dust. In contrast, Amazon has disrupted entrenched competitors in a matter of years not decades. Remembering Walmart took 18 years to reach sales of $1 billion, we consider it astonishing that Amazon was selling approximately $95 billion worth of merchandise in its 18th year, almost 100 times more than Walmart sold during the comparable period in its history.

With Amazon achieving success at such a rapid pace, investors who were slow to study the company because of its short operating history not only missed out on its potential as an investment but also were slow to identify the threat it posed to so many other retailers. Companies ranging from Borders and Blockbuster to Circuit City and RadioShack have already filed for bankruptcy and many more are sure to follow. While extraordinary, Amazon is hardly a lone example. Companies such as Google, Netflix and Facebook have overpowered many traditional media businesses, Uber and AirBNB are challenging the taxi and hotel industries, and a number of new companies are using biotechnology to challenge traditional pharmaceutical businesses. The bottom line is technological disruption is rapidly changing the investment landscape, creating great opportunities for investors who can adapt and enormous risks for investors who cannot.



From Chris Davis (Trades, Portfolio)' New York Venture Fund 4th quarter 2015 commentary.

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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 15, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) underwent a major re-rating in 2015 as the stock appreciated 118% amid a flat market return environment. Better financial disclosures around Amazon’s cloud computing business, Amazon Web Services (AWS), led to the realization that the business is significantly larger, growing faster, and is already very profitable. AWS is estimated to have between 80% and 85% market share of all workloads that are being run in the cloud. The penetration of cloud-based workloads is less than 5% today and we believe it is poised for continued rapid growth. In the meantime, the core retail business is firing on all cylinders. During the Christmas holiday week alone, Amazon added three million new Prime members and shipped packages from 110 countries to customers located in 185 countries, with 70% of the orders coming from mobile devices. We believe that Amazon’s structural competitive advantages are strengthening with tens of millions of Prime members solidifying its grip on e-commerce, the unrivaled distribution footprint facilitating significant gains in third-party business, and AWS’s scale and dominance as a new computing platform creating and adding to the very meaningful benefits of the company’s network effect already in place.





From Baron Funds' Global Advantage Fund letter for the fourth quarter 2015.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com - Feb 08, 2016

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) rose on strong fourth quarter results. Enhanced financial disclosures demonstrated that Amazon Web Services (AWS) was more profitable than investors anticipated. Rapid growth in the retail and AWS businesses boosted confidence in the company’s growth plans. With e-commerce comprising just 10% of global retail sales, we believe the shift to online retailing represents a multi-year growth opportunity. We also believe that, over time, the nascent AWS cloud computing opportunity will account for the majority of Amazon’s value. (Ashim Mehra)



From the Baron Funds Opportunity Fund fourth quarter 2015 commentary.



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Weitz Funds Comments on Amazon - Jan 25, 2016

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) is an e-commerce and cloud computing company. While the company’s retail business is seemingly ubiquitous, we believe that Amazon has built a considerable and globally- competitive advantage that will successfully challenge for significant share of the worldwide retail (not just e-commerce) market. The company has a long runway of growth ahead; Amazon’s strong, customer- obsessed culture is unique among technology and retail firms, and its long-term investment philosophy allows for a continuous flow of new product ideas. In addition to the retail business, the company’s Amazon Web Service business has built significant share and scale within the infrastructure as a service sector of technology. This business is highly profitable and participates in a large and growing market.





From the Weitz Funds' Research Fund shareholder letter for fourth quarter 2015.



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Bill Nygren Comments on Amazon - Jan 08, 2016

We eliminated our Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) stake during the quarter, as the stock’s rapid climb in 2015 brought the shares up to our estimate of intrinsic value. While our holding period for Amazon (first purchased in the Fund in the second quarter of 2014) was much shorter than is typical for us, we’ve always said that turnover is simply a byproduct of the length of time required for price to converge with value. We’ll happily show high turnover when it is the result of rapid stock price appreciation. We reinvested the Amazon proceeds across existing holdings, ending the quarter with investments in 19 companies; the Fund generally holds about 20 positions.



From Oakmark Select Fund's fourth quarter 2015 commentary.



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Bill Nygren Comments on Amazon - Jan 08, 2016

Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN) has been a great holding for the Fund, and with the share price more than doubling in 2015, we believe the business is now fairly valued. With minimal reported earnings and a very high P/E ratio, Amazon may have looked like an unusual purchase for a value-based fund when we initiated a position in April 2014. We looked past reported earnings, which were tempered by large investments for future growth, and found that the scale and core earnings power of Amazon’s business were quite impressive and under-appreciated.



From Oakmark Fund's fourth quarter 2015 commentary.



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Baron Funds Comments on Amazon.com Inc. - Nov 10, 2015

Shares of Amazon.com, Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN) rose after the company reported another better-than-anticipated quarter. Having recently disclosed that Amazon Web Services (AWS) was more profitable than many investors anticipated, the continued growth in both the retail and AWS business provided investors with greater confidence in the company’s future growth plans. With e-commerce representing around 10% of global retail sales, we believe the structural shift to online retailing represents a multi-year growth opportunity for Amazon.



From Baron Opportunity Fund's third quarter 2015 letter.



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GAMCO Investors Comments on Amazon.com Inc. - Oct 19, 2015

Amazon.com Inc. (NASDAQ:AMZN)(3.6%) (AMZN – $511.89 – NASDAQ) opened on the World Wide Web in July 1995. The company is guided by four principles: customer obsession rather than competitor focus, passion for invention, commitment to operational excellence, and long-term thinking. Customer reviews, 1-Click shopping, personalized recommendations, Prime, Fulfillment by Amazon, AWS, Kindle Direct Publishing, Kindle, Fire phone, Fire tablets, Fire TV and Amazon Echo are some of the products and services pioneered by Amazon.





From GAMCO's Growth Fund third quarter 2015 commentary.



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Ratios

vs
industry
vs
history
PE Ratio 243.24
AMZN's PE Ratio is ranked lower than
96% of the 705 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 20.25 vs. AMZN: 243.24 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 102.88 Max: 3732.43
Current: 243.24
25.94
3732.43
Forward PE Ratio 84.75
AMZN's Forward PE Ratio is ranked lower than
100% of the 155 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 14.58 vs. AMZN: 84.75 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward PE Ratio only.
N/A
PE Ratio without NRI 243.24
AMZN's PE Ratio without NRI is ranked lower than
96% of the 708 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 20.25 vs. AMZN: 243.24 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PE Ratio without NRI only.
AMZN' s PE Ratio without NRI Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 25.94  Med: 102.88 Max: 3732.43
Current: 243.24
25.94
3732.43
Price-to-Owner-Earnings 49.30
AMZN's Price-to-Owner-Earnings is ranked lower than
82% of the 433 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 20.35 vs. AMZN: 49.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Owner-Earnings only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Owner-Earnings Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.59  Med: 44.54 Max: 89.84
Current: 49.3
12.59
89.84
PB Ratio 19.83
AMZN's PB Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 908 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.67 vs. AMZN: 19.83 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PB Ratio only.
AMZN' s PB Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 6.46  Med: 14.96 Max: 89.2
Current: 19.83
6.46
89.2
PS Ratio 3.11
AMZN's PS Ratio is ranked lower than
88% of the 913 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.70 vs. AMZN: 3.11 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PS Ratio only.
AMZN' s PS Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.9  Med: 2.1 Max: 3.4
Current: 3.11
0.9
3.4
Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow 50.81
AMZN's Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
88% of the 381 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 15.71 vs. AMZN: 50.81 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Free-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.53  Med: 45.41 Max: 555.04
Current: 50.81
15.53
555.04
Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow 26.87
AMZN's Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow is ranked lower than
85% of the 474 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 10.26 vs. AMZN: 26.87 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Operating-Cash-Flow Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 12.45  Med: 26.86 Max: 39.92
Current: 26.87
12.45
39.92
EV-to-EBIT 117.25
AMZN's EV-to-EBIT is ranked lower than
95% of the 737 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 14.76 vs. AMZN: 117.25 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBIT only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBIT Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 15.3  Med: 84.2 Max: 2797.9
Current: 117.25
15.3
2797.9
EV-to-EBITDA 33.69
AMZN's EV-to-EBITDA is ranked lower than
86% of the 779 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 11.75 vs. AMZN: 33.69 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-EBITDA only.
AMZN' s EV-to-EBITDA Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 11.9  Med: 34.1 Max: 50.7
Current: 33.69
11.9
50.7
EV-to-Revenue 2.97
AMZN's EV-to-Revenue is ranked lower than
86% of the 933 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.78 vs. AMZN: 2.97 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful EV-to-Revenue only.
AMZN' s EV-to-Revenue Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.8  Med: 2 Max: 3.3
Current: 2.97
0.8
3.3
PEG Ratio 5.96
AMZN's PEG Ratio is ranked lower than
72% of the 292 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 2.04 vs. AMZN: 5.96 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful PEG Ratio only.
AMZN' s PEG Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.8  Med: 3.38 Max: 192.89
Current: 5.96
0.8
192.89
Shiller PE Ratio 550.97
AMZN's Shiller PE Ratio is ranked lower than
99% of the 255 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 18.75 vs. AMZN: 550.97 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Shiller PE Ratio only.
AMZN' s Shiller PE Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 146.97  Med: 288.67 Max: 3461.75
Current: 550.97
146.97
3461.75
Current Ratio 1.01
AMZN's Current Ratio is ranked lower than
76% of the 929 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.64 vs. AMZN: 1.01 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Current Ratio only.
AMZN' s Current Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.89  Med: 1.41 Max: 7.57
Current: 1.01
0.89
7.57
Quick Ratio 0.73
AMZN's Quick Ratio is ranked lower than
56% of the 929 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 0.92 vs. AMZN: 0.73 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Quick Ratio only.
AMZN' s Quick Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.54  Med: 1.09 Max: 7.34
Current: 0.73
0.54
7.34
Days Inventory 40.91
AMZN's Days Inventory is ranked higher than
79% of the 884 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 90.95 vs. AMZN: 40.91 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Inventory only.
AMZN' s Days Inventory Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 31.84  Med: 41.93 Max: 47.23
Current: 40.91
31.84
47.23
Days Sales Outstanding 19.56
AMZN's Days Sales Outstanding is ranked lower than
57% of the 754 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 14.40 vs. AMZN: 19.56 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Sales Outstanding only.
AMZN' s Days Sales Outstanding Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 14.71  Med: 19.41 Max: 23.37
Current: 19.56
14.71
23.37
Days Payable 81.42
AMZN's Days Payable is ranked higher than
68% of the 701 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 50.04 vs. AMZN: 81.42 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Days Payable only.
AMZN' s Days Payable Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 81.42  Med: 104.29 Max: 110.64
Current: 81.42
81.42
110.64

Buy Back

vs
industry
vs
history
3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio -1.30
AMZN's 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio is ranked lower than
57% of the 505 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: -0.50 vs. AMZN: -1.30 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio only.
AMZN' s 3-Year Average Share Buyback Ratio Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: -18.6  Med: -2.25 Max: -0.5
Current: -1.3
-18.6
-0.5

Valuation & Return

vs
industry
vs
history
Price-to-Tangible-Book 24.26
AMZN's Price-to-Tangible-Book is ranked lower than
97% of the 839 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.94 vs. AMZN: 24.26 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Tangible-Book only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Tangible-Book Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 9.69  Med: 22.98 Max: 6424
Current: 24.26
9.69
6424
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF 6.12
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF is ranked lower than
93% of the 523 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.25 vs. AMZN: 6.12 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-Projected-FCF Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.72  Med: 4.64 Max: 246.06
Current: 6.12
1.72
246.06
Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) 22.73
AMZN's Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) is ranked lower than
97% of the 93 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.14 vs. AMZN: 22.73 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Intrinsic-Value-DCF (Earnings Based) Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 14.27  Med: 36.04 Max: 104.21
Current: 22.73
14.27
104.21
Price-to-Median-PS-Value 1.49
AMZN's Price-to-Median-PS-Value is ranked lower than
80% of the 830 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.06 vs. AMZN: 1.49 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Median-PS-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Median-PS-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.34  Med: 1.09 Max: 15.21
Current: 1.49
0.34
15.21
Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value 9.73
AMZN's Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value is ranked lower than
97% of the 173 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.50 vs. AMZN: 9.73 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Peter-Lynch-Fair-Value Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.13  Med: 3.68 Max: 188.39
Current: 9.73
1.13
188.39
Price-to-Graham-Number 16.20
AMZN's Price-to-Graham-Number is ranked lower than
99% of the 612 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 1.49 vs. AMZN: 16.20 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Price-to-Graham-Number only.
AMZN' s Price-to-Graham-Number Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 4.01  Med: 13.87 Max: 114.71
Current: 16.2
4.01
114.71
Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % 0.85
AMZN's Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % is ranked lower than
74% of the 952 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 5.23 vs. AMZN: 0.85 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % only.
AMZN' s Earnings Yield (Greenblatt) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 0.1  Med: 1.2 Max: 6.6
Current: 0.85
0.1
6.6
Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % 44.34
AMZN's Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % is ranked higher than
97% of the 554 Companies
in the Global Specialty Retail industry.

( Industry Median: 3.68 vs. AMZN: 44.34 )
Ranked among companies with meaningful Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % only.
AMZN' s Forward Rate of Return (Yacktman) % Range Over the Past 10 Years
Min: 1.8  Med: 27.8 Max: 62.6
Current: 44.34
1.8
62.6

More Statistics

Revenue (TTM) (Mil) $150,124.00
EPS (TTM) $ 3.94
Beta1.38
Short Percentage of Float1.23%
52-Week Range $710.10 - 1083.31
Shares Outstanding (Mil)480.38

Analyst Estimate

Dec17 Dec18 Dec19 Dec20
Revenue (Mil $) 173,116 209,868 246,413 296,917
EPS ($) 7.09 12.41 19.54 28.97
EPS without NRI ($) 7.09 12.41 19.54 28.97
EPS Growth Rate
(Future 3Y To 5Y Estimate)
28.37%
Dividends per Share ($)
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